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Abstract / Resumo 
 
This thesis addresses the concept of indifference and its moral implications – 
indifference to other people, indifference to ourselves and indifference to what is 
around us. The thesis begins with an argument that considers the connections between 
the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action, attempting to lay bare, and 
therefore avoid, the pitfalls of reductionist tendencies. The argument is then expanded 
to the topic of political philosophy, showing the heritage of this reductionist thinking 
as a form of personal elimination present in some political theories. At this point, the 
argument turns to the assessment of the moral importance of reciprocity, analyzing 
such notions as to accuse someone, to confess before someone, to forgive someone 
and to help someone. 
 
 
Esta tese consiste numa tentativa de interpretar moralmente o conceito de indiferença 
– ou seja, indiferença em relação a outras pessoas, a nós próprios ou aquilo que nos 
rodeia. A tese começa com um argumento acerca das várias relações entre a filosofia 
da mente e a filosofia da acção, de forma a tentar evidenciar, e evitar, as tendências 
reducionistas inerentes a ambas as disciplinas.  
O argumento é de seguida alargado à filosofia política, de forma a demonstrar que o 
eliminativismo presente em muitas teorias políticas é o justo herdeiro do 
reducionismo anteriormente tratado. A tese oferece no final uma interpretação do 
conceito de reciprocidade, analisando noções morais como as de acusar alguém, 
confessar-se perante alguém, perdoar alguém e ajudar alguém. 
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A Ausência da Indiferença: um resumo 
Esta tese começa por restabelecer a relação entre a filosofia da mente e a 
filosofia da acção. Restabelecer esta ligação, com propriedade, implica construir um 
argumento capaz de apontar as insuficiências de uma putativa separação teórica; isto 
é, implica apontar para as insuficiências de uma forma particular de reducionismo. O 
argumento tenta estabelecer esta forma particular de reducionismo  enquanto uma 
ameaça à apreensão correcta de uma pessoa, assim como das suas acções. O 
argumento é, desta forma, alargado a questões filosóficas sobre identidade pessoal, 
responsabilidade moral e raciocínio prático.  
Este alargamento implica uma revisão de certos conceitos filosóficos; 
conceitos esses que constituem, em larga medida, os vocabulários da filosofia da 
mente e da filosofia da acção. Esta revisão visa devolver um contexto intacto a estes 
conceitos através da explicitação da ameaça reducionista. Por este motivo, é 
necessário oferecer uma explicação daquilo que é obliterado por esta forma de 
reducionismo, isto é, é necessário descrever a saliência moral daquilo que é 
obliterado.  
O argumento aborda, em seguida, a relação entre as acções de um agente em 
particular e a sua identidade pessoal: o seu devir. Esta relação é tratada a partir dos 
conceitos de vocação e impedimento. Neste momento do argumento, torna-se 
necessário abordar alguns conceitos, por exemplo, o conceito de aspiração, como 
tendo uma função vital para a filosofia da mente. A proposta para a expansão do 
vocabulário da filosofia da mente acontece, por isso, devido a uma estrita necessidade 
expressiva e filosófica.  
O conceito de vocação – a dignidade de uma pessoa em particular – serve de 
transição para uma discussão sobre o conceito de dependência e tirania. Discuto em 
primeiro lugar as formas de associação política que visam captar a dignidade de uma 
pessoa em particular sem evitar a sua situação numa sociedade política – 
nomeadamente, o conceito de consciência de classe. Este conceito é interpretado de 
forma a evidenciar a tendência para a eliminação pessoal que herda, de forma 
relevante, o reducionismo anteriormente tratado.   
A ideia de tirania aprece, por sua vez, enquanto a perversão da forma de 
dependência inerente à espécie humana; ou seja, enquanto herdeira de uma forma de 
reducionismo que elimina a vocação individual. As ideias de poder e personalidade 
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são neste momento abordadas, e é oferecida uma justificação para a herança teológica 
destes conceitos. No entanto, a herança teológica é simplesmente reconhecida, e 
aparece neste argumento como subserviente à interpretação filosófica dos textos que 
implicam estes conceitos. Em nenhum momento é feito um tratamento teológico 
exaustivo dos conceitos, em vez disso, o argumento aborda textos filosóficos que 
usam os conceitos de poder e personalidade reiteradamente, tentando, 
sistematicamente, eliminar a sua dívida à teologia.  
O último capítulo aborda o conceito de reciprocidade enquanto principal ideia 
moral, e por isso política, relevante para o restabelecimento de uma forma intacta de 
dependência humana. O argumento oferece uma interpretação da Fenomenologia do 
Espírito de G.W.F. Hegel, que demonstra a importância da revisão feita por Hegel  da 
representação do conceito de virtude a partir da filosofia de Aristóteles. Neste 
momento, o argumento trata de questões como acusar uma outra pessoa, confessar-se 
perante outra pessoa, ajudar e preocupar-se com uma outra pessoa; oferecendo assim 
uma representação inerentemente dialógica, tanto da posse, como da aquisição de 
virtudes.  
O argumento tenta concluir que a ausência de indiferença é a vocação possível 
de ser revelada à espécie humana.  
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The Absence of Indifference 
 
 
The thread that unifies this thesis is the concept of indifference – indifference 
to oneself, indifference to others, indifference to history and, finally, indifference to 
the world around us. This concept is defined in its various aspects as the thesis 
progresses.  
 My notion of indifference occupies a position within a family of concepts that 
is distinctively Hegelian. Indifference is the absence of recognition and it is the aim of 
proper philosophical work to reveal it as a threat. Nevertheless, it is not from Hegel 
that I started this thesis or, for that matter, my thinking.  
The thesis starts with an enquiry concerning the relation between human 
action and the human mind. The first five chapters are a reading of Anscombe’s 
Intention. I have made an effort to read this difficult text as an essay on the 
philosophy of mind, rather than in a more contemporary way, that is, as action theory. 
The reason for this resides in my resistance to use this text as a powerful argument 
inside a contemporary contention concerning the proper definition of an action. My 
intuition since I first encountered this text was, instead, a Wittgensteinian one: The 
text seeks to give a proper context back to the concepts pertaining to the philosophy 
of mind. The path from having intentions to actions is to be understood as a particular 
case of Wittgenstein’s don’t think but look!  
To reestablish this context carries a considerable weight attached to it. Not 
only does a proper conception of an action emerge as an explanation of what it is to 
have an intention, so does a rather substantial notion of agency. Of course, when I say 
that I try to stand to the side of the contemporary discussion surrounding Intention, I 
do not mean to imply that I do so because I find anything wrong with it. Quite to the 
contrary, I do wish to contribute to the present discussion. Nevertheless it is my belief 
that to address the idiom used in Intention is to move from a particular philosophy of 
mind towards an understanding of the place of morality in human life. If I am 
permitted to borrow a notion from Althusser’s reading of Capital, I believe that the 
path from Anscombe’s texts to Anscombe’s philosophy will imply the consideration 
of all the concerns that occupy her in that particular text. 
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For this reason, the first five chapters are mostly occupied with addressing the 
idiom of Intention, working evermore towards a manifest theory of agency. For that 
purpose I often went back to the predecessor of Intention – the Philosophical 
Investigations. I believe that it becomes clear that the way from having intentions to 
actions is paved by a characteristically Wittgensteinian concern: the philosophical 
conception of an autonomous mind and its contents threatens our understanding of the 
place of these ideas in our lives. To reestablish this wider context is to answer 
Anscombe´s starting point for a philosophy of mind, which is to address the 
complexity of all the concepts pertaining to the philosophy of mind in trivial contexts 
so as to avoid the danger of reductionism (being that the sin of reductionism is not its 
explanatory economy and elegance but rather its elimination of what we commonly, 
in a familiar sense, call persons). Therefore, I have everywhere attempted to preserve 
that very Wittgensteinian animus: to think of a human mind is to think of a world and 
a human body. 
This idea qualifies extensively the way my reading of Intention progressed. I 
have read Intention as another example of what Sebastian Rödl called a true 
materialism (his paraphrase of Marx’s non-contemplative materialism).1 And I, too, 
found the expression of such ideas, not only in the Theses on Feuerbach, but also, and 
perhaps in a more systematic way, in the first volume of Capital. The Capital sought 
to capture the actions of a particular mode of production in its wider implications. I 
believe it is no coincidence that the project of the Capital can be described in such 
terms, nor is it that Marx’s attempt in the Theses on Feuerbach is reconcilable with 
Anscombe’s concerns in her essay on the First Person.  
Marxism had trouble in reconciling the optimism its political project demands 
with its revolutionary mode of action. It is therefore no surprise that the eliminativism 
we find in subsequent versions of Marxism is not altogether different from the sort of 
behaviorism Anscombe addresses at the beginning of Intention – there is a family of 
concepts shared by both political philosophy and the philosophy of mind, these are 
concepts pertaining to the topic of human action: prediction, individual, movement, 
etc. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Self-Consciousness, p.122. 
2 ‘Leninism or Marxism’ in Reform or Revolution, pp. 80-82. 
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Section five introduces what I argue is the outcome of a reading of Intention. 
It is also, coextensively, an attempt at making sense of some of the issues Feuerbach 
addressed in The Essence of Christianity.  
A theory of manifest agency ought to address the issues raised by an 
understanding of action that intends to absorb what is revealed by one’s doings. I have 
tried to make apparent how the exercise of our vocations becomes pertinent to a 
complete understanding of our minds. How what we do and who we are is essentially 
connected in a primitive way.  
Feuerbach understood the essential connection between the concept of a 
personal limit and that of one’s existence. But more valuable to me is the context in 
which he established this connection. It is not possible for a person to aspire to be 
someone beyond his own personal limits without incurring a serious personal 
distortion. This being said, I cannot but admit that I do not find this truth particularly 
useful when put to the service of explaining what is supposed to be the false 
conception held by a religious mind regarding what it believes in. Here we are 
reminded of Marx’s Theses: Feuerbach’s contemplative materialism implies a 
contemplative anthropology and psychology. I was therefore concerned with making 
sense of the notion of vocation as containing the concepts of achievement and failure. 
I believe these concepts emerge at the very end of Intention when we are asked to 
understand the moral failure of St. Peter. I have sought to argue that these concepts 
stand as the sine qua non of a personal history, that is, as the essential link between 
personality and action.  
Chapter six starts with an appreciation of the position one occupies in doing 
political and moral philosophy. It became important for me, in the course of the 
present study, to be able to address some of Marx’s ideas in the context of the shift he 
was responsible for in political thinking. This means that the way we can understand 
how he sought to answer a few Aristotelian questions implies a consideration of the 
different point of view he occupied. Aristotle defined an initial position for the 
student of the ethics. Marx sought to understand how valuable it was to be neglected 
by one’s country or political community. I believe these positions are related, but they 
also show valuable contrasts. 
The chapter six continues with a study of the concept of class-consciousness 
as an appropriate way of recovering some of Marx’s moral teachings. I say, 
recovering, because I believe that Marxism has interpreted this concept in a 
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functional, or even, tactical way. This made the concept of class-consciousness the 
disguise for some rather dangerous eliminativistic attitudes that I do not believe to be 
endemic to Marxism. I argue, therefore, that a careful consideration of this concept 
reveals some difficult moral problems for a political community. It is valuable for 
moral philosophy – and hence for political philosophy – to understand how humans 
are capable of forming class-consciousness in virtue of their shared condition and 
outlook on life.  
If not considered as just one more cog in the complex machinery of a Marxist 
conceptual scheme, the concept of class-consciousness, and the conditions in which it 
is formed, reveals a difficult recurring idea political communities have to address: the 
holding of legitimate power. But there is a peculiar moral danger in this: the 
opportunism that comes with the attempt to read the formation and purpose of class-
consciousness as finally revealing a form of dependence upon a party or a leader has 
to be philosophically addressed. In this sense, the history of Marxism cannot be 
ignored. 
I tried to read Lukács’s History and Class Conscioussness with as much 
caution as I could. I know it is not fair to accuse him of the sort of revolutionary 
voluntarism Luxemburg accused Lenin of. 2  But his concept of epistemological 
privilege has, in the end, a function not altogether irrelevant to the legitimation of a 
party as a vanguard. Luxembourg had always, although not explicitly, preserved the 
genuine Hegelian substratum of Marxism: The formation of class-consciousness is 
connected to the notion of alienation; it emerges in a political community that exhibits 
the signs of deterioration. In favor of this particular idea I have sought to criticize 
both Lukács’s idea of an epistemological privilege and his reading of alienation as a 
form of immediacy.  
The animus of a generation is historically bound; and so was the animus of a 
particular generation of Marxist and their opponents. Very often it is rather comical to 
inherit a posture that is not at all concordant with the place we find ourselves in 
history. I believe I have kept my thinking outside pressures of this sort, pressures that, 
very often, strain many readings of Marxism. In my readings of Marx, there is nothing 
but an attempt to understand what seemed to him to be a moral salience manifest in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘Leninism or Marxism’ in Reform or Revolution, pp. 80-82. 
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the most trivial actions that constitute our common lives. I was nowhere preoccupied 
with any allegiance to any form of orthodoxy. 
In chapter seven I have sought to address what I believe is a cue for an entire 
philosophy of reciprocity in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is my point of arrival. 
I address topics such as the abrasive moral perfectionism that comes with the 
arrogance of a generation that believes its political aspiration to be the achievement of 
perfect history. And also, how a political community may not, in virtue of its 
imperfect past, survive without explicit reconciliation – any given political 
community ought to listen to its history as the history of the resentment and joy that 
often accompanies its formation. 
Hegel recognized the Aristotelian necessity of clarifying the conditions under 
which individuals acquire virtue. But he revised this idea in a world where an initial 
position for both individuals and political communities was no longer available. 
Moral philosophy was to learn from history that to ignore that very history was bound 
to lead to evil – the human function is revised as a human vocation.  
This means that the moral vocabulary we use to talk about virtue, and its place 
in human life, has to be able to accommodate such notions as forgiveness, aspiration, 
and moral failure. The history of morality cannot do without addressing the 
emergence of the virtue of charity and its place in human life, nor can political 
philosophy aspire to preserve a common end for a community without the notion of 
reconciliation.  
I found in the Nicomachean Ethics the intuition Hegel expressed at the very 
end of Faith and Knowledge in his quote of Pascal: Philosophy either lost nature 
altogether or exalted it as synonymous with a lost God.3 But the recovery of nature – 
for us, here and now – assumes a different path from the one Aristotle took. We do 
not only find ourselves unable to stomach the idea that slaves are naturally deprived 
of aspiring to a vocation similar to ours, we are prevented by our humility from 
believing that, as McIntyre pointed out, the thief at the cross could not have died 
unlike he lived.  
Aristotle believed that nature sometimes made mistakes in attributing the body 
of a free man to a slave. Such was his conception of a benevolent nature. We, on the 
other hand, cannot but help thinking that it is only we who make such sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Faith and Knowledge, p. 190. 
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mistakes: this is the burden of our history. I have tried to argue that this is a problem 
we cannot avoid, precisely, given our Aristotelianism.  
The reconstruction of a coherent account of the importance of virtue in our 
lives can hardly have the same shape as it did for Aristotle. I have attempted 
throughout to make room, in what I called a moral psychology, for such notions as 
aspiration, failure, redemption, and forgiveness. I do not claim that such notions did 
not have their counterparts in the culture Aristotle belonged to. I have rather simply 
focused on the culture I belong to. Since, I am bound to think about the ethical life I 
have known so far. The problems such notions make for a coherent treatment of 
virtue, and for a proper understanding of what virtue is, are quite present in our recent 
history in the form of philosophical perplexities. I have therefore merely sought to 
understand why, from out of the teleology of a benevolent nature, came the need to 
understand the teleology of aspiration.  
We are nature. Or, perhaps more accurately, we belong to nature. I feel the 
wind pushing against my back when I am walking somewhere, and this wind pushes 
me in a similar manner as it does the dust on the road. The wind does not care about 
the dust, or about me. The wind, the dust, and other animals are here with us. Other 
animals, like us, will perish in nature, while the wind will never cease. We are in 
nature, and yet nature never ceases to give us a sense of threat – it always remains an 
inexhaustible, blind, power. I am nature, but in my condition. And my condition 
imposes a limit upon me.  
As students of the Phenomenology, we are bound to aspire to a position of 
humility and with it we are bound to learn the serenity that can bring us revelation. 
The Spirit we find in the pages of the Phenomenology is, in the many stages of his 
education, often humiliated by a powerful way of the world that recognizes no 
authority in its attempts at wisdom or virtue. Philosophy is to stay the course, and to 
see in the way of the world not its enemy but its friend – such are the demands of 
maturity. 
It is with this ideal of empathy that I read the Phenomenology as providing us 
with the elements of our reciprocal way of living and thus with the higher end of 
virtue. We ought not to be indifferent to others; we ought to worry about others. 
But our history – we ought not to ignore it – puts us in a position where it is already 
too late. There have been too many institutions, economic systems, and political 
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nations that have oppressed, enslaved, and taken advantage of others. For this reason 
we can only restore trust if we are capable of conquering resentment with forgiveness. 
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1. Inner and outer  
 
Concerning a starting point  
1. Put your right hand over your chest and wait until you feel the pulse of your 
heart! This, I believe, is the perennial gesture of philosophy – the attempt to 
apprehend at once the absolute, unconditioned, principle of vitality. But this gesture is 
fraught with uncertainty. As a form of contraction, it is fraught with the danger of 
reduction. I do know that I am not the pulse of my heart. But also, that I wish I had an 
answer to what I am appears to be a primitive imposition to me.  
Our attempt to apprehend ourselves contracts and expands. I mean to say that 
we feel the pulse of our heart and so we know that we are feeling our potentiality, 
which is we know we are feeling our individuality and all that may pertain to it, but 
we also know that we are not there. We are not in the vital pulsation; the vital 
pulsation is in me – it is inside of me. And the closer I try to get to this pulsation, a 
sort of folding unto myself, the more distance I have to put between me and all that I 
depend on, that is, everything else I know is another. This distance I speak of is, of 
course, not positive. It is a distance I postulate in my thinking, a distance I cannot 
sustain the very minute I gaze at the world. And now, my thinking begins to expand, 
it begins to grab on to wherever I am, or to wherever I was born, it tries to bring into 
clarity all that surrounds me, all that threatens me, all that helps me, all those who 
gave me my name and my education, only to contract when I feel lost amongst all that 
is another. And now, there is also my acting:  the way I bring about changes in the 
world, the way I become someone, the way I learn something or practice something, 
the way I act upon others. In one sense, it is the way I keep myself to myself even 
when thrown into the world. And I do not wish to say that I am my actions; I am not 
simply my actions. But I wish to say I become someone through my acting. And I do 
so amongst others, others like me.  
I would like to start here, to start with our actions. And this implies that I 
carefully follow the contraction and expansion of our thinking.  
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I want to consider an expression of such a starting point as a starting point for 
a philosophy of mind. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein notices the 
following perplexity:  
 
It seems paradoxical to us that we should make such a medley, mixing 
physical states and states of consciousness up together in a single report: ‘He 
suffered great torments and tossed about restlessly’. It is quite usual; so why 
do we find it paradoxical? Because we want to say that the sentence deals 
with both tangibles and intangibles at once. –But does it worry you if I say: 
‘These three struts give the building stability’? Are three and stability 
tangible?4 
 
The primary difficulty seems to be the ordering of “tossing about” to the 
“torments” that are felt – from tangible to intangible, Wittgenstein goes on to say.  
I mention this specific order, because we encounter in this presentation of our 
problem the concept of a “report”. It is perhaps useful here to look at Wittgenstein’s 
analogy in detail. The analogy mentions four physical objects – three struts and a 
building – and what seems to be a quality: stability. The concept of stability is ordered 
to the three struts, which are responsible for the stability and this, nonetheless, 
belongs to the building. So, in fact, we have an object, which is the possessor of the 
quality of being stable. It possesses not only the remaining three struts, but also the 
operation performed by these three struts that offers stability.   
We may ask: would we still deploy the concept of building if the three struts 
where removed? The answer is, I think, yes. We would have an unstable building, and 
the way we act towards unstable buildings is quite distinct from the way we act 
towards buildings we identify as stable.  
This last remark is meant as an extension of Wittgenstein’s analogy. In one 
sense, the medley that constitutes our reports of intentional actions seemed to require 
something intangible. To answer the question, “Are three and stability tangible?” we 
could reply positively, as long as we can mention the three struts. Nothing in our 
report ever crosses the boundary of the tangible, and yet our insistence that it does is 
not misguided. Not, however, until we have recovered the intactness of the stable 
building – not until we found our way to the thought that the nature of a thing is 
revealed by its operation; even if what we speak of is a building, not something that 
was once a building and still retains some of its characteristic form (such as the way a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Philosophical Investigations, §420. 
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cadaver still retains some of the form of a living body, although it has lost all the 
grace of its movement, not to mention everything else it has lost).  
Sometimes struts are placed on the outside of a house that is threatening to 
collapse, a provisional solution to maintain the house’s façade. Does this unstable 
house now wear the organ of its stability on its outside? I mean, are the exterior struts 
that push against it from all sides just like the struts that once sustained it? They are 
not the same, of course. They are not the same, because the outside struts are a 
perversion of the functionality of the house, a perversion to what a house is for. And 
here we should not say: sure, these outer struts confer stability, and so did the interior 
ones before they deteriorated; because, a house is not a salvaged house, not ab initio.  
If I tattooed my bone structure on the surface of my skin (like many gang 
members do), could I perhaps be said to be reminding myself of my interior? Or of 
what confers stability to my body? My actual bones are not like the cast I wear when I 
break my leg; they are not what I plaster on the outside of my body in order to fix 
something that now is amiss. But again, does the tattoo remind me of my interior? For 
a gang member, it is a reminder of what he will become; it is a reminder of death, and 
so, in a rather straightforward way, it is a reminder of the absence of an interior. And 
so, this is not at all the interior we are looking for because it is not bones we are 
looking for, nor any other part. We are looking for something that is given to us as a 
totality. 
 
2. The root of this perplexity seems to reside in the possibility of utilizing 
“building” in the construction “unstable building.”  Now, the extension of the analogy 
could consist in describing exactly how we behave towards unstable buildings. One 
thing about them is that they are mostly unsuitable for anything a building is made or 
used for: living and working, for example. Their unsuitability can (and often does), of 
course, come in degrees, but the main reason we treat unstable buildings differently is 
precisely because they threaten to cease being a building at any time. Maybe, if we 
substituted ‘unstable building’ for ‘something that was once a building’ we would 
avoid this difficulty. But our problem is not merely a linguistic problem. The 
possibility of using, intelligibly, that is, intention-dependent concepts in situations 
similar to our ‘unstable building’ is quite familiar. For instance, almost all verbs that 
express an activity have a somnambulistic version. These verbs appear in these 
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special cases in a qualified form as in ‘sleep-walking’ and this qualification is not 
without importance.  
Again, as in the case of the ‘unstable building’, our stance towards these is 
quite different. The problem can be seen as a difficulty in correctly appreciating what 
is happening. Let us consider an example where we see someone driving. The 
application of the active verb ‘driving’ is correct, even in the somnambulistic version 
of it. The driver can be correctly described as controlling the vehicle in a series of co-
ordinate movements.5 The peculiarity of the somnambulistic versions of active verbs 
lies precisely in the fact that the string of co-ordinate movements is identical to the 
normal cases when one does thing fully consciously. Yet, in cases of imputation of 
responsibility, the similarity between the strings of caused movements is discounted, 
and the people involved in appropriately appreciating what happened have to turn 
towards different considerations – a similarity in describable movements is not 
sufficient to establish grounds for the deployment of intention-dependent concepts. A 
familiar temptation emerges here: we have to find the element that, when missing, 
keeps us from correctly referring to normal cases of intentional action. Something has 
gone amiss in our descriptions; something more has to be posited in order to render 
the description into a full-blooded description of an intentional action. This 
temptation emerges quite naturally and it is not without further argument that we can 
even term it as a temptation.  
The argument has stressed a possible characteristic oddity in our expressions 
when we reflect on events that involve someone else’s behavior. This oddity is merely 
a device; it is something to be reversed (we can almost hear the warning: ‘Don’t 
think, look!’ within it). Nonetheless, it generates an artificial distance that leads us to 
appreciate the banality of such a medley outside a philosophical argument. At this 
stage, our second point emerges: the (apparently) correct formal construction of 
somnambulistic versions of active verbs is insufficient, precisely because it is 
formally insufficient.  
The temptation mentioned above would proceed by taking the argument about 
somnambulistic versions as formally sound, as a final statement for the necessity of a 
different course of argument. This new direction might mention a separate item that is 
somehow missing – perhaps, something like the three struts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Acts of the will and responsibility’, in Punishment and Responsibility, p.109. 
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Nevertheless, the argument that follows does not impugn the dignity of a 
concept that is operative in explaining the noted difference in our intuitions about 
normal and non-normal cases. To put it plainly, the mode of explanation has to pay 
attention to much more than just finding the missing link. (In spite of this, we ought 
not to impugn the dignity of such an argument; there is a shared motive for an 
argument like this, even if the premises are not shared). I do not, therefore, wish to 
dispute the bona fide attempt to make causality one such operative term. As for the 
notion of Self-Conscioussness – the notion I intend to further pursue – it cannot be 
treated as an unexplained explainer. This is to say that I will have no concerns 
regarding its epistemic priority, since I believe we ought rather to look at what we do 
– walking, building houses, going to rehearsal, aspiring or failing – in order to find 
out what a human mind is. Any intuition about our application of the concept of 
intentional action and the deployment of intention-dependent concepts will imply the 
conceivability of the idea of Self-Consciousness. Therefore, the idea of Self-
Consciousness is to be explained as required by our banal intuitions – the very 
intuitions that give it content. This approach resists a starting point   that posits a 
formally distinct object, one conceivable along the lines of the three struts, something 
responsible and yet formally distinct from a stable building (a building we treat as a 
building). Self-Conscioussness draws up a stability in our actions as, it is our capacity 
to provide answers to such question as: why we do what we do, how we do what we 
do, and our critical apprehension of what we have done; or, alternatively, now in an 
Aristotelian vocabulary, it defines what being an intact person is. 
Anscombe famously expressed this same intuition by criticizing the notion of 
a “mere extra feature”. Her argument finds fault with a particular conception from our 
first assumptions – the connectedness throughout time of a subjects’ activity and his 
obligation to explain the order of that connectedness – as entering differentially as an 
explanation of what happens: “This (practical knowledge) can seem a mere extra 
feature of events whose description would otherwise be the same, only if we 
concentrate on small sections of action and slips which occur in them”6 
The description of an intentional action is not the description of a 
somnambulistic action. The idea of an extra feature limits our knowledge of what is. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Intention, p. 88. 
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Our common case becomes common by addition and our defective case becomes 
defective by subtraction. But the common case is not like the defective case at all.  
The absence of a limit to our knowledge about what is happening constitutes 
the appeal to our initial intuitions about action. These represent the content of a 
species of knowledge that implies more than mere isolated episodes of reasoning, as 
well as acts of integration of what is otherwise mere theoretical knowledge (theory 
put to the service of practice). Strictly speaking, the process, through which the 
connectedness of the positively referable events emerges, grounds the answerability 
of the agent. In this we find self-consciousness as a unifying principle. 
 
3. The imposition of a limit on our activity, in turn, pushes us toward a 
solution that concentrates only on “small sections.” It can hardly take in all that is 
involved in an entire activity (e.g. becoming a bass player). But why does it only take 
into account small sections? 
One answer is: due to its expressive economy. We have certain bits of 
behavior that are correlated to certain other items, perhaps intangible ones, which suit 
our explanation and is undeniable, that is prima facie undeniable (hence the elegance 
of a theory). To demand more than a local, expressive explanation will require 
defining a species of knowledge and a particular capacity that allows us to suitably 
gain and act based on such knowledge – practical knowledge as practical reasoning.  
A second answer to this imposition of a limit derives from the initial 
plausibility that we might perceive behavior as formally sound when it is anything 
but. To restate the previous argument trying to make apparent the value of the normal 
case is perhaps more than just to insist on a bit of common sense. If there is no 
paradox in our reports, and if the non-normal cases are discernable, we seem to be 
bound to recognize the common case and to be capable of recognizing it without 
having to appeal to defective cases. Therefore, let us introduce a descriptive term in 
order to approach such common cases: in our reports of common cases we 
characterize a power – we apprehend a characteristic power at work. 
This descriptive term is internal to the phenomenology that supports it. In 
shifting our attention to the common case, we shift our attention to the conditions of 
intelligibility revealed through such descriptions. Some of the concepts used in the 
first statement of our problem – tangible and intangible, or external and internal – are 
reflexive. A question relating to the sense of the contrast – interior/exterior – assumes, 
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at least problematically, the intelligibility of the pair. By introducing this descriptive 
term we turn our attention both to the conditions of its use (how we know), and to 
what it renders comprehensible (what is known). This descriptive term functions like 
a dragnet. When we consider cases like Wittgenstein’s example above of someone 
who tosses wildly about, the characterization of a power will work by retaining the 
whole of what is given: the tossing about and why someone is tossing about, etc. So, 
the descriptive term introduced is not meant to be reductive, but to retain everything 
that answers to our interest, proceeding then to a piecemeal understanding of each 
case – this is the dragnet conception of descriptive metaphysics. There is no attempt 
to revise the status of our metaphysical apparatus, but rather to understand our most 
vital actions as a totality.  
We start our investigation by (a) explaining the problematic reflexive 
character of the concepts employed in the characterization of a power; how the 
expression of our reflexive thinking expands and contracts – to the world and to the 
expression of our unmediated thoughts –, and how to apprehend someone doing 
something is, necessarily so, something that allows for reciprocity, (b) how to 
conceive of an individual who possesses such a knowledge, what it is to become 
someone through acting, e.g. to become a musician and (c) the possibility that 
conditions this species of knowledge: connectedness of events involving a subject’s 
behavior throughout time and his liability to provide the explaining order of these; 
practical knowledge and practical reasoning. 
 
The imposition of a limit  
4. Before, I said that Anscombe’s complaint mentions an otherwise absent 
limit. The limit seems to be part of a correlative mode of thinking that renders 
something, that is to be conceived in a thoroughgoing manner, as an extra feature of 
something distinct.  
An argument for the artificiality of this limit may start from a hypothetical 
exercise of actual limiting. Wittgenstein attempted such an exercise. Let us question 
the virtues of such an exercise. This sort of limiting illustrates a certain kind of 
pressure that emerges quiet naturally in philosophical thinking. I mention this only 
because although Wittgenstein once asked himself: “but can’t I imagine that the 
people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the 
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same way as usual?”7 No answer to such a question will resolve the modal difficulty, 
which is the same as saying that, the importance of this question is not relative to its 
possibility, which Wittgenstein does attempt, and equally important that the 
philosophical pressure Wittgenstein’s question addresses is in no way reducible to our 
ability to conceive of such question. And therefore, finally, an affirmative reply to 
Wittgenstein’s question is not what we are after. If this were the case, the 
somnambulistic versions of verbs that express an activity would provide enough 
argument for the notion that what we have to render explained is something quite 
distinct from what we usually explain; after all, the somnambulistic versions are 
actual occurrences.  
What we should ask in turn is if the explanation of this separate item, the item 
that makes the difference, would be the explanation of what we usually call 
intentional action at all; would determining this item be equivalent to the rendering of 
some intentional action explained? To render an intentional action explained is not 
necessarily to define it as such. It is rather to assume it as such, perhaps even on 
grounds of fallible evidence. An explanation that proceeds by positing a separate item 
is a mode of reification – it explains something we wanted explained, but it is not 
what we understand when explaining. It confers autonomy upon the explanation by 
extracting it from the context in which it is used, the context that supports its 
epistemology. If we contrast the two distinct modes of explanation, the difference 
emerges: ‘He is causing his arms to move’/ ‘He is driving’. 
The latter explanation is our preferred mode, because it is our usual point of 
departure. Notwithstanding the fact that these modes of explanation can be conflated, 
it is from a statement like ‘He is driving’ that we usually start. This is the case even 
when we wish to know what the driver has to say about it, and in this starting point 
there is something we do know. 
Therefore, let us conceive of a limit as something that removes some of what 
figures in our usual explanations. What it removes will have to emerge in the course 
of the argument, and this argument will first have to stay away from the sort of 
philosophical pressure we mentioned above. So far, no additional motivation can be 
given for this course of argument, and we cannot say yet what exactly is being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Philosophical Investigations, §420. 
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limited. Instead, let us first mention some direct consequences of attempting to 
enforce a limit of this kind.    
 
5. Most likely, if you try to conceive of everybody around you as an 
automaton “you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless; or, you will 
produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.”8  
To limit our knowledge produces both of these effects. The sense of our 
descriptions dissipates and we cease to feel at home with them. This hypothetical 
limiting of our knowledge exerts a violence that remind us of the dignity of 
considering the normal case – we are quite capable of spotting the normal cases, even 
when we lack a proper determination of what it is we do know.  
This way of thinking can be complemented by considering what is relevant for 
the correct determination of an object in actuality. For instance, in analogy with 
perception, the right determination of a given object will imply more than just its 
shape. Wittgenstein does give us an example involving perception, but his example is, 
again, expressive of a reduction: To see people as automatons/to see the cross-piece 
of a window as a swastika.  
In the context of perception, the reduction is obvious enough so that we should 
clearly understand the one element of the example that is to be preserved. This is, 
namely, that the completion of the object –the cross-piece –is logically prior to its 
being limited and constitutes the possibility condition of its limiting (the swastika). 
Once again the mere possibility of limiting is present, and it has to be shown how this 
would affect its correct determination through perception. One viable answer, which 
fastens on the logical priority of the whole, is to maintain that the real relations of the 
object could not be properly thought, as long as we maintain its cropped version.   
By real relations, I am referring to something like the following: when 
cleaning a window, you have to clean within the edges of the cross-piece; you could 
not treat the cross-piece as a swastika and clean right through the subtracted four 
window edges. This is to show that, in abstraction from the real relations that imply 
the intact object, objectivity cannot be maintained.  
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Again, we have to reconsider the capacity to which we seem to be answerable, 
namely, to apply our concept of intentional action to normal cases. Our exposition 
offers us a new aspect: the idea about real relations provides us with a positively 
signifiable concept. It makes the real whole intelligible in the context of a relation. It 
is implied that when we clean the window, we will, indeed, treat the window as 
having a cross-piece at its center in the same way as it is implied that living and 
working in a building will imply the stability of the building – the tangibility of the 
stability has to be understood in the context of the real relations in which the building 
stands to us; this is what was lacking in our argument: the conception of a relation. 
Self-Consciousness, as that which marks the difference between a normal case 
of intentional action and a somnambulistic version, has to be placed under the same 
sort of consideration. The only thing our hypothetical limiting showed was how the 
relations we usually assume can become ungrounded, and what was intelligible 
became unfamiliar. Still, the reduction to a behavioristic automaton implies its 
association with a notion of interiority – a reflexive concept.  
After all, we can say: that is what marks the difference. The difference did 
produce unfamiliarity in us; if this automaton talks, it can talk at us but not with us. 
This is something we know, and yet our unfamiliarity is not resolved by coming to 
terms with what we perceive in such automatic behavior. Our question is related to 
the unobvious origin of the knowledge of such concepts. One way of putting this 
unobvious character is to call it intangible or otherwise to apply the exercise of 
subtraction to these concepts, which is, in a way, to isolate them from their real 
relations – although only in thought.  If we do not reify this interior, we can maintain 
that its inteligibility is not given to us separately from anything we do know positively 
(even though we do have a conception of this interiority that is beyond its reduction to 
what is outer, supposing that the outer would be stable just anyhow). Let us call it 
something comparatively internal. And let us insist that this idea of something 
comparatively interior necessitates something that is recognizably positive.  
This notion seems at first to be merely negative and an attempt to dilute our 
first intuition about something interior into something outer. But this is only the case 
if the conception is still reminiscent of the initial correlative way of thinking. Instead 
we may try to argue that the knowledge of something positively referable will not 
dilute our initial intuition about the distinctive element missing in somnambulistic 
cases. Contrariwise, it will be an attempt to elucidate the implied amphiboly of this 
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concept – the supposition that the interior could be constructed quite autonomously 
from any positive signification, since it is often felt as missing when anything 
otherwise outer is in place. 
Let us give more content to the idea of something comparatively interior. 
 
Not quantitative interiority – dialogue and dissection 
6. Before, I mentioned our capacity to be answerable to normal cases of 
intentional action. In these cases, nothing beyond our positive signification has to be 
present and this does not have to impugn any intuition about interiority. This very 
intuition is represented in Anscombe’s suggested method of inquiry into intentional 
action, or to which normal cases of intentional action is liable: asking the question 
‘Why?’ To ask this question is already an indication of a wider conception, and 
certainly of a positive relation between an acting subject and somebody else. It 
presupposes at least that the agent’s doings is liable to be questioned (although the 
origin of the question does not have to always spring from the same kind of doubts).  
 
7. The questioning is a method of inquiry. It is representative of a peculiar 
interest two subjects might have in each other’s actions. This is an interest that, 
according to our initial intuition, could figure into our earlier rubric of interior. Before 
saying more about the peculiarity of this method of inquiry, I want to look at an 
opposing method. The reason for this is to negatively work out some important 
aspects pertaining to the preferred method. 
When going to the store, one often has the choice between grapes and seedless 
grapes. The latter ones are indistinguishable from the former. This can be a problem if 
no other indication, price or an ad hoc description, is available. Assuming one could 
interfere with these grapes, your preferred method to distinguish amongst them would 
be to look inside them – to open them up and look for seeds. Doing so would resolve 
your doubts, but it would also allow something else: to numerically discern the seeds. 
If, by chance, you applied your method to seedless grapes, you would discern zero 
seeds.   
The method of dissecting the grapes allows for two distinct results: no seeds or 
seeds, and if so, how many. The point of the inquiry depends on the knowledge of the 
interior of the grape; the concealed interior is what demands the inquiry in the first 
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place. This type of interiority directly opposes the sense of comparative interiority we 
are after.  
One feature of the numerical interiority of the grape is, as said, precisely that it 
allows for zero. It allows for a seedless grape without affecting any of the grape’s real 
relations. The inquiring method of dissecting is an answer to this – comparative 
interiority does not allow for this feature because there is no possibility of its complete 
absence; its absence implies a positive difference in its real relations.  
An equally important feature of comparative interiority is that it also does not 
allow for one to quantitatively discern anything. The question “How many thoughts 
did you have today?” is hardly answerable. Nevertheless, one answer related to this 
question is intuitively possible, since any given subject is in a position to quote some 
of his decisions, choices or resolutions.  
Let us subsume all of these under the concept of conclusion, and imagine an 
opposing concept of mistake. The opposition between both of these concepts can be 
explained as follows: when deciding or choosing, one arrives at a conclusion – the 
conclusion to do A, for instance. This conclusion is liable for a justification, so the 
subject decided to do A, because…. Upon arriving at this conclusion, there is the 
possibility that the subject went through different stages in his reasoning. These stages 
might even have represented stopping points similar to those of a conclusion, but if 
the subject kept thinking, and revised what had crystallized as a conclusion, then these 
can hardly have been conclusions. These were mistakes, since they represented stages 
where the subject had not yet reached the full conclusion of his reasoning. These 
mistakes can represent similar stopping points for the subject, because they afford the 
formation of beliefs. (Both information and misinformation generate beliefs at least in 
the very banal first personal expressive sense: I believe that… uttered by someone 
who is about to be shown the opposite.) And, both conclusions and mistakes may 
persist as beliefs throughout time. This persistence would explain, for instance, why it 
is possible to have several expressions of the same thought throughout time (where 
each expression does not represent a different thought, nor would the persistence of it 
be consciously isomorphic with the stages taken to arrive at such a thought). What 
will complete the because… clause will not necessarily be a description of the various 
stages: you might abbreviate or paraphrase the stages, you might not quote all the 
mistakes you made, you might have forgotten some of these.  
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Now, given this very sketchy scheme, let us imagine the following dialogue 
where a subject explains his reasoning to another by quoting some of the stages of his 
reasoning:  
S1- “I want to do A, so first I thought that y was a way, and saw later that x was better 
because….”  
S2- “Why not z?”  
S1- “Well, z is good, but z implies l!”  
S2- “Not at all! You can z without l nowadays!”  
S1- “Well, I now think that z is better for A-ing!”  
This dialogue expresses the quoting of a procedure where S1 ends up adding 
one more step to arrive at his conclusion. (The dialogue is a deliberative conversation 
about means).  
It is a person different from the reasoning subject that suggested this addition. 
Nevertheless, in order for the reasoning subject to figure in this suggestion as a 
conclusion, he had to recognize it as constituting a pertinent conclusion to his own 
reasoning. This addition could be asserted by the subject later on in a monologue that 
revises or recalls his reasoning.   
This is the sense of adding that is pertinent to what, in our discussion, has been 
called interiority. This adding, although effected by a subject who is not the reasoning 
subject himself, bears an interior relation to the reasoning subject and this relation is 
not necessarily one of quantitative discrimination. Its sense allows for the notion of 
isolation, say, like recognizing a missing step, but it is that to which it adds that 
allows for its presence and status.  
Before, in our exposition of quantitative interiority, we said that discernibility 
in number was possible in virtue of the dissecting method. But was any adding of this 
sort possible? A grape might grow just as many seeds as it naturally does, but nothing 
exterior to it may introduce another quantitative element without introducing 
something alien. To introduce another seed into it (assuming there is such a method 
without destroying the grape) would be the introduction of something baring no 
relation to the other seeds contained in the grape. The simple fact of being a seed, or a 
similar seed (from a similar grape), would not bare any ordered relation. It would bare 
no relation of opposition, nor of necessity, but only of similarity. As said before, 
quantitative interiority may imply numerical variation (e.g. grapes at different stages 
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of their growth have a different number of seeds), but it does not allow for ordered  
variation.  
Comparative interiority then implies the impossibility of absence and a 
suggestibility for an ordered variation. Both these aspects are expressed in the outer 
relations of the thing possessing such a comparative interiority; they are real 
relations. 
The contrast worked out above made use of an obvious deferring conception 
of interiority, but the two aspects that we have fleshed out should give some content 
to the notion of comparative interiority. In light of this latter notion, let us approach 
the notion of expression of intention and contrast the two distinct ideas implied by this 
idea. 
 
Local expressive explanation  
8. Here is an example of a model for this type of explanation: “One might as 
well call a car’s stalling the expression of its being about to stop”9  
A problem resides in the restricted locality of this expression. The expression 
seems to be correlated with a mechanical defect (in this case), which is manifested 
through the malfunctioning of the car. The potential expressiveness of intention 
would have to radically differ from this form of expression, since one fundamental 
aspect we have to account for is the ongoing presence of a form of knowledge. What 
is expressed is not merely an antecedent; it is not merely a completed antecedent that 
causes a symptom. A symptom is locally restricted and its flaring up is conclusive. 
What is expressed by intentionally acting, as an expression of intention, would have 
to make itself apparent non-locally – its detection would have to be thoroughgoing 
and not sporadic.  
Here the previous argument against the conception of small sections returns. 
But why does this form of knowledge involve thoroughgoing expressiveness? 
Theoretical knowledge gained through receptivity and practical knowledge form a 
nexus subsumed under the idea of the attainability of an end, a nexus relevant to the 
control of the deed. The expressive character of sustaining an intention will imply a 
continuous mode of expression throughout time: Imagine someone insisting on 
walking up a hill. The picture might involve various slips, the reconsideration of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Intention, p. 5. 
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alternative path, the noticing of a harder patch of dirt in one particular spot. What is 
expressed is far from completed. The expression is not something that flares up and is 
detected; it is something we accompany while it develops. It develops in an orderly 
fashion: what was expressed in a previous attempt is absorbed in every following 
attempt as a correction – the expression is not instantaneous. 
The example of the stalling car seems to give us a model that offers no room 
for the consideration of sustained intentions. It is merely an immediate expression of 
two distinct items through correlation. The relation between these two items allows 
for no interval. The mode of expression characteristic of action has to allow for an 
interval, since the concept of mistake would otherwise never be applicable to actions.  
The possibility of an interval that occurs between the malfunctioning of the 
car’s motor and the car stopping opposes the sense of interval we are interested in. 
Since nothing relevant regarding the stopping of the car  occurs during this interval, 
this interval is merely the time the expression takes.  
Everything that could happen in between, say the car starts up again because 
of another malfunction, is merely accidental and bears no relation of order to what is 
happening. The car’s stalling could not be interrupted and later on resumed in the 
same way that a disease cannot. It can vanish and return, but it cannot be interrupted 
because the stalling is not the expression of something that is being brought about.  
 
9. Before, in working out the notion of comparative interiority, we discerned a 
sort of interval that was of interest to us. It emerged in connection with the reasoning 
of a subject and a suggestion by another subject. Anscombe suggests that the 
expression of an intention can be contrasted with e.g. the expression of emotion. One 
reason she provides is that the expression of an intention allows for a certain kind of 
conventionality. She must not mean that these are not conventionally recognizable 
since, in a non-specified way, expressions of emotion are – crying is by all means 
conventionally recognized. The argument also cannot equally mean that the sense of 
convention she uses must imply a certain tacit agreement (it is true that no one agreed 
that to shed tears was an expression of crying in the same way that no one agreed that 
moving one’s legs constituted walking). The conventional aspect of an expression of 
intention seems to reside in its responsiveness to normative assessment. We can start 
by developing this thought in a rather simple case. By contrast, one important aspect 
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of emotion is its putative blindness to adding of the sort described earlier – emotion 
exhibits a non-responsiveness to reasons.  
If someone is expressing a given emotion (e.g. grief) through crying, she 
cannot, in any relevant sense, be wrong about her expression of emotion. She can be 
wrong about the reasons that make her cry, and some reasons not to cry may be 
available to her. But even the recognition of the validity of these reasons does not 
guarantee any impact on the expression. A person might be crying for the loss of a 
very precious pen, find it at some point, and still be unable to stop crying about it for 
a while (the mere idea of having lost it for good). Emotion can be truly blind to both 
reasons and facts. Like the stalling car metaphor, emotion is correlated with a state 
that is irresponsive to reasoning and owes its locality to the presence of such a state – 
expression of emotion is the expression of something complete, not of something that 
might yet have to be completed or is yet to be complete.  
 
Acting from affection – a first attempt at interpreting the notion of an 
antecedent to an action; the dictum: a mental cause need not strictly be a mental 
event  
10. Here we discern a class of actions that is related to the expression of 
emotion. In this class, the subject is passive and does something from affection. This 
affection may vary: it can include bodily states, such as hunger, or emotional ones, 
such as anxiety.10  
The reason why it is useful to discuss this class of actions is that the items 
falling under it can legitimately pertain to the concept of intentional action (unlike the 
expression of emotion) – when someone does something to stop his hunger or exits 
the room in order to stop her anxiety. In this class of actions, an opposing movement 
to our ordered adding emerges, namely removing. That is, in this class of actions, the 
agent does something to remove a given state she finds herself in.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Talcott Parsons in Actor, Situation and Normative Pattern: An essay in the theory 
of social action develops the significance of affection to a more complex notion, 
comprising aspects of any given social order. His notion of affection is not entirely 
unimportant for the present argument. However, in this section, my examples are 
closer to a more primitive notion of affection, since what I intend to address is the 
notion of mental causality at large. Nevertheless, I do not oppose that this category 
can be expanded on, and indeed has to be expanded, if the aim is to understand certain 
complex social practices.   
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In our previous discussion, the ordered adding emerged as the capacity to gain 
both practical and theoretical knowledge through the integration of reasons. In the 
class where the subject is passive, all an agent does is conducive to removing the state 
affecting him and no suggestibility regarding the knowledge of that state has to be 
present. For example, someone might suggest reasons why someone else should not 
be anxious, why it is silly to be so; nevertheless, this person will still have to leave the 
room as this is the only way to remove her anxiety. To remove the state affecting the 
agent restricts what can be done, quite independently of any normative consideration. 
But, in this class of actions, it is difficult to discern among cases. In the case of 
hunger, an agent may be very receptive to better ways of attaining food. Also, in the 
case of hunger, the action of the agent has to end with his having removed his hunger. 
In the case of our anxious person, there will surely be no guarantee about her exiting 
the room.  
The sort of acting under consideration tends towards the extinguishing of the 
present state. It is terminal in its character, but its terminality is quite distinct. This 
form of terminality is controlled by the object of affection (its intensity, for example) 
and, also, its vital or non-vital urgency (hunger or anxiety, for example). The acting 
towards this extinguishing exists on the conditions of the affection. It is, in the case of 
hunger, bound to be recurrent, but, recurrence does not necessarily have to entail the 
repetition of the removing action: Contrast ‘I am hungry again, I have to eat 
something’, ‘I need to smoke, I have to go outside’, and ‘I am hungry, I really have to 
eat something’, ‘I really need to smoke, but I can’t because I have quit smoking’. The 
object of affection restricts what can be done; the doing is dependent on the nature of 
the passive imperative.   
So, in this class of actions, the subject acts from a form of passivity, although 
he cannot be said to be responsible for the formation of the state of affection, but only 
for his response to it. This response can be conducive to gaining practical knowledge 
in the context of an exercise of a negative capacity, as when someone refrains from 
doing something because…, or otherwise in reasoning about the action leading to the 
removal of the affecting state.  
The states the subject finds himself in can arise naturally, as hunger does 
(followed by going out for lunch), or they can be directed at an object of affection 
(like craving ice cream, a form of cathexis, and going out for ice cream), or they can 
be induced by something or someone as in becoming scared because of a 
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thunderstorm or because of the noise of a motorcycle (which is followed by the 
person hiding because of the noise).  
 
11. Now, at this point, another important contrast emerges. All of these states 
may be provoked, but none of these is expressible in an imperatival form. Given the 
limited responsibility the agent has in the formation of these states.  
Nevertheless, an order also restricts the possibility of forming an intention. 
But the contrast is quite visible, since the class of actions we looked at cannot be 
constructed as orders. One reason for this is that acting from passivity is not 
something that the agent intends to carry out. The agent may quote the affection as a 
mental cause, but not as something produced by him practically in order to be 
appropriately treated.   
One difficulty arises immediately: as things stand, someone knocking on the 
door is just as much something not produced by an agent. But a knock on the door is 
like an order, not like anxiety. It is like an order in the sense that it forms a request for 
the agent to carry something out. Although a knock on the door is a material process, 
it is intentionally brought about.  It is, like an order, reciprocally structured. The 
reciprocal structure marks one aspect of the reflexive implication of the concept of 
intentional action by setting up the possibility conditions to request or give an order. 
 
12. Before moving on, a brief explanation regarding the material we have 
addressed so far. The last two sections are an attempt to answer some of the troubles 
introduced in Intention §10-11. In other words, to address the dictum: that a mental 
cause need not be a mental event. The suggested cause is, as said, a knock on the 
door, something as out there as it gets. Of course, this is but one of the many things 
that make us act, and that do, relevantly so, bare an intimate connection to reasoning. 
I wish now to take a break from this subject, but only to return to it later.   
        
The body that holds a power: natural object, product and power  
13. In a comment about the immediate difference that emerges when judging 
about an eye and a stone,11 Kant introduces a normative notion that denotes an 
immediately intelligible restriction: an eye ought to be suitable for seeing. As a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Critique of the power of judgment, 20:240. 
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contrast, a stone can be used for building something or for crushing something upon 
it.  
 The force of this normative notion lies in its immediacy. When we make a 
judgment about the eye, its actuality implies what it is for and reduces its possibilities 
for to nothing; no disjunctive possibilities are available.  
There is a certain potentiality that is attached to the stone that is excluded from 
the eye, which is a certain advantageousness that is recognizable in its relative value. 
A stone can become a house or a hammer. Because it allows for such a relation, the 
stone circulates in the sphere of consumption; it becomes variably equivalent to 
something else it is not on its own. In a determinate quantity, stones become a house 
and before becoming a house, stones are bought for an equivalent sum of money. A 
stone contains all of this in virtue of its qualities, and yet the value of a stone will shift 
with the principle that is pressed upon it. In one case it becomes a house, in another 
case it can become a statue. Statues, however, are very different from houses in both 
value and use. Even if the stone circulates in an untransformed state, its possibilities 
for becoming something else are preserved. A stone might have a useful value even if 
untransformed; a simple stone might be for throwing.  
The stone circulates without being reduced; these are some of the things a 
stone is for. The eye could only enter into such a set of relations by being reduced; it 
could only be transformed into something else, by being reduced. Of course, as a 
physical object, it contains this kind of possibility, but not without the implication of a 
reduction.  
The intelligibility of the normative restriction is primarily of a reductive 
character. Both what we know and where we find an eye is compromised by such 
reduction. This becomes comprehensive if we rehearse a set of comparisons: Stones 
can be thrown, and so can eyes. But eyes would have first to be removed from a face. 
Branches brake; and so do my arms and legs, but my arms and legs would then hurt. 
These contrasts are evident. They are as evident as the knowledge revealed 
upon their consideration. Now we know the possibility of error is not provided. Our 
answerability to the actuality of the eye is given, but it is given in a distinct mode, 
distinct from that of a stone – a mode that is limited if reduced.  
 
14.  If reduction is a threat, what exactly do I mean by this? In the case of the 
eye, reduction might mean deprivation. When we refer to the eyes of a blind man, we 
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refer to the eyes’ power in absentia. The stone may gain an end, but if left alone it is 
hardly deprived of anything. There is a difference of sense in what we want to 
express. Kant is right; it is hardly on the same account that I express that a stone 
ought to be for anything at all. This sense expresses a difference in our answerability 
to the objects we encounter. The difference in the expressed sense is a difference in 
the conditions of intelligibility regarding these objects when we make judgments 
about them.  
The common dominator – the object – is rendered uninformative, although not 
false. The immediacy of experience would be deprived of stability if these differentiae 
were not what ground that stability. By recalling these differences, we descriptively 
interpret our ontology. This is to say that, to recall differences is not merely a truistic 
form of expression. When I say a stone is different from an eye because…, I do not 
mean to express a difference in the sense that a door is different from a window, a 
frog from a dog, a pear from an apple, a pineapple from a car, red from blue…. The 
expression of this sense of difference is an attempt to grasp the conditions through 
which the object is known.  
 
Two separate grammars  
15. Following Wittgenstein, we could further delineate this difference of sense 
through the investigation of two separate grammars: one for the physical eye and the 
other for the geometric eye.  
It has to be clear from the start that the physical eye is not a different type of 
object from the geometric eye.12 They are not different as a stone is different from an 
eye, nor as a stone is different from a statue; they certainly are not categorically 
distinct, nor are they formally distinct. And yet, if we allow for the construction of 
two separate grammars, this would be due to the distinct expressive capacities of 
these grammars. It would be in virtue of an expressive necessity that we would 
proceed with this split between grammars. But since the physical eye and the 
geometric eye are not distinct objects, isn’t the expressive purport of both grammars 
merely an expression of the need to avoid a form of reduction?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Blue Book, pp.101-103. 
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16. The solipsist in Wittgenstein’s Blue Book cries ‘I saw such-and-such’ and 
points at his eyes, and we want to make sure that his eyes are not all he is pointing at. 
Although it is perfectly fine that he does this, it is perfectly intelligible that he points 
at his eyes, we just want to be able to paraphrase what it is that he is talking about. 
We know he is not talking about his optic nerve, or at least not directly; we know he 
is talking about what he saw. 
All we want to express is that we know that an eye ought to be suitable for 
seeing. Furthermore, we wish to say that an eye can only enter into a set of relations 
similar to that of a stone through a reduction. The eye immediately implies a mode of 
being known that avoids reduction in a distinct way. The description of the stone 
within circulation is an enlarged description – it is the description pertaining to the 
geometrical stone, not to the physical stone. The physical eye and the physical stone 
are its properties. The geometric eye is what it does. The geometric stone is what is 
done with it.  
As said from the start, all we ever talk about is the stone and the eye. All the 
different grammars did was to give back to us the distinctiveness of a mode of 
knowing. 
Unlike a statue, the eye is not an artifact. Its suitability for is a form of 
possession that is not an attributed functionality. This is the restrictive character that 
Kant discerned immediately in his comparison with a stone. Each and every artifact 
seems to be wholly unproblematic in the apprehension of its function, at least in the 
minimal sense of being an unnatural product, so it must have had a function at some 
point even if it is now lost to us. But we might say that, the eye contains its function 
from the very beginning.  
 
A power as belonging to a part, a part as belonging to a whole – referring to 
my organs 
17. The eye has, in our considerations, has been presented as disembodied. If 
we return it to a human body, we can further contrast it within its organic whole. Hair, 
for instance, seems to have a secondary cognitive function when compared with the 
eye. But its secondary character does not deprive it of a position within the organic 
whole. Again, our problem seems to rely on something more we want to say: hair 
grows, you see with your eyes; you lose your hair, and you might lose your eyesight. 
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Now, the following distinction has a further application: baldness is not a loss of a 
cognitive function where blindness is. 
Kant’s Konkretionen make for a defective body if they are absent, but these do 
not embody the exercise of a self-conscious power. This distinction might seem 
entirely insubstantial only if we forget the sense of ownership the solipsist was 
interested in or the sense of exclusivity Kant was interested in (“only of the eye do 
I…”) –  to be able to see with one’s eyes makes one the possessor of something quite 
distinct from having hair on one’s head or from having a brick to build something 
with.  
The eye, all the same, does have its function within an organic whole, which is 
the same body the hair also belongs to. And this very body is intact only when it has 
eyes and legs, and also the power to see and to walk (the sort of intactness that 
grounds the solipsist’s pointing at his eyes, which is the same sort of intactness 
expressed by the man who pointed at his heart to assure someone else of what he 
knows).13 Self-reference of this sort, such as pointing at the surface of one’s body, or 
at one’s healthy organs, implies pointing at one’s power to see or walk or understand 
with one’s eyes and legs and heart. These acts of self-reference, reference to an organ, 
are backed by the possession of a healthy body (a living body); and possession means 
here possession without acquisition, which is to say that it is not a matter of acquired 
property. This grounds the applicability of a distinct sense of privation such as being 
deprived of one’s eyesight: imagine the gesture of a blind man who points at his eye’s 
to say he is blind.  
A fence is not more at home if it is built around the stump of the tree that 
provided the wood for that very fence than if it were built around a lake far away from 
that stump. Which simply mean that: dispersion is part of its value.  
 
18. The Existenzform of the fence implies that it ends up where it useful and 
needed. But not in the same way a donated kidney that ends up where it is needed and 
useful. The donated kidney preserves its function only if it is restituted to a body 
because if you cook the kidney, of an animal for example, you destroy it. The wood of 
the fence – the natural kind the implement is made out of and not the implement itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Philosophical Investigations, Part II, iv. 
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– allows for restitution; this is not restitutio in integrum, but perhaps we could 
restitute it to the forest it once belonged to in the form of detritus.  
 
19. Imagine we come up to a fence, for instance, in a store. We are answerable 
to it as a product, a product of work, and as something we need. This form of 
reciprocity – what you need, what someone else made – might seem hieroglyphic in 
the way Marx put it. One would have to make an effort in order to reclaim the totality 
of its meaning, which Marx tells us is an effort similar to reclaiming our language.14 
    
20. This comparison works if we understand what underlies it. In spite of the 
ontological difference between a language and a fence, these can both be figure as 
products; as exercises of a power. But an important dissimilarity also applies. To 
retrieve back a productive force, starting with a product, is to reestablish a productive 
relation: a relation that holds among persons. In this sense, we arrive at the exercise of 
a power, and at whatever it uses in order to make a product. Through the 
interpretation of this hieroglyph, we rescue a particular power from its anonymity. 
Language can, although in a different way, be anonymous. But language is usually a 
product only in a mediated sense, for example, in a book or letter, in writing in 
general or recorded speech.  
To put it crudely, and perhaps in a bizarre way, the difference between a fence 
and a language seems to be related to how close you are to the exercise of a power. 
The notion of commodity seems to efficiently retard this closeness. You purchase so-
and-so’s record or book. You also can buy a fence, and it might even be a fence made 
by so-and-so. But to pick up just any record irrespective of the artist would be 
clueless or a gesture of complete indifference, and not a matter of banality. 
 
21. Normativity in this case is closely related to the capacity that we know 
seeing as an expression of the actuality of an object (the eye). Normativity latches 
onto the eye in a proper sense. The insight we are looking for, nonetheless, is not with 
respect to an exercise as such because it is not the product of an exercise. We 
introduce therefore the concept of an act: not the crystallization of an exercise, but the 
exercising itself. It is clear that we benefit from an explanatory priority – it began 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Das Kapital, p.86. 
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with an act, then the product came to be – and yet we have to discern the content of 
this act if we are to explain the notion of an exercise.  
The actuality of the eye, by implying its power, implies the notion of the 
exercise of this power. The possessor of the eye has it for seeing, but he may close his 
eye and refuse to use it for what it is for – the actuality of the eye implies its power 
and what it is suitable for, but it does not imply the uninterrupted use of this power.  
When we detect this particular power, we presuppose its differentiation from 
mere motion. Mere motion may of course be interrupted. But this interruption has no 
internal relation to the stopping of the movement. To construct a dam is to interrupt 
the flow of a river, but the dam does not bring with it the not-flowing of the water; the 
water merely flows against the obstruction. When I close my eyes in order not to look 
at something, the closing of my eyes brings with it my not-seeing, in the proper sense 
– to refuse to see is an intentional action, a negative action.  
The concept of exercise is an intentional-dependent notion; it is connected 
with the notion of a conclusion, insofar as the thing possessing it does not only run 
against obstructions, as in the case of mere movement, but has the capacity to refrain 
or conclude an exercise.  
With the river, there is no before and after the obstruction. The river does not 
resume after the obstruction, nor does it remove it. There is the chance that it may 
destroy it; but the river’s power is pressure, not an act. The obstruction occupies the 
same environment as the river. The river, nonetheless, does not regard the obstruction 
as such; the obstruction perishes under an inexhaustible source of power. An act of 
the sort we are after, an intentional action, does not spring from an inexhaustible 
power. An intentional action is a power exercised in an act that takes an obstruction to 
be an obstruction, if it encounters one. It treats an obstruction through a form of 
reasoning, which is acting.  
The nature of a thing is revealed by its operation15. We are following this 
lesson.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Summa Theologiae, Question 76, Article 1, p (22). 
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The reflexive distance: Requesting, being ordered, refusing, inability and 
one’s body 
22. Let us return to the notion of a request or an order. A request is a reflexive 
notion: it implies restrictions that are peculiar to it, and we might deem these 
restrictions to be reciprocal. Although the argument still has to address this notion in 
a more explicit way, our ability to foreshadow in this direction already speaks to our 
sense of reflexive contraction – this is the case where we recognize the reflexive as a 
resource for our ability to intelligibly express ourselves to others in a trivial, but 
relevant sense. 
These restrictions become intelligible when we recognize an individual who 
possesses a power or ability to which these restrictions have application. In this sense, 
a request involves more than the possible fulfillment of the task requested; it also 
assumes a possibility of refusal or incapability to fulfill the task. 
The knowledge of these possibilities is tied to what I characterize as the 
primitive viewpoint. On the surface, a request seems too common to justify the 
introduction of such a concept to the present discussion. Nevertheless, when we are 
confronted with the refusal of a given order or request, we know what is going on. 
The intelligibility of the refusal falls short of what we know when we make a request. 
One knows from oneself that having an intention cannot be completely diluted into an 
order or request even if one might intend to execute a request – in sum, what I will 
call reflexive distance. This viewpoint is, as said, primitive, as is this sort of distance 
(although one might have to be reminded of it). And remembering this distance 
entails the recovery of the position from which certain phenomena cannot fail to be 
intelligible to us. So knowing from oneself implies knowing what one is – hence self-
consciousness. 
  
23. The inability I have mentioned is dependent on the actuality of the 
individual agent realized in action, while refusal does not strictly necessitate any 
positive action for its content. But refusal is not outside the scope of practical 
knowledge. Refusal does depend on an attitude taken by the agent towards the effects 
of the requested action and towards himself as the author of such effects; to refuse is a 
negative action.  
In contrast, an automaton is hardly able to do anything at all; it is merely able 
to do what it was made for. And therefore it does not refuse, nor is it ordered to do 
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something – its Existezform is pure execution. When it becomes obsolete, it is turned 
off, and its carcass is the historical reminder that something has progressed – the 
automaton does not cease to exist, it merely ceases to be useful. Its death, in this 
figurative sense, is brought about by a technological leap. This leap may render its 
mechanism useless, but perhaps not its function; the stability of the principle it 
embodied might be transposed to another machine with more gain. The technological 
leap is a quantitative and qualitative leap in relation to efficiency; the cadaver of the 
obsolete machine exists separately from its products, that is, they are not necessarily 
exclusive to it. The emergence of a better version makes it useless to bring the older 
version back to life; therefore, it is deprived of a return to a status quo ante not in 
virtue of a lack of possibility, but out of a lack of usefulness.16  
In one important sense, the machine or the automaton, as a body that holds a 
causal power, lacks uniqueness. It does not lack formal uniqueness, say as having a 
style, or even a time-specific mechanical constitution. But the principle it embodies 
stands in no exclusive, let alone unique, relation to that very body. I do not mean to 
assert – as Strawson, I believe, correctly denied17 – that uniqueness of a body is 
sufficient in accounting for the fact that I have experiences, intentions, and the like. 
Later I shall try to approach the insufficiency of such minimal conditions, or, 
coextensively, I shall approach a viable sense of my as it figures in my intention and 
even in my body. But I do wish to maintain that the notion of uniqueness of my body 
can be given an important sense. This would be the sense that pertains to a stable 
notion of our experiences as being embodied, that as said, does not have to impugn 
the dignity of our expressions using the possessive (I mean, that our self-referring 
expressions using the possessive are not merely gateways to philosophical 
misconceptions). 
Unlike the machine, I do not merely harbor a principle of action or thought in 
my body (a fact the Wittgensteinian solipsist often exaggerates and the very reason 
why the solipsist keeps returning as an interlocutor). Of course, two different sewing 
machines sew almost alike, and two different tailors sew almost alike. But one of our 
tailors could be the protagonist of an advance in style, and the machine could easily 
reproduce this advance. Still, this is not all, nor even what I find more relevant. If on 
the one hand, I wish to provide enough argument for why my intention is a sensible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Das Kapital, p. 204. 
17 Individuals, p.98-100. 
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expression, on the other hand, the expression: I am this thing right here is far from 
irrelevant. In a moment, we shall further appeal to this idea, but for now let us 
advance to what I believe is crucial for the sense of uniqueness I am putting forward. 
What is important is not merely the logical question concerning what it is to be a 
discernable particular, where one’s body constitutes a principle of individualization 
(although we often appeal to such a logical differentiation). Instead, and if I am 
permitted to put a practical spin on this idea, it is more importantly related to the types 
of concerns we are bound to express with relation to our bodies (for example, in the 
presentation of certain facts of medical concern or even our diets). This is one 
important expressive aspect of the reflexive and, therefore, an integral part of its 
sense. In part, the advantage of machines lies in the fact that their inability may often 
be removed if a better body shows up; the term “better” in use here may mean simply 
faster, or more efficient. And, certainly, eliminating these machines in favor of the 
preservation of the principle they harbor, now in a new guise, carries no moral 
salience.   
Perhaps uniqueness is too strong of a term for the purpose of my argument; 
perhaps we can simply retain this form of being bound to one’s body as part of the 
sense of the reflexive such as in the case of expressions like my arms are long, my 
eyes hurt, and so on. This is but the recovery of a familiarity with our body and this 
sort of recovery presents interesting aspects. For example, Wittgenstein once tried to 
eliminate his body in thought in an attempt that, at first, promised a purer grasp of the 
sense of experience.18 Of course Wittgenstein ended up trying to recover some of his 
old sense of experience not long after his thought experiment had begun, namely the 
unnoticed nexus between experience and movement. He tried to glue his eyes to a 
window – being it the case that the eyes do need some sort of body, and a window is, 
not entirely, but somewhat similar to the glasses we wear. A window is transparent, 
good for seeing through, and offers some measure of protection now that the eyelids 
are gone and eyes are still fragile things. From this, he went on to affix his eye to a 
tree branch, which offered some amount of movement and elasticity; the branches 
allow my eyes to move closer to something, I suppose, to focus on something, and 
also to distance themselves for perspective. Inevitably the whimsies of wind and other 
weather will be difficult to tame and this will have an effect on the branch. Notice: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Philosophische Bemerkungen, §71-74. 
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When Wittgenstein and we, the readers following him, find ourselves recovering our 
sense of familiarity with our body and form of movement, we appeal to a quite 
general sense of experience. For example, we never, not even for a second, thought 
about protesting the fact that because I wear glasses all of my visual experiences are 
accompanied by the presence of a peripheral, somewhat blurry, edge. Such is the 
economy of elimination, and it is bound to entail recovery; Wittgenstein is interested 
here in a general sense of loss, for example: how do I turn around to see if something 
is behind me, now that my eyes are glued to a window? – Now we see that being able 
to turn around is something that pertains to the totality of seeing! But, still, it is the 
case that we are talking about seeing in a quite general way, and thus we are 
purposely leaving out some facts about my eyes. That my eyes may suffer under 
myopia is out of the picture here, even if we have already seen that the condition of 
myopia is entailed by the full-blooded sense of reflexive expressions as reference to 
one’s organs.  
When Wittgenstein says something like “Der Gesichtsraum hat wesentlich 
keinen Besitzer” [The space of vision has essentially no owner]19 his expression is but 
an appeal to our acknowledgment of the stability of our experience.20 This means he 
is relying on the fact that we are capable of thinking beyond the blatant falsity of his 
sentence. The economy of reduction I spoke of before incurs the obvious cost of 
instability – after all, we do find ourselves attempting to recover the old totality from 
which we started. Wittgenstein is relying on our ability to qualitatively discern (which 
is to say, to discern in a relevant way) between subtracting my nose, or the edge of my 
glasses, from the stable sense of an act of experience without thereby losing the 
obvious relevance of something like turning around in order to look at something. 
Although we do have to look further at this idea of an act of experience, we can 
provisionally maintain the following idea: while a philosophy of experience without 
the presence of my nose or my glasses is sound, a philosophy of experience that does 
not take into account the possibility of my body’s ability to move would be ludicrous. 
Looking for other bodies or guises presents itself to thought every time we proceed 
with a version of a self-dissecting method. The machine as a guise for a principle of 
action presents a sort of complete freedom from constraint, constraint as exhaustion, 
for example; the body of the machine could be reconstructed so as to evermore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Philosophische Bemerkungen, §71. 
20 Philosophische Bemerkungen, §47. 
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further the principle it harbors. And so the machine is truly a guise, as Marx puts it in 
the Capital, a guise free from the organic limit we see has applicability to us. This 
guise shifts, but only to bypass the sense of privation and of an inability we express 
possessively (we understand this in cases of medical consideration, or in our general 
concern for ourselves and for others else or something).21  
We do know what it is to be unable to do something. We understand inability 
because we are not able to do just anything, and by this I mean anything possible and 
even worth doing. Equally, a proposed act is something easily conceivable, if we can 
conceive of someone reasonable at all; one could hardly exist merely as an executor 
of requested acts, and if forced to do so, even within a personal limit, unlike the 
automaton, one would posses some conception of this obligation. There is a 
discernable distance here. Unlike the machine, one does not exist solely in a 
functional way – we act; we do not merely exist as the possibility of a given act. We 
are the principle of our acts, not an act in principle. 
 
The recognition of a Power and the recognition of an Act – one’s act and 
one’s power 
24. The reflexive conception of an act amounts to knowing an act on grounds 
that are not merely demonstrative, which is to say in the first person. This is a 
minimal condition. But let us provide it with more context: Reflexivity is the 
possession of what grounds the intelligibility of an act of another that is given to me 
demonstratively, an act that is an instance of the same power as that which is known 
in the first person, as in the following case:‘I am looking at you looking at me.’ 
In the proposition above, the person uttering I is the subject of his act and the 
object of an act of another person. We can also conceive of both acts as being similar 
in kind, in spite of these having different transitive objects and different subjects. The 
proposition, as an utterance of its subject, condenses the knowledge of oneself as the 
object of someone else’s act. This is done through my act; it is an active realization 
that there is someone for me to recognize, while there is someone who recognizes me. 
This understanding of oneself as an object of someone else’s act has to be 
properly differentiated from a kind of objectifying self-reference, such as when 
Wittgenstein imagined someone referring to their limbs in a pile of limbs; this is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Das Kapital, vol.I, p.357. 
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form of identification that springs from a concern with respect to my body, and here, 
in the particular context, we encounter the sort of violence that may befall it. When 
we refer to our limb in a pile, we think in terms of a special sense of lost ownership, a 
sense we have already considered, of privation – with the privation of a body part, 
and the loss of the potential power that body part has, we are forced to recognize the 
violence that can befall the intactness of the body. To think of a limb as a separate 
object is, in the first place, merely a circumstantial accident; an interference that 
comes with this sort of assumed ownership. We may presume that it is exactly this 
idea that underlines this particular notion of identification: our limb is given to us 
through perception – and so are other people’s limbs –, but these are not given to me 
as my limbs – to recognize ourselves as an object of recognition is different from 
recognizing ourselves as an object, or our mutilated organ as an object. The latter 
might be the case if we recognize ourselves as prey for another animal. Yet to know 
that we are an object of recognition issues in quite different expectations than to know 
that we are an object. In the eyes of the beast, I become strangely close to being an 
object precisely because I expect to be treated as one. But I know that I am an object, 
and for this reason I do not expect to fit into any space I can conceive of (under a door 
for example). But in knowing that I am an object of recognition, I may expect to be 
listened to, I expect that my sentences will be meaningful, and I expect that I will not 
become wholly useless to the point of complete indifference. 
 
25. Presumably, Wittgenstein’s solipsist felt the need to point at his eye in 
order to make even more clear his assurance that he saw something; and his eye was 
not in a pile, it was not a dead eye.22 The concept of ownership is applicable here, but 
only in the context of an explanation of an act of seeing. The solipsist points at his 
eye; nonetheless, he is not merely pointing at his physical eye. He points at that with 
which he saw: the topic is, after all, his assurance. We may suppose that the mere 
presence of another eye, not his, would be sufficient for the solipsist to arrive at the 
idea of equivalence. In other words, if he has any intact notion of an organ, or any, no 
matter how shaky, knowledge of human biology, the notion of equivalence can be 
expected to come to him intuitively. After all, he did not exactly point only at his 
physical eye, but also at whatever he saw. For this reason, what he pointed at should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The Blue Book, p.101. 
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also be present for another eye, if that eye is open and directed at anything at all. 
(However, if he really stands by his solipsistic convictions, he could argue that he 
does not yet have enough margin to understand it as the eye of another; perhaps he 
could insist on this, even if we see that it introduces instability in his knowledge of 
eyes, and the world he looks at, let alone the entire purpose of his assurance.) But 
there is an important truth to the solipsist’s assurance: even if he admits that he 
recognizes some sort of equivalence, he would be admitting to the equivalence of a 
power, and not to the equivalence of an act.  
If the proposition above is available to the solipsist and it is true that he is 
looking at me, while I am looking at him, the very intelligibility of what he is uttering 
depends on his knowledge of an equivalent power in a rather robust sense. All the 
same, and this is crucial, his sense of ownership, that only he is the owner of his act, 
persists; after all, it is true that: ‘I am looking at you looking at me’, while ‘You are 
looking at me looking at you’. His act has me as an object, mine does not. When he 
utters ‘I am looking at you looking at me’ his act is reflected back at him. It is 
reflected as springing from the same power, but not as an equivalent act. And this, 
finally, should demotivate some of his insistence on his sense of epistemic 
uniqueness, or privilege. But maybe the solipsist will further refuse to grasp the sense 
of his act as dependent on the proper conception of a shared power – he will simply 
deny the fact that there is no possibility in which we can construct an epistemology 
that is solely exclusive to his acts. 
We cannot help but to notice that the solipsist’s attempt at explaining himself 
to us was already an excess of confidence on his part. But is the solipsist really as 
unrecognizable as that? Perhaps if we conceive him to be someone trapped in a 
hyperbole, he becomes strangely familiar. His sense of ownership over his own 
experience seems merely to have overstepped the boundary of reasonableness – 
maybe he feels somewhat threatened. After all, we do know that there are things that 
threaten to dissolve what he knows if he reflects upon them. And now the question 
becomes: is this a justified dissolution? The solipsist claims to know certain things, 
but error lurks every time there is the possibility of knowledge. Our knowledge tends 
towards the truth, but it does not resist error. What he saw may actually have such an 
overwhelming importance to him, considering the fact that it was he who saw it – this 
much is clear to us. Perhaps he realized that we do vitally rely on our attentiveness? 
But, of course, the point all long has been that the solipsist cannot preserve the 
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importance of his act, nor any stable conception of his attentiveness, not even to 
himself, and certainly not to us, without a general notion of the fallibility of a shared 
power. He can never make any claims with the seriousness he wishes to have. 
 
26. Our solipsist is not interested in the sense of uniqueness of body we first 
started out with, as his pointing at his eyes might have been nothing more than 
incidental like something he did out of habit. He is, nevertheless, very interested in 
the uniqueness of his experiences and acts. By making my act the object of his 
experience, I hoped to steer the discussion in the direction of Strawson’s dictum that 
one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to 
others.23 This kind of reciprocal thought has still to be further addressed, and perhaps 
it will be more instructive to drop the solipsist from the discussion. But the solipsist 
was very important, because he is proud of the reflexive distance we have been 
speaking about; the preservation of this distance matters greatly to him, as it does to 
us, with the important difference that we believe (less proudly so) in its 
communicability to others. What I have been more interested in is not the conditions 
under which the solipsist could preserve his position, but rather, and believing as I do 
that this is not grantable, what it is that the solipsist does to others when he does not 
recognize them. I hoped to make myself, in a sense, closer to the solipsist by forcing 
him to address my act of looking at him, and yet this does not sufficiently express 
what I mean. He may still not grant me that privilege, of course. If he does not 
address my act of looking at him, then he is not merely a solipsist anymore but just an 
egotist.  
Reflexive distance is part of the sense of the expressions we are considering; 
we denote this with our use of different pronouns. But this question goes beyond the 
mere grammatical facts: it is the case that, if this reflexive distance collapsed, both he 
and I would be, amongst other things, trapped in a form of projection – supposing that 
at least that could be granted; we would have no operative conception of each other as 
the subjects of our experiences and acts. For example, I could not possibly ask 
anyone: “Why are you smiling?” The smile would have to be evidence enough, or not 
at all. I could project something onto the smile, but this projection could not even 
amount to empathy; there would be no question as to the correctness or the reason 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Individuals, pp.100-101. 
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why someone says anything. There would be no question as to why someone smiles, 
and so no questions about understanding another person; and, therefore, finally, even 
projection would be rendered utterly pointless.  
I may demand that someone pay attention to me, that that person must direct 
his attention to me: “Look at me!”, and if am granted the privilege, what I now have 
to say to him might entirely depend on his looking at me, e.g. on his attentiveness to 
my seriousness. In this sense, when I direct his attention to me or even to my looking, 
this is quite distinct from directing his attention to some feature of the world (not just 
in the sense that the object I direct his attention to might be very different from me, 
inanimate or otherwise). Contrariwise, his attentiveness to me is an exigency upon 
him and a case in point of our reflexive distance. When we look at the same thing, our 
attentiveness collides in an object, or aspect, or event, etc., while our attentiveness to 
each other is precisely the preservation of this difference with respect to the object – 
him and I – and this must be necessarily so, if we are not simply to be indifferent to 
each other, or even worse, eliminate each other. 
  
27. To recognize oneself as recognized by another is not reducible to an 
attribution of status. This is to say that to know what it is to be recognized exploits the 
capacity to know what recognition is, in the sense that it is like my recognizing (but 
this does not necessarily imply the knowledge that this recognition is the recognition 
of oneself as the underdog, for example). Undermining recognition is also 
recognition. But attributions of status depend on this more fundamental capacity. The 
importance of such an attribution lies precisely in a non-eliminativist conception of 
the truth of the attribution. Without this, the attribution is powerless and perhaps 
merely an insult. Since an insult may work even if there is no truth to it, that is, its 
performative aspect need not be, but may well be, independent from any truth about 
the offended person.  
Before we get to this point, let us conclude the previous thought: reflection 
implies the capacity of being answerable in a certain way to a certain type of object, 
namely things like ourselves. This takes on the assumption of the differential capacity 
to correctly distinguish among objects, never mind the assumption of the primitive 
character of the concept of person. Perhaps further describing some of the differentiae 
is a way of knowing this answerability. Answerability is not something we have 
explicitly before our mind when dealing with objects; it is something, as we 
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mentioned earlier, unavoidable. It nevertheless presents itself to thought when, from 
our necessary viewpoint, we feel some sort uneasiness.  
A commitment to the truth of attributions of intention, for example, presumes 
the responsibility an agent has for his own actions. The possibility of uneasiness is 
one problematic point attached to the epistemology that results from the 
characterization of this power. Our starting point was precisely the actuality of this 
problematic. For example, inability is something irreconcilable if the characterization 
of a power assumes only a generic form in the sense that it is not elastic enough to 
adopt the concept of an individual person.  
An agent is not a pure act, nor is he a mechanical potentiality; he does act, and 
the possibility of a reflexive distance pertains to his power to act in the same way that 
it pertains to our apprehension of his act. An agent has something to claim for his act 
if his act is one of his acts, that is, if his act is intentional. And to criticize an agent is 
precisely to hold him accountable for what he did or failed to do, for the explanation 
or lack of explanation he has for his action or lack of action. To criticize him for 
retreating into the role of a mere patient is, sometimes, to notice his failure to claim 
any pervasive effect of his own doing and to hold him responsible for his chosen 
lethargy – the possibility of a critical standpoint towards persons and their actions 
depends on the non-elimination of the agent’s responsibility. 
 
28. But we find some uneasiness in this thought. One expression of this is 
found in the mistakes one is bound to make due to the unreflected application of this 
knowledge to artworks, which is something that results from our default position. As 
it is quite different from a piece of fruit, an artwork does not tell you right away what 
it is for; As it is less then a person, you obviously cannot ask it anything. The 
recognition of the actuality of the artwork is the recognition that it does not have to 
tell you anything, in the sense you may have expected; it may never tell you anything 
at all.24 This already constitutes something like prevention against an eliminative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I take this idea from Heidegger. His interest is to prevent blindness to the 
recognition of the actuality of the artwork, which is to say to prevent the elimination 
contained in blindly asking something from our point of view. He cannot maintain his 
proposal, where we should ask from the objects’ point of view, if this implies the 
suggestion to eliminate our point of view. We cannot attempt to occupy anything’s 
point of view by eliminating ourselves. Therefore, this attempt may fail, and the 
artwork may not tell us anything at all, ever. Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks, p.70. 
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move – a move that suggests itself when under the pressure to make an attribution of 
meaning to an object in question. But this is a peculiarity of an artistic object. It 
occupies something of midway; it exerts a peculiar sort of pressure. This pressure is 
nothing but the contrast between the un-eliminable character of the reflexive 
knowledge that grounds our relation to the artwork, which is put in check by our 
confrontation with something inanimate. In the case of a reciprocal relation, our 
reflexivity finds an object directly answerable to it – attributions of intention depend 
for their correctness on the advertence against the eliminative move and this 
advertence is grounded on the reflexive knowledge of oneself as an acting subject. 
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2. The moment of difference 
 
Reciprocity  
29. Imagine two people standing in front of each other, and one of them utters 
the following sentences: “My left is your right;” “Your right is my left;”   “My 
background is in front of you;” “Your background is in front of me;” “Up is our up” 
and “Down is our down.”  
All of these propositions display reflexive knowledge of oneself in a 
reciprocal act of recognition of someone else. These also exploit the capacity to 
establish an equivalence relation between the positioning of the bodies relative to how 
these bodies stand in space. But the equivalence relation can only be established if 
there is a robust conception of the experience of the other. It is robust in the sense 
where we possess the knowledge that the other is capable of possessing a notion such 
as his right, which is meaningful for his acting – this is the type of possession that 
makes a difference in any thoughts about actions, such as his actions.  
If you look at a room full of both people and objects, you are always able to 
refer to the objects in the room as standing to the left or the right of each person. You 
are able to assume their point of view, precisely because you recognize them as not 
merely belonging to the aggregate of objects in space. The space stands still and if the 
person you are observing moves about in that room, these objects assume different 
reference possibilities relative to the position of this person (and now I am not simply 
saying “body” any longer), e.g. that thing over there to your left. His movements in 
the room contain the possibilities of that very room, e.g. the possibility of moving 
passed something, or behind something, or in between something, etc. This is a case 
in point where our reflexive notions expand reciprocally.  The owner of what 
Wittgenstein termed a Gesichtsraum becomes immediately understandable to us, even 
if we do not own his Gesichtsraum; – but still, we are all the owners of a 
Gesichtsraum and in spite of some discountable differences (my myopia for example) 
all our Gesichtsräume contain room for that in the same way; otherwise, what would 
the purpose of being the owner of a Gesichtsraum even serve for? When we use 
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expressions like ‘over there, to your left,’ we do not pause over any peculiarities; we 
do not reflect on the fact that it is someone’s left. But, of course, the actuality of the 
thought we purport to express would be useless if this wasn’t in fact someone’s left 
(and I mean this in the sense that the warning: “you have a bug on your shoulder!” 
would be useless if we did not have a material conception of “your shoulder” for 
someone in particular; in the absence of this conception, there would be no reason for 
someone to jump up and say, “Whose shoulder!? Mine?”)  
The reflexive distance that is demanded by the employment of these thoughts, 
or by the fact that they are stable, latches on to the material conception someone has 
of the possessive my, that is, of himself. What the reciprocal thought “my left is your 
right” goes to show, apart from our vital sharing of orientation, is that the reality of 
“your left” is rather unproblematic to me. And by problematic I mean that I never 
even think of liberalizing your use of my in this particular case, such as to make an 
argument that it can only mean something public, not private.  (For example, would I 
be tempted to liberalize your sense of ‘my shoulder’? I doubt it, and not simply 
because I also have a shoulder and a left. To put it in another way, I trust that you will 
understand what I mean when I say “my thoughts about sonatas” even when I have 
never had any thoughts about sonatas in the first place – although this implies a 
different question altogether.)  
What we are after is a primitive question. If you do not have a left, you do not  
have a world; and now I am not even sure if you can have a body, in the Aristotelian 
sense of intactness, which is a human body that is fit for movement  (although you 
might be some sort of body, for example, a plant in a vase). It seems that yours and 
mine can be quite unproblematic. After all, my left will always be my left, although 
occasionally it can be yours too. And, in this sense, we never have joint custody of 
our left. I mean, even when it is our left, my left is still in many useful ways 
exclusively mine with respect to both of us.  
 
30. Imagine we could control a person like an automaton. We would have to 
guide him in the exact same way through a room, the way we previously described, 
like passed certain things and behind others. Say we want to get him somewhere in 
that room successfully, we would have to assume his point of view and steer him 
away from other stuff. In doing so, we would be relying on the nexus represented by 
an action and its effecting. This is a conception that his power to act, now at our 
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service, contains the room as a condition of its effects. We would make him do what 
happens, and there is no frictionless way for achieving this, not for him, nor me. This 
frictionless impossibility never figures into our plan; we never entertain it as a viable 
possibility – we never entertain it at all. We know he lacks those possibilities and this 
guiding conception is something we perceive in his action across the room; we 
perceive the possibilities of his movement over there.  
Yet the way we perceive the possibilities of his movement over there are 
transposable onto us over here and this includes the sense of the propositions 
discussed above. But our interpretation of this thought would be very incomplete if 
we missed the use of the personal pronouns. The reflexive thinking, which backs up 
the transposition we have talked about from us to him, generates a generic conception 
of our shared power. By generic I mean the following: we have, in the guiding 
conception we are resorting to, long forgotten what he, perhaps in the possessive, 
would refer to as his exhaustion; imagine we have been pushing him around for quite 
some time now. Our guiding conception is operative in making him act, but it says 
nothing about his rest. Is it simply that we do not feel what he feels? That we do not 
feel the pressure of the room on his heels and legs when we are subjecting him to our 
ceaseless pacing around? It is true that we do not have his sensations. But the question 
I wish to address now is precisely that we do not need to have his sensations in order 
to understand his exhaustion, nor do we need the quality of his sensations in order to 
give some content to the notion of exhaustion. We could appeal to a general fact of 
human empathy, if we wanted to make some sense of his exhaustion, but I do not 
even mean this. I want to approach the very sense of sensation involved in our 
actions, the sense we already know from ourselves. We have to consider what is 
relevant to an interpretation of the appropriate connection between intention, action, 
person, and actuality. So let me begin by suggesting an interpretation for the 
following Hegelian thought: “For the cognition of nature, without the veins injected 
into nature by self-consciousness, there remains nothing but sensation.”25  
Our guiding conception dispensed with reduction to sensations without 
dispensing the effectiveness of an action. But our argument does not purport to show 
that sensation can be altogether absent, or that the guiding conception of a stable 
action can dispense with sensation altogether. There are many cases where sensation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Faith and Knowledge, p.77.  
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seems to make an important contribution, even if only through a sort of absence – that 
odd thing when you miss a step, and also through extreme concentration on a task that 
offers some resistance such as opening a jar with a stuck lid. There is a substantial 
passive contribution here to our cognition of an inchoate action: remember a time 
when you stopped trying to open a jar because you wrist hurt and now compare this to 
stopping when you are lost like when you stop on a road to read the directions (what I 
mean here is the direction of your gaze, and perhaps this is too simplistic but, in one 
case your gaze was at what is out there while in the other case you gaze was at what is 
here close to me; nevertheless, both may bring you to a halt).  
A reduction to sensation would miss what is known in acting. This is what I 
intend to argue for now. But I do not wish to make the power to act effectively 
homeless, nor even to eliminate the proximal sense that stops me from opening a jar. I 
wish to state the fact that I do not get clues, as Anscombe puts it, about what I am 
doing from particular sensations; I confess that I am hardly able to describe sensations 
in a nexus capable of yielding identity as actions, not mention the fact that sometimes 
I am wrong about how it feels (like if my knee feels bent, but it really is not). 26 But 
from the fact that reduction to sensation does not confer full identity to actions, or 
even postures, it does not follow that these should be eliminated. Perhaps I can make 
the point in this way: say we lead the robot-man up a staircase; he is carrying some 
heavy suitcases for a few minutes, and at this moment we grant him an intermittent 
Self-Conscioussness. Would it be inconceivable to us that the weight of the luggage, 
and perhaps even his own weight, would be somewhat punishing after a while? We 
could retain the sense of a generic power I spoke of, and all the facts about orientation 
we employ in guiding him. But can we override the realitas objectiva of his weight 
because, as we have said, he has no conception of it? I mean, even if at times, as said, 
he has no conception of it? But since both his, and our, Self-Conscioussness is not 
intermittent, but rather significantly absent, when it is, would we not be making our 
guiding conception into an ens rationis? Surely if any material conception of both 
actions and persons is to have any stability at all, it must rely on the simple fact that I 
can utter “I am this thing right here.” And this is so not merely because I may in fact 
say this out loud (something I would never really say and thus this is a liberty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 ‘On sensation of position’ in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, p.71. 
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philosophical discourse), but rather because I am that very thing with its weight and 
so is he. Therefore I now wish to finally abandon this idea of a robot-man.  
Let us, once more, address the idea we are examining more explicitly: if, on 
the one hand, it became quite clear that the reason why our guiding conception could 
have any purpose at all was exploited in the fact that there is no point to the 
expression my world (although, I do not deny there is one, in certain contexts), on the 
other hand, what became threatening as a form of elimination was that there is a point 
to the expression my legs in the context of an explanation of action. This not only 
eliminates the individual (or automaton) as a subject, in a full-blooded sense we have 
yet to explain, it also makes the concept of action unstable if not completely void.  
But now we are at crucial point of the present argument. I wish to preserve the 
sense of sensation we have arrived at; I wish to preserve this primitive fact. But I do 
not wish to reduce an individual (or the automaton, or any one of us) to this primitive 
fact; I do not wish to reduce his actions to his sensations. We understand this in the 
sense that I do not reduce myself to my sensations, and neither do you. Take for 
example my breathing. We may safely assume that my breathing is an all-important 
biological fact about me – a condition of possibility for my life. But I can easily 
remind myself that my conscious life entails, but is not exhausted by, my breathing. 
Facts about my breathing (that I have asthma, for example) come before me as things 
that condition everything else I will go on to do, or not do. This idea already has 
considerable scope, which is the idea that the pathology that befalls my breathing 
impedes me. And behind all this lies a philosophical temptation – again, to reduce 
myself to a vital sign, which would, perhaps, finally give me the beginning of an 
explanation about what I am even though it would probably miss who I am.  
 
The proximal and the directional interpretation of sensation 
31. Hegel’s image of Self-Conscioussness, which has its veins in nature, 
intends to tell us more than we have been able to understand so far.  
The over there deployed in our guiding conception cannot be interpreted 
merely in a proximal way; it is not merely knowledge of something that is somewhat 
removed from oneself – in any event, it is only in a special sense that I say my 
sensations are proximate or close to me. This is precisely what is striking about 
Hegel’s image: although we might make sense of a proximal interpretation of the 
image, this interpretation would miss out on something we further wish to express. 
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Provisionally, we might say that there is more than the feeling of a sensation to it. 
When we consider Self-consciousness as having its veins in nature, we could say that 
this is as close as it ever gets. Is not going over there something that requires my 
sensations, although not in the same full-blown passive sense that is involved in e.g. 
being tickled by a feather? The thought experiment with the robot-man purported to 
avoid a reduction to sensation, but also to make apparent the shared sense of a space 
as condition of possible movements (something captured by any description in the 
common idiom of actions along the lines of “He is going into the kitchen”).  
Hegel is trying to capture a principle of cognition rather than a mere condition 
of cognition. But how does this imply a distinction between mere sensation and self-
consciousness as having its veins in nature? The principle in question would have to 
exhibit some form of substantiality that the passive aspect of a sensation lacks. We 
can provide enough argument to maintain this difference because there are two 
conceivable relations to explain the heterogeneity between self-consciousness and 
nature. As a condition of consciousness, we delimit a sense in which nature impresses 
itself upon self-consciousness (perhaps in an unavoidable sense). But the sense of the 
principle in question is quite distinct. Consider, for instance, how we commonly 
maintain that what we are doing can be described as: going somewhere. This is to say 
we are moving towards someplace that we are not currently in; in contrast, imagine 
leading a completely motionless life, like a plant in a vase, where we do not move 
ourselves anywhere. We require no more than our common idiom to express this idea. 
We do move about; we do intend to go to places in order to do things. The idiom we 
use to express these ideas is, to take an expression from Hart, our ordinary 
terminology of actions.27 So in our thinking about sensations, we discern the notion of 
proximity. But, nevertheless, are your sensations with respect to moving your legs any 
closer to you than your thoughts about going to the airport?  
 
32. The proximal interpretation of Hegel’s image could be potentially 
vindicated if we were to model it after pain, as something that possesses (and 
relevantly so) locality and intensity. But this qualitative knowledge is quite strange if 
we are talking in our ordinary idiom. If you have a bruise on your knee, you might 
bring it to your doctor’s attention by pointing to the surface of your body. You may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 ‘Acts of Will and Responsibility’ in Punishment and Responsibility, p.102. 
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even poke it, as a means to discern the quality of the bruising, and say: “It really 
hurts, I really hurt my knee.” It is exactly this sort of case that justifies the proximal 
interpretation of sensation; coextensively, it is also this kind of case that renders the 
interpretation of sensation extraneous to an explanation of intentional action. This 
phenomenon requires a folding onto itself; the explanation or verification of the 
sensation addresses it qualitatively and therefore lacks the required scope.  
 
33. Instead, imagine you say, like the individuals in the Investigations: “I feel 
something hard and rough over there.”28 We might start by conceiving of this 
sentence in the sense of an extension. This is precisely the perspective Wittgenstein 
starts with, and is indeed very similar to Hegel’s image: “It is as if I had nerve-
endings in the tip of the stick?” A reply to this question demands a sense for this 
phrase. The image of an extension is helpful, but not enough. This is so because the 
idea of an extension still exploits the proximal interpretation: it is an extended version 
of the proximal interpretation – perhaps a subsidiary image would be that of a tree 
with its many roots and branches, ever expanding, but, of course, never leaving its 
place.  
The individual in the Investigations uses a stick. And the question is about the 
direction of his feeling: does he feel it over there or against the tips of his thumb, 
middle finger, and index finger…”29? The matter of direction is not an all-together 
dissolution of the disjunction; it is not a choice we have to make. The directional 
interpretation is rather selective, in the sense that it absorbs proximal facts if they are 
relevant; notice that the enumeration of the parts of one’s hand might, even if ever 
present to self-consciousness, be irrelevant; but this is not always the case, e.g. when 
you stop trying to open the jar because it hurts your wrist. Wittgenstein’s anatomical 
enumeration exhibits the same type folding unto itself we noticed before about pain. 
And this folding unto itself represents an opposite interest from what we are trying to 
bring out through the directional interpretation of sensation. 
Notice that Wittgenstein does, indeed, make his argument from ignorance. He 
imagines that the individual in question is ignorant about what he is feeling; he 
expresses perplexity about what is over there. And, furthermore, irrelevance and 
ignorance are not really the same thing. Suppose that everything in the world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Philosophical Investigations, §626. 
29 Philosophical Investigations, §626. 
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exhibited the same qualitative sensation to human touch. This monotony would be 
catastrophic: we would not touch a cake to see if it is baked, for example (and the 
cake is, in any relevant sense, over there). The person in Wittgenstein’s example is 
not entirely satisfied with the hardness of what is over there. We find this to be the 
case because his sensations, as involved in finding out what is over there, are all 
important to, but no exhaustive of, his interest. By this I mean to say that to discover 
what is, in fact, there, is not limited to our sensations. – or not limited to whatever is 
enveloped in our sensations.  
In the example, the individual appeals to his sensations. His appeal is an 
expression of his interest, and his sensations gain directionality through their 
involvement with his act. The individual points and touches with the stick in order to 
offer scope to his act. For instance when you miss a step, it characteristically feels like 
the step was not there. When you run against something in the dark, it feels like 
something hard was there. To miss, to run against, to point at > are expressions of the 
scope that characterizes the directionality of a sensation.  
It would be strange, and off point, to try and restore the inferential picture 
Anscombe subsumed under the rubric of clueless knowledge. This sort of sensational 
empiricism would, in the end, have to appeal to a form of voluntaristic 
sensationalism; it would have to, prima facie, concede that an order such as “produce 
that tingling feeling in your thumb, and then put pressure on your index finger, and 
likewise on your middle finger and other fingers!” is an adequate paraphrase of ‘grab 
that bottle with strength!’ And even if this sort of voluntarism was less specific, 
similar to the voluntarism Hart analyzed in the legal doctrines of Austin30 the sort that 
is, very often, justified in some contexts, as for example, in a gymnastic class, a 
practice that, as matter of course, harbors orders such as ‘stretch your quadriceps!’, 
we might still be unable to understand why our ordinary thinking and acting has 
suffered such a reductive spin  to the point of having us think about muscles we do 
not know the names of. Hart is quite right to maintain that we do not, save for special 
occasions, give descriptions of our actions in terms of muscular contractions; 
Anscombe’s clueless knowledge, which is but one variation on the theme of 
knowledge without observation, will not harbor acts directed at particular muscles, not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 ‘Acts of will and Responsibility’ in Punishment and Responsibility, p.98. 
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because this cannot be done, but because such muscular atomism escapes our ordinary 
thoughts about actions.  
Suppose that, while in front of a mirror, I gained the capacity to become 
invisible. I would at least be able to know I was holding a bottle of water, not by 
seeing my hand in the mirror, not even by looking at the bottle floating in the air (it 
could be suspended by translucent nylon strings), but by feeling the sensation of my 
grip. But, of course, this would be due to my act of grabbing the bottle; in a similar 
way, I know I am not inside the room when I hit my hand against a closed door, 
which is a sort of clue, even if now clue is a rather coarse notion, not at all fit for any 
empirical epistemology and, at any rate, again, as over there as it gets. I am not 
satisfied by the clue a sensation gives me, not simpliciter; in a similar manner, I am 
not satisfied by the parallactic facts provided by my vision. I do not act on the fact 
that things seem smaller from here; I do not act as if my visual sensations could evade 
measure and scale. And similarly it is but a mistake when the cake felt baked when I 
touched it yet turned out not to be, but I am satisfied if I am able to tell the doctor 
what sort of pain it is that I feel in my neck when I point to it, I like everyone do rely 
on this ability.   
     
Distinction between a condition and a principle of cognition 
34. Let us reconsider Hegel’s image in relation to the use of ‘I’ in 
Wittgenstein’s example “I feel something….” The directionality of the sensation is 
expressed in the first person. This helps us understand the plausibility of Hegel’s 
image that self-consciousness would have its veins in nature because it is now brought 
into a more ordinary setting. This self-consciousness now deals with the presence and, 
of course, the importance of its sensations, intentions, and so on, and it does so as 
embodied; if I am permitted to slightly change Anscombe’s phrase: Self-
Conscioussness is knowledge of the object one is.31 And since we now are in the 
possession of the difference between a proximal interpretation of sensation and a 
directional one, we may ask: in which sense does the expressing I offer directionality 
to its sensations.  
Before, we noticed that a consequence of being movable is the possession of 
thoughts that express going somewhere to do something.  This is expressive of a sort 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 “The First Person” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers Volume II, p.34. 
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of immediacy, one that is quite insubstantial. There is, nevertheless, still some virtue 
to considering this immediacy more closely. Consider how we came to appreciate that 
this sort of immediacy was at the root of our reciprocal attribution of a left and a right 
to someone else, how it was at the root of apprehending another person as such. For 
this reason, the insubstantiality of this immediacy should not reside in its obviousness. 
Or better, as Hegel puts it, it is a loss for philosophy when this obviousness is 
conceived as a mere condition – it is a loss when we transform it into an abstract form 
of the finitude of our intellect.  
Both Wittgenstein and Anscombe thought there was quite a bit to be 
understood in this sort of immediacy. Anscombe, for example, doubting the value of 
introspection (a method that perhaps could easily degenerate into the construction of a 
self-image, something that in her view sharply opposes self-knowledge), sought for 
answer that would be substantial to who I am in the sort of immediacy we express 
when we say “I am standing.” This is, recognizably, a Wittgensteinian thought: she 
did not seek, we might provisionally maintain, for something that offers a contrast to 
my familiarity with myself and the world; she did not seek, not in this text at least, an 
answer that presented itself as a form of discovery. (I do not mean to deny that there is 
such a discovery, nor that, as I shall say later, there is some opaqueness that threatens 
my knowledge of myself, and – my knowledge of who I am and ought to be.) With all 
of this, what I mean to say is that it is intriguing how Wittgenstein could, in the same 
train of thought, pass from: “Das uns nichts auffällt, wenn wir uns umsehen, im Raum 
herumgehen, unsere eigenen Körper fühlen etc., etc., das zeigt, wie natürlich uns eben 
diese Dinge sind” to “Die Selbstverständlichkeit der Welt drückt sich eben darin aus, 
das die Sprache nur sie bedeutet und nur sie bedeuten kann.”32  
What is most curious is that he could derive his meta-philosophy from our 
immediate experience of the world and ourselves; and I am arguing that this implies 
that Wittgenstein was keen on preserving the very same thing Hegel understood could 
be lost by making subjects into mere conditions of experience – namely, the notion of 
a person. In a rather Wittgensteinian way, I intend to take Anscombe’s notion of 
immediacy rather seriously, although I do not wish to express myself in what I will 
call her minimal vocabulary.  
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 The apprehension of immediacy 
 35. We already saw, through our reciprocal judging, how substantial this 
kind of immediacy is and how there is a particular significance to having a right and a 
left. We also saw how a sense of direction, in a space populated by a multiplicity of 
objects, is a condition of the actuality of these thoughts. 
But let us further address the sort of abstraction the Hegelian thought about 
Self-Consciousness, as having its veins in nature, intends to revert (which I believe is 
in consonance with Anscombe’s ideas on the first person).  
The abstract form we have mentioned is a consequence of the need to address 
the conditions of the intelligibility of experience as such and the philosophical need in 
this problem. In virtue of this, not just an I, but every I, is abstracted into formality. In 
this way, the I becomes a mere condition, and as a condition it becomes a dogmatic 
subject (it becomes the guarantee that there always is a subject). But up until now, any 
notion we had of a subject concerned an acting and feeling subject. And I do not 
believe we have lost any generality (in the sense that just about everyone has a left 
and a right). Consequently, if there was any gain to this method of thinking, it was, in 
a way, to preserve generality without the sort of abstraction that would collapse me 
into a condition of my experience (which I take is the point of Hegel’s image); and if 
this is not generality sensu strictu, then at least, I hope, it is enough to give us a 
perspective on the employment of such real expressions as my left, my face etc., or 
real in the Anscombian sense. But let us focus on the margin that is offered to us by 
the Hegelian critique of the paralogism argument. We have gained enough distance to 
consider the idea of a condition as a form of dogmatism; we have apprehended it as a 
result of an attempt at an explanation. Hegel’s image follows from a Kantian thought, 
and later on Hegel did cast his old image from Glauben und Wissen in a distinctively 
Kantian language: “What does not disappear in all this is the ‘I’ as universal, whose 
seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but is simple seeing which, 
though mediated by the negation of this house, etc., is all the same simple and 
indifferent to whatever happens in it, to the house, the tree, etc.”(Phenomenology of 
Spirit, §102) This simple seeing has no veins whatsoever; I suggest that this is the 
only way it could be indifferent to the house or the tree – the only way it could 
apprehend its seeing as such. But this is the only thing that does not disappear. So 
now the question is: does indifference to whatever mediates my thoughts, my self-
apprehension as a condition of cognition, entail my indifference to myself? Hegel 
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replies: “The ‘I’ is merely universal like ‘Now’, ‘Here’, or ‘This’ in general; I do 
indeed mean a single ‘I’, but I can no more say what I mean in the case of the ‘I’ than 
I can in the case of the ‘Now’ and ‘Here’”(Phenomenology of Spirit, §102)). ‘Now’ as 
absolute singularity, and also ‘Here,’ and ‘This,’ stand without acknowledgement of 
any kind. That is, this or that, here and now have lost all their differences, which are 
the very differences I look to acknowledge; and consequently, I only know my 
difference to other things in a formal relation.  
To avoid the pond, I step to my right, he steps to his left: this would be a 
reflexive and a reciprocal thought that holds a connection to me here and now. But I 
am not indifferent to myself, or to him, or to the pond. And I do mean a single I. (I do 
mean the I that steps to the right in order not to fall into the pond.) This is not because 
I am in the possession of good criteria to refer to myself – I am immune to 
misidentifying myself in this way, as long as I am able to keep my healthy 
spontaneity – but because these are the immediate thoughts that I, A.A. usually 
have.33 They are, if you wish, die Art of my being, and I mean this in the way, as I 
take Anscombe also to mean her phrase “E.A. about which I did learn that it is a 
human being,”34 in a species-specific way. Sub specie electricity I could preserve my 
absolute indifference, as Hegel puts it. As electricity, I would be a simple Force 
indifferent to its law.35 But E.A. did learn that she was a human being, a single human 
being as we are entitled to suppose, and so she did learn how to mean something by 
using E.A. and even I. So we, with our bodies, are indeed a principle of actions and 
postures insofar as we mean something by our thoughts about these acts, postures, 
etc.; or better, insofar as we mean something when we say “over there, to your left!”  
When electricity passes through a wire, it exploits the cable’s conduciveness. 
One feature of its indifference is, precisely, that it can change bodies, or rather pass 
through any number of bodies that allow it to do so. Electricity is a Force. We only 
apply force, and our application of force, for example, to a boat we are pushing, is the 
sort of thing we mean and constitutes the sort of I-thought we might catch ourselves 
having. And these thoughts, my thoughts about pushing, can be verified, as Anscombe 
puts it, by this body that is pushing the boat. Now we should remember our previous 	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34 “The First Person” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers Volume II, p.34. 
35 Phenomenology of Spirit, §152. 
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discussion about the mechanical possibilities of a machine’s body. I can, following 
Aristotle,36 enumerate a number of facts about my pushing. These are considerations 
that would not be available to me if, one day, I were to wake up sub species Felis 
catus. But the reflexive apprehension of my body, Anscombe’s “I can also feel one 
part of my body with another,”37 is not so much an infallible method of verification, 
but more of a matter of course; it is as much a matter of course as the fact that the 
person who pushes the boat in Aristotle’s example has to have both of his feet firmly 
planted on the shore. My body allows me to know facts about it just in this way, such 
as these substantial facts and even its limits. And as such, my thoughts about acts and 
postures cannot partake in the electricity’s indifference; I cannot partake in such an 
indifference, nor can I assume that my body is a mechanism at my service (that my 
body contains a closed set of reproducible movements in potentia). We can observe 
this in the following example. When I verify that my fingers are correctly placed on 
the frets of an electric bass, this may be but the incipient expression of my bass 
playing. And in this case I do mean my looking at my fingers, which is to say that I 
have stopped playing a poorly executed bass line and now look down to see where my 
fingers are.  Although I do not mean with this example to say, contrary to 
Anscombe’s animus in both “The First Person” and Intention, that all of these facts 
are simply given to me by observation. It will be the case, if all goes well in my 
practice, that I will stop looking at my fingers and it will be no accident that my bass 
line sounds much better. But my fingers are at a distance from me here. It is not a 
matter of how it feels to play a certain bass line, nor is it a matter concerning the 
quality of the sensations I feel at the tip of my fingers. And, when I do no longer look 
at my fingers, it is the case that I have become accustomed to playing, not that I have 
learned to recognize a set of sensations. This is what I take Anscombe to mean when 
she says that sometimes I can give a much more exact account of what I am doing 
when what I do is at distance from me.38 And I take at a distance from me to mean 
that which is over there, even if this over there designates a posture I take towards my 
own hands.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Movement of animals, 699a. 
37 The First Person’ in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers Volume II, p.34. 
38 Intention, §30. 
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The previous thought I put forward about being, the species-specific thought, 
should not be read as an attempt to reduce the matter at hand to something that could 
figure under the rubric of my animality. I do not know how I could even conceive of 
this save, perhaps, as a form of offense. Thus the immediacy we are trying to grasp 
possesses the dignity of my person – a dignity that can be offended and sustain injury. 
And so neither is this immediacy an attempt to capture a sub-personal sense of 
myself, nor is it an attempt to exhaust all answers to the present question with the fact 
that I am an animal; rather, it is simply the case that, primitively, I am a person. 
Ultimately, I wish to say that this immediacy becomes, in the present argument, Self-
Conscioussness. (Plainly speaking, what else is the sort of thing I do when I consider 
my hands in learning how to play the bass?) But, of course, I do not add Self-
Conscioussness to my body, as you add electricity to the machine in order to make its 
mechanism move.  
 
 Having thought 
36. When we consider this sort of immediacy, we are considering the capacity 
to have thoughts that are material to the action of a given person. This is a starting 
point to conceive of the expression of I as a principle. But we have to understand that 
the notion of this expression is not merely the enunciation of the presence of a 
thought. And I believe that this entails understanding how this notion of expression I 
am putting forward inherits some of the sense of personal dignity Anscombe appealed 
to in her use of the phrase offences against the person. By this I mean that any 
standing conception of immediacy, any conception of the I-thoughts I have, could not 
prevail if I were to seriously occupy the position of someone who reduces themselves 
to something else. Consider the arsenal of expressions Anscombe goes through in the 
formulation of her argument: this object, this body, and this human animal. Could 
anyone in such an epistemologically unstable position, if we were to take this idiom 
completely seriously, even pose these questions? It is rather clear that if anything is 
immediately knowable at all, then this will surely include that I have no doubts as to 
what sort of thing I am (even if I might momentarily lose the sense of who I am). 
Anscombe does, indeed, grant us this. In a situation of total sensory deprivation, I 
would have nothing that this would latch on to, and I might still be able to utter I (of 
course, this sort of ontological homelessness does not follow from my sensory 
deprivation). But it would be senseless to question if I could still utter I had I been ab 
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initio deprived from this body, or this human animal. (To know what sort of 
consciousness is the consciousness of something disembodied would be a relevant 
question here, as would be what it is not to know what privation is. I believe that that 
question about a disembodied consciousness is, in some measure, similar to asking if I 
can know what it is like to be a bat, which is a question that is utterly senseless.)  
 
37. This class of thoughts, these immediate thoughts are part of Anscombe’s 
positive account in “The First Person.” As an elucidation of her conclusion ‘I am this 
thing right here’ she offers the following: “…of whose action this idea of action is an 
idea, of whose movements these ideas of movements are ideas, of whose posture this 
idea of posture is the idea.”39 A question arises from this statement as to how exactly 
would the items mentioned – action, movement, and posture – be intelligible to 
Anscombe’s readers? These propositions have to convey some information, if these 
are to be read as real propositions in the way Anscombe insists. 
The thing right here expresses itself as the possessor of the items mentioned; 
it does not simply express these, since, to use Hegelian terms, no one merely 
expresses his own finitude. And now the question arises as to a person’s possession of 
a self-conception regarding their own discursivity. I take this into consideration 
because an individual, at least minimally, can be in the possession of these very 
thoughts without having any opinion about a self-conception. This person has already 
distinguished herself from her thoughts; this means to say, this person does possess 
the concept of experience as such. And this is manifested in her immediate self-
ascription of these thoughts and also in being immune to missing the subject of these 
very thoughts. As Strawson puts it, in practice, the reference to the immediate 
possession of experiences is not lost even if there is no criteria of personal identity at 
work40 – But notice that with this we get ever closer to a condition of experience;  I do 
not even mean that a self-image, or a biographical self-apprehension has to be in place 
in order for one to have such thoughts (neither do I wish to discount their importance) 
–  I am simply concerned with the pervasive passive aspect of having thought. (If we 
are able to keep Hegel’s suggestion in mind, we may recover how Anscombe’s 
expression of possession contains something further. This partially amounts to not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 “The First Person” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers, Volume II, p. 33. 
40 The Bounds of Sense, pp. 164-166. 
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giving in to the evermore exultant character of the structure and function of 
cognition, the master-thought behind Glauben und Wissen.) 
We should remember that this form of immediacy might discount its own 
peculiar simplicity. For this reason, at this stage of the argument, it is pertinent to be 
reminded that such a form of immediacy belongs to a healthy, spontaneous mind. This 
is a mind that does not, in principle, ask for a who with respect to its possession of 
thoughts and intentions. Ultimately, it is this sort of healthy and spontaneous relation 
to a world, and to one’s thought about the world, that Anscombe will address 
knowledge without observation (although I would prefer to forego the use of this 
idiom until we have addressed it more explicitly).  
We do not ask who the subject of our thoughts and intentions is. But, if we 
consider the items Anscombe refers to demonstratively, we discern something further: 
we are capable of applying, and recognizing, the scope that offers these a direction. 
This is to say that these items allow us to consider them in a distinct sense, which is 
distinct from the consideration of their presence simpliciter.  
If we consider these thoughts and their involvement in an action, we restore 
the sense of immediacy that is familiar to something that is not simply immovable. A 
movement and a posture as in climbing a ladder gain a direction: going up the ladder, 
doing such and such movements, not missing steps when assuming each climbing 
posture, etc. This peculiar involvement in an action shows one aspect of the discursive 
nature of this very intellect, which is not merely conditional, nor enumerative of the 
possession of thoughts. Although it does not yet tell us the point of such discursivity, 
the plain fact that one is indeed capable of expressing one’s thoughts. But let us first 
begin by focusing on the isolation of one feature so as to explain this form of 
compatibility, namely the locative aspect of these thoughts.  
 
A suggestion, locative thinking as an initial intuition concerning the 
possession of immediacy 
38.  Locative thoughts relate to a person within an environment, and this point 
in turn, to a general conception of a world that contains it. They relate an interest with 
respect to an environment, which is in itself a section of a world; it is not just any 
section, but a section considered to be relevant as a direction for a subject. Even if we 
find ourselves somewhere we did not choose to be, it is still the odd place we are not 
supposed to be. We occasionally get lost, and getting lost overthrows our sense of 
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direction (although it does not make it impossible to relate, in an immediate way, to 
our surroundings wherever it may be that we find ourselves). We find ourselves 
where we are not supposed to be, and now we have to get back on track. It is in this 
sense that although we may still be capable of uttering “I am at x,” this is in no way 
synonymous with “I have arrived.” And we may even find ourselves incapable of 
even discerning the place in question. At this moment we might utter an unspecified 
thought, such as “This isn’t x!” which is an expression that gains its pertinence from 
the directionality of going to x. The directionality we are addressing contains the 
world as its home; we return to a familiar thought here: the principle we are 
considering manifests a certain kind of dependence. 
The person who utters I am this thing right here locates herself. There does 
not even have to be a reason for her to do so – she does not have to be going 
somewhere, or be trying to inform someone she is on the phone with, who is looking 
down from a balcony, of her location in a crowd below. Rather, and in much simpler 
terms, perhaps too simple, I mean that the here in I am this thing right here has to 
have a location, even if this person is pointing at her chest (and by pointing she does 
not mean to point out her heart, or liver, or soul). We may even appeal to Anscombe’s 
arsenal of preferred expressions: if I am this human animal, or this body, then I am 
somewhere.  
I do wish to include spontaneity in my immediate possession of thoughts 
about actions, postures, etc., that I am here. In other words, that I am in a library, at a 
university, in a city, in a state, in a country; I could give you my current address. And 
this does naturalize my apprehension of my thought about actions, postures, etc. I do 
not have to, as in Anscombe’s joke, pause to think some of these thoughts; I have 
these thoughts all the time. And hence I do not merely express myself as an empty 
ego-concept, as capable of having thought in principle, but rather as capable of 
actively making use of the thoughts I have. In a deprivation tank, I am nowhere; I am 
not going anywhere, and my spontaneity is perhaps only filled we anguish. Our 
imagination does allow us to ponder such a horrible scenario, but it is immediately 
checked by our sense of reality; we immediately remember the immense privilege it is 
to have spontaneity and all that comes with it. In the deprivation tank, I am nowhere 
and close to nothing at all – nothing is close to me or far away; I am no longer this 
thing right here because there is no here and I am not even what I used to be anymore.  
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An interpretation of the demonstrative in ‘these ideas of movement, posture, 
etc.’ 
39. We may raise doubts about Anscombe’s use of demonstratives in the 
identification of these kinds of thoughts. Is Anscombe referring to her particular ideas 
in ostensive acts?41 The question is to disentangle her use of demonstratives, in this 
particular context, from the sense that depends on acts of ostension. She never does 
claim, as a private linguist might be tempted to do, to give any phenomenological 
description of her current experience, which is something that would fall within the 
proximal interpretation of these thoughts. Any detail of this kind would be quite 
useless in her announcing herself to us (unless one of us is a doctor, and in that case 
her announcement would be different, as it could indeed be about the location of the 
pain). The sense of her use of demonstratives arises only at a very specific moment; it 
is a problem that emerges only when addressing unmediated thoughts. But we may 
provide a context that is not artificial for the emergence of these considerations. To 
signal out these thoughts about actions, movements and postures is a way of revealing 
self-knowledge. This kind of knowledge, as Anscombe puts it, is knowledge of the 
object one is or of the human animal one is; We can take this to mean something quite 
trivial (as we have already discussed) without the exultant character of substituting 
one form of dogmatism for a different one (in a Hegelian vein). Of course the object 
that we are is rather substantial for gaining of knowledge about ourselves; it grounds, 
amongst other things, our capacity to have a left, which is something quite useful for 
the thoughts we might catch ourselves having, e.g. I am going downstairs. 
Now this particular use of demonstratives, the use that identifies these 
thoughts and indexes them to a given person – if these are not exhausted by their 
apprehension simpliciter – has to allow our understating of her thoughts as her 
thoughts. Hence the expression, this thought about action yields some facts about her 
practical reasoning, namely the sort of reasoning that both I and her employ in order 
to act. And, certainly, the sense that is employed to identify her thoughts as hers may 
be useful, for example, as an assertion about its superior quality. (Imagine we are both 
attempting to solve the same problem. Then one of us says: I got it! This is how we 
should do it. Nothing prevents us from sharing a thought, although the instrumentality 
of my thought as significantly different from her thought is still preserved. We could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Kenny raises doubts about this use of demonstratives. See “The First Person” in 
Intention and Intentionality, pp. 6-12. 
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then find ourselves in the following dialogue: are you thinking the same thing?! …Ok, 
you lift it and I will hold it still! No private linguist would be interested in the 
discursive aspect of these thoughts since his interest does not concern the employment 
of these thoughts at all; it is not a matter of asserting his thoughts for him, but rather 
of how he came to be able to speak, at all.)  
In spite of this, the minimal sense Anscombe expresses herself with in this 
particular essay still lacks the character of an ordinary expression (even though I do 
not doubt that her point concerns the instrumentality of such thoughts). By this I mean 
that her expression still lacks any sort of resemblance to the idiom we employ when 
we address our reflexivity. This is perhaps a consequence of Anscombe’s interest in 
dispelling the deep-rooted grammatical illusion, and this is something we do not have 
to share with here. We may be interested in gaining knowledge of a proper conception 
of the expression I, in the positive sense of understanding our reflexive and reciprocal 
thoughts, without having to stay clear of anything that might come close to a 
substantial conception. If we have clarification regarding the concepts involved – a 
condition of cognition, property of thoughts, the directional sense of sensations, etc. – 
we do not have to insist on paraphrasing away our conception of an expressing I. We 
may, carefully, start speaking about our experiences and thoughts without having to 
express ourselves as a thing. 
So the disentangling might actually proceed by converting her these or this 
into my. Her use of this, nevertheless, is only sensible to her listeners if it picks out 
her thoughts about her actions. It cannot mean that the sense of her use of the concept 
of action, or movement, is glued to her as hers; she does not, indeed, insist on the 
exclusivity of her thoughts like the solipsist might. It is, presumably, this sense of my 
that is involved in the asymmetries, revealed through the gain of first-personal 
knowledge, which are the characteristically privileged or characteristically limited 
ways we have of possessing such knowledge. We can see this in the following 
example: imagine you are taking your wallet out of your back pocket. You know that 
you are doing this. What you do not know, but I know, is that when you took your 
wallet out of your back pocket, you dropped your house keys in the process.42 It is 
this sense of my that is verifiable in descriptions – the sort of descriptions that 
putatively contrast with my knowledge of what I am doing, or descriptions that cannot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 “The First Person” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers Volume II, p. 26. 
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but to be about this body.43 In the same way, My left is your right is only stable if we 
recognize our subjective positions without damaging the sense of the proposition that 
conveys information as constituting a real proposition. It is in this sense that 
Anscombe’s this implies my.  
 
40. “My left is your right” is an intrinsically reciprocal thought, and one that 
is grounded in the reflexive capacity expressed in the use of my. Presently, however, I 
wish to address the absence of context. We have to eliminate her presentation as 
starting with an announcement and substitute it with a convenient necessity;“My left 
is your right” may be nothing more than the expression of convenience. 
This convenience is to be read as a particular necessity felt in common 
contexts. And in these cases, the position of a first person, that is, that one is the 
subject of one’s own thoughts about oneself is assumed to begin with. A question 
regarding the affirmation of this does not even arise. In light of this, we do not have to 
become blinded by our anxiety to dispel any positive conception of the first person 
subject at all. We do not have to eliminate the attempt at a conception, or feel that we 
must paraphrase it into something more tangible. The knowledge that you have a left 
is convenient, and we do not ever have to be tempted to extrapolate it into something 
more dogmatic than that. 
 
An excursus: the embodied knowledge implied by the possession of the 
concept of agency – over here and over there 
41. In these propositions discussed above, we encounter the deployment of 
egocentric concepts. These presuppose the capacity of a given person to locate herself 
properly in a spatial context. This context provides the frame of reference for the use 
of the egocentric concepts such as “my” and “yours,” but also, “here” and “there.”  
Let us address the sense of this “here” when deployed by both subjects who 
share a frame of reference. This concept is, of course, also intelligible apart from the 
context of a reciprocal relation in a shared space. It can be the “here” of an individual 
subject as he tries to find his way through a city; and it can be shared in a context 
where both subjects are not present in the same spatial location, as when someone 
calls another person on the phone to ask for directions – one says to the other: “Yes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43“The First Person” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers Volume II, p. 35. 
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now I am here.”  In our simple case, the formation of a shared spatial “here” implies 
two subjects sharing a given space from a personal perspective. What are the 
resources for a constitution such as this?  
The constitution will imply the position of the bodies of the subjects; it will 
imply that they are bodily agents occupying a particular space. But it is not limited to 
this aspect, since the mirroring relation presupposes elements that are apart from their 
body. The constitution of the frame of reference, which supports the propositions 
above, integrates two different perspectives from two distinct subjects as embodied 
agents. This integration is a conflation of interests and horizons in the world (as can 
be expressed in: ‘that thing there behind you”).  
The reason why these are termed agential bodies is related to a feature the 
deployment of egocentric concepts allows, namely their variation in relation to a 
shifting point: a form of movement. Both Taylor and Evans make this point.44 When 
we refer to paradigmatic objects, such as the sky or the ground, we do not provide an 
exhaustive explanation for the use of concepts such as up or down (which does not 
exclude the active fixing of such paradigmatic objects to assist orientation). The 
explanation has to contain the use of these egocentric concepts in the context of 
actions. But this does not, not per se, overthrow the stability these concept gain within 
the world we act. No one who is suspended from his feet in midair thinks that up is 
where the floor is and down where the sky is. For another example, we consider that 
the books on my table are to my right or to my left depending on where I stand in my 
living room. These remarks, however, are intended to bring into to view the 
familiarity that comes with the possession of these concepts. Moreover, familiarity in 
this context is familiarity with one’s body. To consider that my head is up does not 
stand on equal measure with the sky as a paradigmatic fixing point of directionality. 
When I am underground, the ground is up; but my head is never, in this way, 
susceptible to a shift. When I am suspended in midair and walking on my hands, I do 
not cease to know that now everything is upside down; similarly I do not, while I hold 
my toothbrush, in front of a mirror, give myself the impression that my right hand is 
my left hand (even when writing appears confusing when in front of a mirror). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Varieties of Reference, p. 156. 
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42. Let us consider the capacity of two agents to create a shared frame of 
reference. This frame is not abstracted from the spatial physical order and it cannot 
be. We can see this, for instance, when we position our subjects in a building: they 
will deploy the same relevant concepts in their shared frame of reference, and 
integrate these into a physical and spatial order, when they are given a simple 
indication of where something is in that building; an indication of this kind could be 
something like “It is right there, to your left, behind the door.”   
The agential aspect appears here as a necessity for the correct conception of 
the activities involving these concepts. Our first subject presupposes that right in front 
of him is a person with the capacity to correctly deploy and understand these 
concepts. And he assumes that, given the location of the other subject, these allow for 
a certain kind of shift. His presupposition is guided by the intelligibility of the 
constraints a given space exerts upon his actions. (These are constraints such as 
material restrictions within a physical space, e.g. tables you have to walk around or 
doors that impede you from going into a room.)  
When giving directions, one subject assumes the usefulness of his directions in 
guiding the other subject’s actions. This usefulness has to be understood in the 
context of a reciprocal relation; when giving directions, one is not merely providing a 
description of one available way. One gives directions with respect to not any just old 
way, e.g. a straight line from the point where the other person is standing to the 
desired destination, but a way of getting there. Directions are descriptions of 
indications relative to a particular physical space; these are descriptions of potential 
intentional actions. (In this sense, these share an aspect of an order. These 
descriptions accommodate the conditions for their execution.)  
 The locative aspect of the space can also be shared with reference to the 
function of the space and the objects that populate it. For example, imagine I am 
within a house talking to someone who is in the kitchen while I am in the living room. 
My shouting “Bring the salt with you” is a way of anticipating an intentional action. 
This feature of reciprocity depends on our knowledge of, say, the house we are in: the 
other person is over there where the salt also is. And, if we are both in the kitchen, I 
may ask him to take the salt into the living room since we are both over here (where 
the salt is). Of course, I do not refer to him as that thing over there when I shout for 
the salt; but, in a way, he is that thing over there, although not a thing that is outside 
the confinement of my reciprocity. His being over there, for me – and, if I call for 
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him, his over here, for him – conceals the sense that he is indeed a human animal with 
legs, arms and so on (in sum, with a body); although, now, in our reciprocal thinking, 
he is that human animal, just like I am this one, the animal that could, potentially, 
follow the same paths as I do, were I to give him directions. A statue is over there, 
and even if this statue has a human form, even if it is the statue of a person, its 
Existeznform is stasis. The statue is, in this important sense, outside the confinement 
of my reciprocity, even though we share a space. We do share a space, but the statue 
and I could not share a horizon, nor could we share the task that makes this horizon 
possible. The statue is, perhaps, decoration, or a reminder of someone or some event. 
But we find this statue, in any case, to be a fact of my, and others’, dwelling.) 
 
 To share a space 
 43. Consider sharing a house, or a library. We do act within spaces that 
facilitate our actions, and we arrange these spaces to contain objects, tools, and people 
(who may be working). The setting of orientation points is done within a world that 
we make familiar: consider how objects are disposed within a space, e.g. the display 
of tools at a hardware store, and also consider how the very form of a hammer 
anticipates our grip. Things and places are over here or over there, closer to both of us 
or closer to you. Closeness is crucial to our mobile lives, as is, in equal measure, 
distance; it is as such a mark of the locative for us who have a body. Unlike plants in 
vases, we can get further away from where we are now, get away from something or 
someone, and also closer to somewhere or someone. (These remarks pertain to an 
attempt at the interpretation of the phrase “I am this thing here”45 in connection with 
the idea that knowledge without observation is related to knowledge of the position of 
my limbs, as employed in Intention.) 
 
The expression of unmediated thoughts – the contraction and expansion of 
reflexivity: I, my, and myself 
 44. The fact that we are the principle of the direction of those thoughts about 
actions, movements, and postures, provides some measure of knowledge about what 
kind of thing we are. And even if, provisionally, we used expressions such as the 
human animal, the sort of knowledge we have been trying to attain does not concern a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “The First Person” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected 
Philosophical Papers Volume II, p. 32. 
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contribution to a list of zoological alternatives. This is a list that could include, for 
example: the vertical ape, the tool-making ape, the brainy ape, the territorial ape, the 
naked ape, and so on.46  This is not at all an attempt to gaze at a species in a museum, 
perhaps amongst other species, nor a way of putting some considerable distance 
between me and the species I belong to in order to facilitate my zoological endeavors 
and discern the distinctive trait of the human animal. I only mention all of this 
because the sense in which Anscombe used this expression, the sense I have been 
following, is not the zoological sense at all. Of course this marks an aspect of 
philosophical thinking – to apprehend human spontaneity without losing its 
materiality, which can mean the human body or the entire world. It is more of a threat 
to philosophical thinking, such has been the history of philosophy, that one could drift 
away, or contract one’s thinking to the point of postulating the autonomy of this very 
thinking – perhaps, because, amongst other things, we are capable of apprehending 
that we have thoughts – than to indulge in the sort of search for a distinctive trait (of 
which the above list is a reflex). The distinctive trait is, we assume, familiar evidence, 
although not unquestioned familiarity, but still, familiarity nevertheless.  
Hegel once put into words the sort of contraction I have in mind. For him, this 
was a sort of diremption, a moment of difference with a perennial character where the 
recognition that our philosophia perennis is a form of contraction: “In thinking, I am 
free, because I am not in an other.”47  
The truth of this thought expresses, again, something general about what one 
is. It is, as is the thought that one is a human animal, an expression of a form of 
generality. This thought recognizes that there is another, although not in the 
reciprocal sense we have addressed before, perhaps because the point of this reflexive 
act of recognition is not the other but oneself – for whomever thinks that thought. The 
notion that “the manifold self-differentiating expanse of life, with all its detail and 
complexity, is the object on which desire and work operate”48 could be annihilated by 
the truth of this thought, is not difficult to recognize. For example, when I think, I 
realize my singularity, not the distinctive trait of the species that is now wholly other 
to me in a logical relation.  But I cannot do away with thinking what is other, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 This list can be found in Desmond Morris’s The Naked Ape: a zoologist’s study of 
the human animal. 
47 Phenomenology of Spirit, §197. 
48 Phenomenology of Spirit, §199. 
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whatever it may be, if I am to be able to think what I individually am. At this point, 
there is even more that threatens the truth of this very thought. The idea that I am free, 
in thought, does not imply that I am free for everything else that is other than me. This 
is not the case simply because I can be prey for other animals, but because others like 
me could be indifferent to me. And if they are indifferent to me, they can then 
threaten my freedom by harming me, or by simply ignoring me, leaving me in 
complete isolation. The thought that my entire species could be wholly other to me is, 
if this is to mean that I could be indifferent to it and not suffer under the indifference 
from it, completely absurd. Despite this, I do not mean to imply (not even to suggest 
the image) that everybody else, whoever it may be, is me – I know they are not. The 
reason, nevertheless, why I experience some measure of urgency at the thought that I 
ought not to be indifferent to others, and everything else (or why I hope that others 
will not be indifferent to me), springs from the fact that I have learned that the good 
and the true49 are something to be found in this world and in others. And I find this 
thought does not solemnly reflect on my animal dependence either. I do know I could 
keep myself intact, that is alive and sane, even if everybody else was gone (at least for 
a while), but even so my Self-Conscioussness would not turn into that of the solipsist; 
probably, I would just feel lonely. And this dependence that I feel upon others is also 
not an unambiguous fact of my existence; it is, amongst other things, both the source 
of my comfort and of the many offences I take. But the truth of the thought expressed 
above is, nevertheless, invaluable: I do know I am not in an other, in no conceivable 
way; in this same sense, I know that the world and my body condition me at the same 
time as I know that others are, and have been indifferent to me; and I know that I can 
be indifferent to them, although I could hardly be indifferent to the facts of my 
cognition. 
Perhaps, the same idea can be expressed negatively. It may be expressed as 
what we are not: “My soul is not I; and if only souls are saved, I am not saved, nor is 
any man” as Aquinas said.50 In my present condition, whatever the temptations are, 
either to abstract myself into complete generality or complete singularity, all that I 
can express as myself is bound to be far less special than any of the alternatives. And 
it is bound to carry with it some rather distinct tasks, which would be entirely 
insubstantial to any soul, formal condition of experience or singularity. 	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50 Aquinas, Commentary on Paul I Corinthians 15. 
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45. And yet, this is only one way that I have to grasp myself – a via negativa. 
St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans often appeals to the reflexive. And these appeals, the 
appeals to be understood by others, employ the reflexive in an unequivocal sense: “I 
say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience bearing witness with me in the Holy 
Ghost, that I have great sorrow and unceasing pain in my heart.”51 That what I say is 
the truth, that there could, in principle, be a verification of the truth I speak, that this 
truth is all important, that which witnesses what I speak is above us all, and yet, that 
all I wish is to communicate this to others, is as much of a full-blown reflexive 
expression as it is a reciprocal hope. That he is the possessor of an unceasing pain, 
and that now the sense of pain is not merely proximal, or there is no question if the 
proximal quality of his pain could only be for him as it would be for the solipsist, but 
that it is, in his speaking, principally for us. He does not refer to his conscience, or he 
does, but not as a guarantee that he in fact is, but so it can be for us. And our 
understanding of Paul as the possessor of that very conscience, and the pain it bears, 
does not turn out to be more, or less, intangible than if he were referring to his body. 
Paul writes, “For I could wish that I myself were accursed from Christ for my 
brethren’s sake, my kinsmen according to the flesh: who are Israelites….”52 That his 
blood can, as can everyone’s blood, hold political value, that is, that he can refer to 
his body and its vitality as holding such value is a mark of the expansion of the 
reflexive. Now, some of what is wholly other to me shares of the same principle of 
vitality as I do. But what does the same blood mean? My kinsmen do not have the 
same blood as I do, because they are not biologically attached to my circulation. What 
plagues my circulation, what threatens the human animal I am, does not threaten my 
kinsmen in propria persona. And, moreover, it is a fact about the human animals we 
are that we stand in blood relations, and that we know these blood relations. It is also 
true that I could stand with those who are my kinsmen in the flesh as I could with 
those others who are my kinsmen in faith. And now, my reflexive conception of 
myself has expanded even more. I mean, that my kinsmen in the flesh are Israelites, 
but my kinsmen in faith are not even that. I have long since drifted away from the 
thought that it is my own blood that unites me with what is other – which is to mean 
that the confinements of my reciprocity have grown. Paul has reminded us that we 	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52 Romans 9:3-4. Cf. K. Barth Epistle to the Romans, 335-338. 
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know our own blood is not in another. And although blood like mine can be in 
another, I am (as blood, if I could be my own blood) not in another. My brethren, 
those for whom I could wish a curse upon myself, those I worry about to the point of 
my own annihilation, do not have to possess blood like mine. The vitality flowing 
through their veins is not the same as that which flows in mine. But it does not flow 
less than mine – Not for me! But let us take a step back – I am not my blood, nor my 
veins, nor my brethren. I am made out of veins and blood and I do worry, to the point 
of an unceasing pain, about my brethren. Nevertheless, this thought is not complete. 
At this point, we see that when we expand this thought, it brings much more into view 
than we expected at first. The sorrow that the biblical voice expresses is with respect 
to the fact that I indeed can be indifferent to my brethren, and so I am, as they are. 
 
The expansion of reflexive towards the world: the relations of dependence and 
avoidance between persons and objects, products and activities 
46. There are distinctively reflexive concepts that apply to material inanimate 
objects such as: “a is useful,” “b is poisonous,” and “c is harmful.” All of these 
predicates denote a quality of the subject. But to denote this quality presupposes a 
certain relation that grounds the truthful applicability of the respective predicate. This 
relation presupposes something or someone to whom the objects, which fall under the 
predicates above, would be useful, poisonous or harmful.53  
The objects to which the predicates above apply will condition our activities. 
These things, in an unavoidable sense, surround us. As objects of work, or to be 
worked with, they may be transformable. Their value can further our activities, and is 
both preserved and increased through our working on and with them. This notion of 
value condenses, in a subtle way, our presence in the material world. We imagine this 
presence as activity or as dependent activity. In other words, we are thinking of our 
nature as dependent upon that which is demarcated from it by having its own nature. 
Hence, Hart and Honoré: “Common experience teaches us that, left to themselves, the 
things we manipulate, since they have a ‘nature’ or characteristic way of behaving, 
would persist in states or exhibit changes different from those which we have learnt to 
bring about in them by our manipulation.”54 These things do not persist according to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The examples are taken from Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences 
in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, p. 248. 
54 Causation in the law, p. 29. 
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their nature because of our presence; they stop the course of their characteristic 
activity the minute they enter one of our activities. (I presume that this is exactly what 
furthers Hart and Honoré’s interest in a central notion of causality.) 
We can visualize this in the following example. The mirror in any room 
started out as glass and, like any other raw material, reflects back a necessity of ours; 
it was, as a raw material, consumed through distinct processes and became different 
through its involvement in an activity. Through this notion, we approach a sense of 
consumption; further, we discern the nature of our own dependence as something that 
demands stability. Peaches are peeled off before being canned, and metal is 
galvanized so it will not rust. It is an abnormality to find a peach with a peel inside a 
can of peaches, and it is an inconvenience when your patio table rusts. We may say 
that some of these objects resist an imposed form, but this is to be expected. Defect 
and inconvenience are given relatively to the stability that prompts their usefulness.  
These things surround us, usually, in a stable manner – even if, in some cases, 
the corresponding activities are usually things worth pursuing in spite of this or that 
accident. Dependence is, in this sense, the practical knowledge one has of how these 
objects have constituted and will continue to constitute an activity. It is not accidental 
that one transforms them, as Aristotle would put it, nor is it an accident that we came 
to know how to do so. It is this sense of consumption that we apprehend in many of 
our descriptions of intentional actions – we apprehend productive consumption.  
Someone who weaves a basket binds a material together, someone who fixes 
an electrical cable binds it back together; the first makes something new, while the 
latter repairs something old. Our activities concern production, but they also concern 
the maintenance of products. This is, in turn, the way these objects surround us and 
the way they enter our descriptions of actions. Our activity and their existence as 
products unfold together in time: 
 
Determinatio est negatio.  
 
And the question that imposes itself now is: what does it mean to deny 
something its nature? I wish to suggest that we find some difficult aspects here. If on 
the one hand, there is an intuitive notion of having power over something, or even 
someone, there is, on the other hand, a less intuitive notion, namely, to do violence to 
something or someone. Sticking with Hart and Honoré’s concept of a characteristic 
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behavior, what is the difference between grooming a lawn and grooming your hair? 
You interfere with the growth of both, do you not? And both would be considerably 
longer had you not interfered with them? Determination is the conferral of identity – 
the lawn, the hairdo – but it is, simultaneously, a loss for whatever is determined. 
Before, I mentioned the notion of resistance when speaking about some of our 
products. Now, notice how all of these considerations are a form of grasping our 
dependence; we do depend on some things that offer us resistance. And now, I think, 
we have marked at least one important difference between hair and grass, although 
this difference is not a novelty for this argument: hair is part of a body (human hair 
that is my hair); the grass on the lawn is not. But it still feels like a liberty to say that 
the lawn resists. And it feels less so, nevertheless, if I think of this argument with 
respect to the animals I consume. All of this is a reflex of my nature and the nature of 
what is another to me; this is an other upon which I, nevertheless, depend. The fact 
that‘a is useful’ does not permit my ignorance about what that thing a is. More 
accurately, I cannot keep my knowledge within the confinements of what is useful in 
it for me. The proteins in the flesh of the animal I consume are not the animal, and 
similarly I am not my flesh. In spite of this, my consumption of the proteins does 
destroy the animal in the same way as I would be destroyed if someone consumed my 
flesh. Our interpretation of the predicate ‘a is useful’ becomes more dense the minute 
we realize that it has application to many species that are far from being alien to us – 
species that are meaningful far beyond the definition of their utility. I mean, far from 
being exhausted by their utility. 
It seems that the passage from power to violence occurs on the basis of a 
reflexive identification, which I am trying to grasp as a feature of its expansion: 
molded plastic does not suggest any sort of violent negation to me, since it does not 
even have a vegetative nature. But I do shiver if I see an animal being shot, precisely 
on account of its animal nature, on account of what this thing has now lost. This last 
thought about loss is complicated. Dependence entails loss, and it does so in a distinct 
way for us. For example, the extinction of a particular natural object, or animal, can 
imply the extinction of an entire activity. Human activity is not an unlimited creative 
power; I cannot create the deer I hunt, nor can I be a deer hunter if there are no longer 
any deer to be hunted. Generically, consumption re-creates the need,55 as Marx says. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Grundrisse, p.91-92. 
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Consumption may extinguish, not necessarily the need, that which satisfies it. And so, 
if I hunt all the deer on an island, I extinguish them, and by implication perhaps 
myself; my violence against them becomes violence directed at myself, which is but a 
reminder that I determine them in order to determine myself – and here, again, 
consumption is production, but now as the reproduction of myself. If what is an other 
– grass or birds – could resist us, we would perish under their resistance; we would, in 
turn, not resist. And even though we have the power to change their course, their 
characteristic behavior, we do not have the power to change their nature (although we 
do violence to their nature, and deny them their nature). The history of our ontology is 
therefore a shared creation, and many of our additions to it, no doubt, examples of our 
creative power, are exercises of violence against what is an other. 
Consider the obvious modal dependence of the form of a given activity upon 
the existence of a natural object: there is corn farming, with all its techniques, because 
there is corn. And therefore we keep seeds; we protect the corn, further its existence 
and its growth. And so, in a way, the fact that corn enters our circulation protects its 
nature; our dependence on corn becomes care for its nature. We raise corn, or we 
produce corn in order to consume it, and so we produce an other so as to reproduce 
ourselves individually (Individual consumption).56 The care I speak of may amount to 
a sort of organized preemption: acting on the knowledge that, putatively, a wedge 
could be driven between us and that which we depend on. And none of this excludes 
the fact that we may be the ones who will drive that very wedge. But the predicate “a 
is useful” is still not interpreted to the fullest extent. An exhaustive interpretation 
would still have to consider the possibility that care may also amount to a form of 
violence. It would have to fully interpret the possibility that there is a passage from 
care to violence that takes place under the rubric of that which is useful.  
We can observe this in the following: Before recording became digital, there 
were tape operators who worked in recording studios. When recording switched from 
tape to digital, these operators were discarded together with those tape machines they 
operated on. The extinction of a profession is not necessarily the extinction of a 
product; it is rather the extinction of its use-value. (The use-value serves as a reminder 
that actions and their respective descriptions may deteriorate during the course of 
history.) But now something crucial has happened: a profession has become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Das Kapital, p.185. 
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something that can also be consumed – actions are an object of consumption. And, if 
your profession perishes, so do some of your actions, and perhaps, so do you. Thus, I 
depend on the actions of another and, by extension, on another person; my actions 
(say, my actions as a tape operator) depend on what these actions mean to others, on 
their value to an other.  
 I believe that our considerations pertaining to the passage from power to 
violence apply here, although with many important qualifications that have yet to be 
made.  
Let us consider the following idea:  
Wenn also vorhandene Produkte nicht nur resultate, sondern auch 
Existenzbedingungen des Arbeitsprozesses sind, ist anderseits ihr 
Hineinwerfen in ihn, also ihr Kontakt mit lebendiger Arbeit, das einzige 
Mittel, um diese Produkte vergangener Arbeit als gebruachswerte zu erhalten 
und zu verwirklichen.57 
The assertion of the relation between these two concepts – product/work – 
belongs to the notion of dependence that we are investigating. Let us consider the 
following aspect: products are not only the results of processes applied to raw 
materials; they are also a condition of the existence of further work. Our dependence 
on the world and others is not something that has to be first acknowledged in order to 
become an actuality. It is rather because it is actual that it has to be acknowledged. 
For this reason, that certain products are the Existenzbedingung of another form of 
activity goes to show the unviability of an atomistic conception of human activity. For 
example, the hammer made at a forgery is an essential precondition of the activity of 
the carpenter. This is, perhaps, too simplistic of a way to apprehend what was, for 
Marx, morally unacceptable about the idea of a Robinson Crusoe. But, it does bring 
into view that the Robinsonades he spoke of could not purchase the self-reliance of 
individuals at the cost of a humanity in abstracto.58 I do not mean to say that the 
unviability of such an atomism implies the impossibility of discriminating between 
activities; I cannot conceive of such a form of monism. I merely wish to say that our 
prevalent thought concerning dependence does not survive in abstracto. What I take 
from Marx is the teaching that the individuals in these Robinsonades evade their 
dependence on human history; they are, and perhaps could only conceivably be, at its 
very beginning. 
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58 Grundrisse, p. 94. 
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A philosophy of economy builds on elements pertaining to a philosophy of 
action. And Marx, with his notions of erhalten and verwirklichen, attempts to 
construct a qualification of the wealth of human economic reproduction – a thought 
that pertains to a philosophical anthropology. The way in which raw materials become 
products, and products stay within the confinements of human activities as conditions 
of the existence of further laboring, reveals an entire form of life (and the Capital is an 
interpretation of that form of life).  
Now, a picture of this form of life comes into view: value received from 
nature, maintained and increased through work. The human creative power starts 
from nature and generates conditions for the sustainment of activities.  
A hammer is produced out of wood and steel, so we can further produce a 
house. We find within the world the vitality of a rational practical principle. 
Anscombe imagined a sentence or a house emerging out of nowhere. Of course, our 
recognition of these products as such is beyond any doubt. The visible likeness to 
what we produce59 would provide enough material for our recognition. Like a mirror, 
these products reflect back to us a concept of human action.  
In this passage, Anscombe is interested in descriptions of something that goes 
on in the world,60 or, descriptions that exhibit a dependence upon the concept of 
human action. But our recognition of these products is more substantial than this. We 
may ask, if such a house arose, and was not build by anyone, what kind of house 
would it be? And if a sentence of this kind appeared, what would it say? Our dealings 
with products like this are not exhausted by their production. They usually stay close 
to us, confined within what we need to do at a given time in history. Does the 
spontaneous house exhibit an architectonic style? Does its architecture exhibit a 
function; is it a temple or a hunting cabin? Such a house would have to arise 
spontaneously within human history, within the history of architecture. Are these 
products independent from human history? If they are, after all they were not made by 
any of us, could they maintain the visible likeness Anscombe takes for granted? Of 
course, all of this is absurd. There can be no such evasion from history. The likeness 
we speak of here only has a sense as long as we can understand likeness as 
production, and production, in turn, as exhibiting the form of dependence we have 
been interpreting. 	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47. We have considered those things we depend on, thing we need, things we 
make, things we find and transform within the world. But we also find within the 
world things we wish to push away from us. These are, namely, things we wish to 
avoid, such as things that pose a threat. These may be natural things or things we 
produce, etc.  
For example, the judgment ‘b is poisonous’ when deployed in the context of 
picking mushrooms guides an activity. But the guidance it offers is restrictive – one 
progresses through a selection, and leaves out what is unwanted. You may selectively 
apply a number of different criteria: size, color or growth. But to capture one’s action 
in a description would, in this case, be equivalent to making sense of the criteria of 
selection that has its grounds on the avoidance of an effect on the picker’s health. 
Ultimately, the description would embody the reflexive conception of how one wants 
to preserve one’s health, or of the active avoidance of a threat to one’s health. This 
sets this criterion apart in rank. In application, it may assume the character of one 
more criterion amongst others – size, form, etc. – but its sense demands an enlarged 
conception.  
 
That which is eatable 
 48. Of course, the class that which is eatable contains more than just 
mushrooms. There is an essential connection between action and individual 
reproductions (which is the only way I can make sense of Marx’s notion that we 
produce our bodies). And, in this sense, the poisonous mushrooms are not excluded 
on the same grounds as the mushrooms that are, for example, too small or too high up 
on a tree trunk. These are excluded as a threat. The consumption of a poisonous 
mushroom is the perversion of an act of nutrition if it is done in ignorance. It is the 
perversion of a self-directed act, an act that, as nutrition, is an expression of 
reproducing the intactness of a person; this is not an act of aggression, as is the 
intentional intake of poison or, as we shall see, the homicidal act of being poisoned. 
The consumption of a poisonous mushroom, the perverted act of nutrition, turns the 
tables on us. We can potentially understand it as a threat that lies in our dependence. 
And, I do not say that this is the only threat; it might even be a minor threat, all things 
considered. But I choose it as an example because it narrows down the idea that there 
is a threat in what is an other upon which I, nevertheless, depend (if I am still 
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permitted to use the Hegelian idiom). Now, my knowledge of that which I depend on 
– my ability to apply the predicate ‘b is poisonous’ – assumes the urgency of 
preservation, namely, the urgent preservation of my vitality. And this sort of 
application, or this sort of knowledge, is knowledge in the service of avoidance, 
which I believe is a species of practical knowledge.  
But objects of avoidance may also be products, places, and others. One may 
avoid the smog and a city because of the smog or because of the excess of people. In 
the case of trash (as a product of something further we do), we have organized a 
practice that keeps it away from us. The trash pick up system removes our own 
debris, and it does so as an act of preservation or as an act of self-preservation.  And 
now, those things that are avoidable, the interpretation of the concept of debris, splits 
up. It is not the case that every effect of this kind can be avoided, nor is it the case that 
all that can be driven away from us and kept away at distance (e.g. smog) will not 
have a permanent effect on the world and us. When you describe the trash pick-up, 
you conceive of the sense in which your trash is driven away from your surroundings. 
And the trash pick-up is not an isolated action; it is an organized practice, and as such 
it implies considerations that fall under what we called stability. The stability of an act 
of self-preservation exhibits a form of dependence on other persons; it relies on the 
recognition that our debris has to be kept away from us, that some products have to be 
strictly kept outside the confinements of our reproduction, as they almost wholly exist 
in stark contrast with individual commodities. In this way, the relation between 
objects of avoidance and us is measured by the success of their exclusion, as are the 
activities responsible for this successful exclusion: your drive the trash away and you 
build a fence to keep wolves out.  
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 3. The action 
 
An interpretation of the possessive in: “Thus there are many descriptions of 
happenings which are directly dependent on our possessing the form of descriptions 
of intentional actions” 
49. But what exactly can dependence and form mean in Anscombe’s formula? 
The notion that we do possess the form of descriptions of intentional action can, 
perhaps, simply mean the same as we do posses the form of our bodies. By this I 
mean to say if we were to be asked to imagine how it is to have two bodies, as 
Wittgenstein often does, we would find it quite impossible to give any plausible 
description of a double-bodied experience. By the same token, it would be difficult, I 
suppose, to give an account of double-bodied intentions. (In fact, I cannot even say if 
we could express intention as we commonly do under these conditions. And so, I 
believe that we have already said something about dependence; dependence, in this 
case, is dependence on the sort of reflexive apprehension we have been describing so 
far.) But let us address a concrete example of such a description:  
 
Why do we say that the movement of the pump handle up and down is part of 
a process whereby those people cease to move about? It is part of a causal 
chain which ends with that household’s getting poisoned. But then so is some 
turn of a wheel of a train by which one of the inhabitant traveled to the house. 
Why has the movement of the pump handle a more important position than a 
turn of that wheel? It is because it plays a part in the way a certain poisonous 
substance gets into human organisms, and that a poisonous substance gets 
into human organisms is the form of description of what happens which here 
interests us.61 
 
The relevancy function that operates in this description restricts the 
intelligibility of the event to what happens. This is, specifically, the involvement of 
the pump is obvious and so is the involvement of the poison as a substance of 
avoidance. But we clearly discern that poisoning is in no way dependent upon the 
existence of pumps and pump handles. Although in the example, we undeniably see 
that the connection between pumping and poisoning is strict: pumping that water is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Intention, p. 84. 
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poisoning, even if this poisoning fails. And, as a method of poisoning, replenishing 
the house’s water supply is, I suppose, quite efficient. 
To be poisoned is an act of consumption. In the poisoner’s plan, the poisoner 
shows knowledge of this act of consumption. And the sense of consumption we are 
interested in is the unavoidable act of the consumption of water, but not of the poison, 
of course. Just imagine the following exclamation about the efficiency of this plan: 
“Sooner or later they will use water!” There are multiple uses for water, and no 
conceivable household exists without it. – The exclamation by the perpetrator is an 
insight into an entire net of descriptions. The plan is, in fact, ingenious: it turns a vital 
necessity into harm.  
In our description, we consider the poison and the wheel of the pump together 
in a non-accidental nexus simply because we are considering what the poisoner is 
doing. For this reason, the consideration of a recessive causal link, as Anscombe puts 
it, is inessential to our explanation. Its recessive character renders the action we are 
considering utterly intractable through the dissipation of our interest; it pushes us 
further away from our actual starting point and eventually we end up outside the 
sphere of relevancy that unites the various acts conducive to poisoning. But our 
description of the operation of the pump pertains directly, as a means, to the act under 
consideration. There is no pumping without pumps, no poisonings without organisms 
suggestible to poison, no poisoning with water without a bucket (or similar recipient) 
and drinkers, and finally no poisoning without evil. This is a distinct sort of chain; this 
chain represents an insider’s perspective, if you will. But what exactly defines this 
perspective? Anscombe appeals to interest, but the interest is in the crime, in the 
means-to-end reasoning of the perpetrator; the rest  (i.e., the workings of pumps, the 
effects of poison etc.) was absorbed by our description as a tacit, perhaps even 
unnoticed, appeal to our familiarity with the world. And therefore the sense of interest 
we are discerning is not the sense of interest we have in ghost stories. This is not 
interest, even as a matter of practicality, say for a detective, regarding what happened. 
When we depend on the possession of a form of description of intentional actions, we 
depend on a world and someone reasoning practically about this world; in the end, 
this is a reflection of our possession of a reflexive Wirklichkeit.  
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The limit to the dispersion of descriptions of action 
50. The possession of a form of description singles out a class of descriptions, 
which are sense dependent upon our reflexive knowledge. We now find ourselves 
with a strict notion of dependence to be reckoned with, since there are many 
descriptions that would be impossible if there was no human activity at all. In light of 
this, Anscombe’s examples of descriptions that do exhibit this strict dependence are 
things like ‘going into reverse,’ which can apply to a driver for instance, and depends 
on the existence of engines, amongst many other things. But there are, of course, 
descriptions that lie outside a notion of strict dependency. To say this does not mean 
that these descriptions have to be puzzling. For example, when we consider the 
expression “sliding on ice,” we wonder what thing it is that is doing the sliding. And 
if we are able to answer this question, and I can imagine many cases where we are 
able to do so, we may even be able to discern some of the thing’s dependence, even if 
only up to a certain limit. Whatever category of movement this thing pertains to, 
whatever form it exhibits, will be describable. But, of course, it will not be dependent 
on our possession of a form of intentional action; if it is a cardboard box that is sliding 
on the ice, there might be many predictions about how long it will slide for i.e. given 
its weight…. Nevertheless, these predictions will be very distinct in kind, that is, from 
predictions about my sliding if I am an ice skater.  
Anscombe seems to be referring to a type of exclusivity in her examples. This 
is expressed through the possession of this form that resists dispersion, or, that there is 
no conceivable blindness to the possession of this form, even if this does not exclude 
that this form is misappropriated. Although lots of things may slide on ice, only we 
skate on it. Only we make contracts, telephone someone, offend others, etc. 62 And 
even if all of these are perverted by compulsion, their meaning will not disperse –it 
would simply amount to the apprehension of a form of pathology. If I slide on ice 
after a fish, I do not become closer to the penguin that does the same, even if the 
penguin and I are both fishing, I suppose. And my compulsive skating is not 
comparable to the fly that flies towards a shining light, even if, in both cases, this 
might be a harmful thing for us to do, respectively.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Intention, p. 85. 
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On the epistemological relevance of our sense of familiarity 
 51. At this moment of the discussion, Anscombe returns to her targeted notion 
of an extra feature. And we understand she is going in the opposite direction: instead 
of isolating an item in a taxonomy of mental operations, she recovers the practical 
context in which actions occur. For example putting up an advertisement upside 
down, as she puts it, involves advertisements and also advertising agencies, all of 
which go to enlarge our descriptions of intentional actions (or, in Anscombe’s 
example, of an unintentional advertising mistake). And, of course, the value of the 
mistake, let alone its sole possibility, resides in this particular practical context – the 
world of advertisements.  
The underlying assumption here is one about agency; the reified form of 
explanation generates a sealed off conception of agency. It is sealed off in the mental, 
we might say, and perhaps discounts the importance of how the description of an 
intentional action demands a wider context. This is to essentially discount the notion 
that what practical reason understands is at a distance – it is right over here, or right 
over there, in the same place one is doing something.  But the wider context, the 
enlarged description, as Anscombe adds, also has an application to things such as cats 
(as it pretty much applies to anything with describable effects).63 Of course, the 
intentionality in the movements of the cat when stalking the bird allows for an 
enlarged description. And what the cat does is grounded in the sort of animality I 
know that also has application to me; intuitively, how the cat does what he does is 
closer to what I do than the enlarged description of the epigenetic development of an 
embryo (by this I mean such things as, the involvement of his perception, the careful 
consideration of his movements in order to avoid making noise and so on, all of these 
pertain to what the cat is doing). But, I still do not know what the animality of the 
hunting cat means to him. I can vicariously experience the dive of the cliff diver, 
although I am far from being one, and very far from knowing the life of a cliff diver; 
but I can’t live, not even vicariously, the life of a hunting cat. 
Wittgenstein once suggested that whatever the term of comparison supporting 
the conclusion that, unlike us, animals do not use language, we could instead simply 	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assert that they do not. We can say this because language is not something they lack, 
but simply something that does not pertain to their form. What Wittgenstein thought 
worth discussing instead was the following insight – eating or walking, commanding, 
questioning, and storytelling were just as part of our natural history as language.64 Of 
course, this is a triviality. But the variety in Wittgenstein’s list, which serves as a 
starting point for our explanation, is not simple to grasp. After all, for a certain type of 
explanation, the difference between intentionally eating a doughnut and intentionally 
buying a car would hardly be relevant, as long as it is intentional. This sort expressive 
economy dispenses with the resources that pertain to a representative totality of 
agency – this is a totality the present argument has been trying to gain back. I believe 
that the absence of such a totality, the absence of familiarity, is bound to make the 
agential mind feel rather displaced. But shouldn’t we avoid this prejudicial 
subservience to theory? And if we do, does not this sort of familiarity emerge 
naturally? Just imagine, instead of someone doing something quite incidentally, 
someone learning how to play an instrument. 
The point of Wittgenstein’s list, the forerunner of Anscombe’s list, resides in 
the gain for philosophy – for the philosopher who accompanies the thoughts being 
laid in front of him in that very book – namely, a sense of history that precludes 
Wittgenstein from giving in into the putative demands of autonomy by any theory. In 
this list, agency appears as our history. There is, of course, a discernable difference 
between eating and commanding, the former pertaining to individual consumption, 
the latter to the possibility of mediation. But as part of the same history, both these 
forms of activity represent the condition of reproduction of the beings responsible for 
that very natural history. This makes the possession of certain forms of description 
depend on one’s existence within time. 
 
52. Here is a description of the concept of reproduction by Marx:  
 
The constant reproduction of the basis of the existing order and its fundamental 
relations assumes a regulated and orderly form in the course of time. And such 
regulations and order are themselves indispensable elements of any mode of 
production, if it is to assume social stability and indifference from mere chance and 
arbitrariness. These are precisely the form of its social stability and therefore its 
relative freedom from arbitrariness and mere chance.65 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Philosophical Investigations, §25. 
65 Capital, volume III, p. 929. 
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History is more present in Marx’s thought than it is Wittgenstein’s list, but 
Wittgenstein’s conception of natural history could hardly ignore the human capacity 
of self-addressing the detail of the reproduction of a particular order. And the 
reproduction of an order – the reproduction of a definite form of activity, a definite 
mode of life, as Marx and Engels put it in the German Ideology66 – are not only the 
reproduction of its stability, but also of some of its enduring effects; This is, for Marx 
, most certainly, the reproduction of violence and injustice, for Wittgenstein it is the 
reproduction of a disease that plagues proper thinking. And these enduring effects, 
these side effects, are just as much a matter of inheritance as is the stability, or lack 
thereof, of a mode of production.  We can see this in the following: we inherit a 
language, and also, we learn from others how things are done and have been done 
long before us. So, as Marx and Engels tell us, “as individuals express their life, so 
they are” the recovery of this sort of familiarity, the recovery of ordinary language for 
philosophy, for example (or of ordinary practical contexts of an action in the 
philosophy of mind, or of moral persons to an economic scheme), is not the recovery 
of a sort of unquestioned familiarity, and it is not a form of familiarity that is unable 
to reveal something to us about ourselves. Indeed, Wittgenstein is right: we are 
supplying observations pertaining to the natural history of human beings; not 
curiosities, nor observations anyone has ever doubted, but merely observations that 
have escaped remark, perhaps because these are always before our eyes.67  
 
53. We thus shift our attention away from an extra feature to a totality: if you 
look out of your window, you see people walking, running, waiting for the bus, 
buying a bus ticket, and so on. This is what you see, not something as unspecified as 
people acting intentionally (although, of course, they are). You never wonder about 
your surroundings, although you wonder about something that breaks with the 
ordinary. (This is because not all of this, not all of that which surrounds you, is 
happening for the first time.) You may, of course, never forget the first time you saw 
a possession, although you cannot recall the first time you saw someone walking, or 
even the first time you saw a cat jumping; and still, you may very well have a vivid 
memory of the first time you saw a giraffe walking. But I cannot remember the first 	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time I saw someone buying something, nor catching the bus, nor picking apricots and 
by this I do not mean to imply that I always knew all there is to know about these 
things. 
Suppose that everything was happening for the first time. Could I, myself, act? 
This is a terrifying image: all the potentialities are still in me, but could I do anything 
at all? Would I be able to actualize my potentialities? The people outside of my 
window would not be given to me as others. And now there is no one at all to teach 
me anything, when I know from my perspective here and now that I did learn a lot 
from others. In the world of the Gedankenexperiment, continuity, as such, as human 
history, has vanished, and with it the difference between being an adult and an infant. 
With the loss of history came the loss of reasonableness, the loss of difference in age 
and experience. And so, in this world, everyone young and old, might simply drag 
himself across the floor towards something he wishes to eat –Hunger is always 
hunger; it always was, and sooner or later I might even be able to get up on my feet 
and walk towards the food I crave for. But I always knew the difference between the 
hunger that is satisfied by cooked meat, using fork and knife, as Marx said, and the 
hunger that devours raw meat using only teeth.68 I was never, and could never be, a 
Robinson Crusoe; and I am and could only be, in this particular sense, a product of 
that very natural history Wittgenstein spoke of. I inherited all of this, forks and knifes, 
in the same way I inherited philosophy. And I inherited all of these things in the exact 
same way St. Augustine received the perennial question concerning the philosophy of 
language from his parents, from being taught how to talk. 
My form of life, the natural history to which I belong, was passed down to me 
as another son of Adam, by those who went through the troubles of making this 
history  and who went to the troubles of teaching me about it. And so I inherited my 
familiarity with the world, within which I learned to know others as buyers, sellers, 
carpenters, bass-players, and married men and women. And these are all things we do, 
things that have been done before us, and things that will be done after us. As 
Anscombe puts it, these are all descriptions of executed intentions.  
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 A Consideration of the notion of stability – the relation between knowledge 
and action 
54. The possession of the form of executed intentions implies, in the most 
common case, a world and a body for which these are the case. It implies the 
knowledge that our intentions are effective actions, although we often fail to do what 
we mean to.  Anscombe’s ‘I do what happens’ introduces, therefore, a nexus between 
practical knowledge and the effective action it knows. But the consideration of this 
nexus runs into familiar difficulties as soon as we consider the possible discrepancy 
between knowing one’s intentions, prospectively, and knowledge of what has in fact 
happened. We must observe the essential connection between activity and stability. 
Could the concept of human intentional action maintain its sense if no intentional 
action had ever made a contribution to this stability? This offers a starting point for 
our investigation: the power to act is not an altogether ineffective power, but it is 
suggestible to failure – these considerations amount to an appreciation of our own 
fallibility. 
The concept of effect itself requires consideration. The sense of effect we are 
interested in harbors a dependence upon practical knowledge; as Aquinas puts it, not 
just any effect will do. Not even just any effect resulting from my action will do, but 
only the effect produced by my intentional action (not just any unintentional 
consequence). And we may add that in certain cases, very common cases at that 
where quality matters, not just any stew will do, not just any painting will do, not just 
any old way of playing the song “Wouldn’t it be Nice” will do. And so, we could 
finally say that not just anything can count, even if a lot of what I did not expect turns 
out to be useful, or even good, in some way. Aquinas, when he says “not just any 
effect will do,” is addressing the connection between effects and indifference. This 
thought pertains to a theory of agency as it does to moral thinking. But let us begin 
with the isolation of a species of knowledge, specifically, knowledge of intention, or 
knowledge without observation. 
 
55. First, let us address some initial points in a consideration of the 
terminology of Intention. The notion of knowledge without observation cannot stand 
if it is to imply such infelicitous expressions as Anscombe’s rendering of observation 
as something that has the function of an aid in the performance of an intentional 
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action. 69  This is something, I think, we are now prepared to reject. The 
epistemological importance of the concept of familiarity resides precisely in its ability 
to equip us with the capability to recognize the importance of a totality of concepts, 
which pertain to the representation of stable human actions. The picture Anscombe 
puts forward at this moment of her text works as an abstraction from this totality. 
Consider the following thought: my eyes are, in a familiar sense as much of an aid as 
a guitar player’s fingers are for him when he plays “Smoke on the Water.” These are, 
in fact, not aids to an action at all, but are, as in McDowell’s phrase, the “familiarity 
with the possibilities for bodily acting” that come with being a “competent bodily 
agent”!70 Anscombe is, of course, aware that this way of talking ends with what she 
herself terms a mad account. This is, namely, that there are two objects known: my 
intention and the result. And, nevertheless, there is still a point that pertains to the 
possibility of prospectively expressing an intention verbally, and I will address this 
shortly. For now, I think we ought to focus on Anscombe’s realization that such a 
mad account would leave the concept of willing in a vacuum. But the possibility of 
dissociation between what was intended and what really happened is a practical 
problem that is hardly surprising to anyone who has ever tried to do anything, and did 
so with varying degrees of success. We only have to appreciate the relevance of this 
thought to the species of knowledge we call knowledge of intention.  
Notice that the qualification of an intention as an attempt, as trying to do 
something, is not practically irrelevant when you consider entertaining an intention 
with respect to habit. Imagine you are sitting on a bike for the first time. You say “All 
right, I am going to try this!” Contrast this to “I will just ride my bike to the store; I 
will be right back with the bread you want.” The latter expression presupposes that I 
now know how to sustain balance on a bike, that I know where the store is, that I 
know that I can make it back by dinner time (provided there are no pedestrians to 
delay me, although that is not something I will bring about). Our conception of 
knowledge of intention cannot abstract from this difference. And this difference, the 
difference between doing something for the first time and a habit, relies on the 
performance of an action – i.e. it relies on the relevant knowledge of my balance in 
action, on my having ridden a bike before. Is my balance an aid to having that very 
intention? Is the bike, in either case, an aid to having that intention?  Imagine that I 	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bring about, in myself, the intention to draw a perfect circle; shortly thereafter, I 
inform my friend about such an intention. Now, my friend asks me  “Ok, but have you 
ever drawn one before or is this something you are going to try out?” Can I know my 
intention to draw a perfect circle without knowing the answer to this question? 
Furthermore, how am I going to draw this circle – with a pen, a pencil, on paper, on 
the wall?  And, why do I intend to do so? But say I try to deny the importance of all 
such questions; do I still know an intention?  I am trying to draw a perfect circle right 
now, and I cannot seriously say I even have an intention to draw one. This is not only 
because I have never done so, but also because it seems utterly pointless to me. And 
this does not impugn the fact that I once seriously entertained the intention to reach 
the end of my street while riding my bike, even though I had never done so. But back 
then, the bike was not just an aid. So, there is a false simplicity in the two objects of 
knowledge approach – the agential mind does not have the capacity to declare its 
independence from its physical presence within the world.  
 
56. The autonomy of a yet to be realized intention, of something I am, 
absolutely, about to do, that I know would explain whatever it is I am about to do, is a 
possibility of theory, a provisory segment of a body of knowledge. But it is, 
concerning an actual agent (an agent with an actual life), and if it was to remain 
forever unrealized, nothing but the unhappy consciousness. Hegel talked about 
someone locked in his own head, perhaps afraid to fail; the poet who intended to write 
a good poem and never did, the poet that ended up promoting the sphere of his mind 
to full autonomy, perhaps out of sadness. The dignity of this thought demands a 
consideration that pertains to the importance of failure in human life, and I shall for 
now stall it until section B.  
Anscombe does ask the question: “What can opening the window be except 
making such and such movements with such and such a result?”71 And we may, as 
she also does, dispel the putative reductive thought that makes knowledge of intention 
into the knowledge of my body’s movements, thereby pushing it back further and 
further. But what we know about our intention is something at a distance from me, or 
as I said earlier over there, where the window is (such as the window in my room that 
I want open so some fresh air will come in [an enlarged description]). Now, how 	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could the window be an aid to my opening the window? And when I feel the fresh air 
on my skin, am I, by means of an aid (my skin in this case), verifying that the window 
is open?  
Wittgenstein asks: can I claim to have observed that I, as well as others, can 
walk around without bumping into things when I have my eyes open, but not when 
my eyes are closed. The reply must surely be: yes. We can easily say that we have 
observed this. But it does seem to become somewhat redundant the minute we claim 
to inform someone of this, to claim that this has been a discovery we have made. It 
seems that the grammar of informing someone is out of place here. I take Wittgenstein 
to be saying that, perhaps, this would not be the first example of what giving a piece 
of information is. Perhaps you would instead choose something like: to microwave 
garlic for twenty seconds makes it easier to peel. You assume that the stability of your 
action will rely on your eyes as it has always been like this; but what would it mean if 
it were not like this?  
Is this knowledge derived from the observations the person in the example 
claims to have made? What does this supposition even mean, this idea that knowing 
such a thing relies upon observation? A blind man can claim: “You can walk 
anywhere without bumping into stuff, I can’t.” – He has never seen a busy train 
station, and I do not believe that he considers his intentions to walk somewhere as 
lacking an aid (even if it is a very important aid). For him, blindness was always there 
(this is in the same sense as it is for someone who has asthma, where he cannot just do 
any kind of physical exercise without preparation.) The self-apprehension of a 
privation was there, as it has always been, right from the start.  
 And would this idea even be available to the blind man if he did not have any 
practical consideration of the effects of his actions – of effectively walking wherever, 
more than once? Would it be available to him if he did not have any considerations 
that pertained to the stability and interest of what he usually does? 
 
57. Stability in the face of a privation. This is surely an understandable idea 
and a perfectly common concern for someone who has been deprived of one of his 
senses. The characteristic behavior, which results from deprivation is perfectly 
observable.  
Is deprivation not itself part of what is understood practically? I think when 
we appreciate this question, we realize the problem of an account that works 
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additively along the lines of: there is knowledge of an intention and, perhaps, of one’s 
bodily movements, and what one sees is happening, in the sense of verification. But 
observational knowledge is not something added to an account. We very often 
proceed circumspectly, especially in face of a hard task or an unfamiliar task. And we 
do use observation in order to look at what we are doing – we pay attention, mind the 
details, notice resistances from whatever it is we are working on. If I became 
invisible, and therefore invisible to my own perception, how could I see if am using 
the correct fingering on my guitar? Perhaps I could figure it out from the depressed 
strings and the feelings on my fingertips. But I can, very easily, imagine this getting 
far too complicated. And now, all I would like to do is to look at my fingers; it would 
be a relief to be able to do so. But is this verification? Is this not simply learning how 
to play the guitar? Perhaps this can indeed be called verification, someone might 
insist, but then when your hearing verifies that you know how to play a certain song.  
It is odd, I believe, to suppose that the invention of braille resulted from the 
fact that verification by aid of vision was not possible for some humans. It seems 
rather that it was a matter of practicality, and by this I mean of allowing for 
circumspection. So that one could, as one does, read the previous sentence again, 
study a book, write down one’s thoughts and be able to read them later on, or have 
others discuss one’s ideas. If all of this amounts to verification, then so be it! But now 
verification is not something that occurs simply ex post facto; it is not as if, such as in 
the example from Intention, I would first write with my eyes closed and then check if 
it was correct – this does, manifestly so, sound more like a children’s game than 
actual writing (and this might even make for an interesting game). So, circumspection 
is but the familiar way of acting someone has who is not indifferent to what he is 
doing. The blind man in Wittgenstein’s example is capable of expressing the demands 
of his circumspection, which is to say that he is capable of addressing his privation. 
For him, this is something that has been there since the beginning, and for this reason 
it pertains to the content of whatever he intends to do.  
Let us now appreciate another idea: how can observation be absent and how 
does this not overthrow the nexus between knowledge of intention and knowledge of 
an effective action? How can we address the without observation idiom without 
alienating agents from their personal bodily capacities? 
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 The argument about performance mistakes  
58. There are many mistakes that overthrow the nexus between intention and 
an effective action. Let us consider Anscombe’s suggestion that a performance 
mistake implies no fault in reasoning. Her interest in performance mistakes aims at 
keeping intact, as much as possible, the intuition that practical reasoning is working 
correctly. Now, however, something threatens its effect: an action is in the process of 
the agents reasoning about it, and the person in question went through the necessary 
permutations. But this is the very same action that could be interrupted. In the case we 
are taking into consideration, the action is interrupted, by a mistake, no less. If I want 
to put shampoo in my hair, and accidentally grab the soap container (these are 
confusingly similar bottles), I would, if asked about it, say I was putting shampoo on 
my head (to the perplexity of my interlocutor, I imagine). If someone interrupted me, 
that person would be interrupting my putting soap on my head. Except, I ended up not 
really putting soap on my head (something relevant for my own doing). And even if 
now I do correct this mistake, my previous reasoning remains intact; we will want to 
say: “it was just the wrong container, shampoo is what you use to wash your hair.” 
This does not suggest a separation between reasoning and acting, a conception that 
would survive only at the expanse of the notion of stability. It suggests rather that the 
experience of a dissociation an agent has is indeed possible. This sort of dissociation 
happens in many guises, and we may, together with Anscombe, say that the mistake is 
in the performance; and it is. But unless I do not care at all about if I do, and what I 
want to do, this sort of dissociation cannot be the common case. I mean, what would I 
be reasoning for? 
The interruption prevented me from making the shampoo mistake, and this 
interruption is different from if I were to pause or from my own confusion. For 
example, all of a sudden I do not know if I have to turn left or right at an intersection 
and I slow the car down or even stop completely. The same thing happens when I lose 
my train of thought while cooking and I have to ask myself “what do I have to do 
next?” I stop because my practical knowledge is incomplete. But I may also catch my 
own faulty reasoning. Suppose the following remarks are uttered by someone who is 
working: “No, it can’t be this one, it’s that piece over there,” “I just realized I have 
used the wrong cable” and so on. This class of cases exhibits mistakes that are undone 
by correction, which is a sort of catching myself in the moment of producing the 
 102 
difference: these are exclamation about reasoning mistakes, they are wrong 
calculations about what was indispensable for the completion of a given task. 
Performance mistakes represent a class of cases where the overthrowing of 
practical knowledge is effected not by lack of reasoning. These exhibit a distinct 
problematic and Anscombe casts some suspicion on the sort of knowledge we are 
considering, on what kind of stability, if any, the practical knowledge at work in 
performance mistakes has; she calls it a funny sort of knowledge.72 But is it not the 
case that the problematic exhibited here precisely shows that the point cannot be 
about the production of a funny version of knowledge? Equally, is the problem not 
one of a deprivation of knowledge (rather than finding a marginal case where we are 
still allowed to call it knowledge, even though one cannot help but to notice how 
exotic the case really is)? 
We might consider cases such as writing with one’s eyes closed.73 But these 
considerations would simple override the suggestion that, for any action that is not a 
philosophical example, considerations pertaining to the stability of the action are 
indispensable for knowing the action: if you really are going to do something like that 
very often, you might want to consider Braille (for the sake of legibility and to avoid 
writing accidents, like having ink run out without you noticing it). And so, the 
argument about performance mistakes could not aim to establish the process of 
practical reasoning by supposing its truth as independent from what it aims at 
producing: an effective action. This would merely generate a crippled version of the 
form of practical thought or, even worse, it would threaten it.  
The knowledge that a man has of his intentions is not, not for him, a reified item in an 
epistemology. The practical serviceability of this knowledge, or its proper working, is, 
for him, the only thing he expects to know, except when he does not know. And yet, 
we discern a difference between faulty reasoning and performance mistakes. This 
difference puts forward a conception of agency, which is complex enough to mark the 
distinction. After all, performance mistakes seem to be closer to our accusations of 
having a lack of attention than to our inability to understand or do certain things. This 
throws some light on the notion of agency, especially in its implication for the self-
constitution of an individual person. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Intention, p. 82. 
73 A suggestion made by Adrian Haddock, ‘The Knowledge That a Man Has of His 
Intentional Actions’ in Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, p. 168. 
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 Expression of intention is not isomorphic with the intentional action 
59. The expression of an intention is not performative in the same sense as a 
sentence that is spoken by a judge in a court. The action of sentencing is exhausted in 
the linguistic act. But, a verbal expression of intention only offers us the overt 
expression of an end and not the action. This does not impugn the importance of an 
expression of intention, since there is a point for it in a language. But I wish to 
contend that sufficient attention to this form of expression only shows us the necessity 
to focus on a different matter besides the expression per se (although I do not wish to 
render the contexts for the use these expressions pointless, nor could I). Sure enough, 
these expressions show the subject as figuring in a future event as an agent, but this 
leaves matters relative to intentional action untouched. After all, if someone speaks 
his sentence out loud, this also shows him as participating actively in some future 
event. 
Let us address some of the conditions in which we express our intentions, in 
which we, as Michael Dummett puts it, learn to use sentences in the future.74 
We can restate the problem as follows: to sincerely express the intention of 
doing x is expressing doing what will be sufficiently conclusive of x. The knowledge, 
however, does not stop with one sincerely intending to x, as St. Peter reminds us.  
Anscombe’s funny sort of knowledge, that is independent of what it is 
knowledge of, pertains precisely to discounting the fallibility that comes with the 
possession of this species of knowledge (knowledge of an intention I do have). And, 
the knowledge of my intention is, for example, the sort of knowledge I may quote 
when things go wrong as a way of asserting involuntary participation in any 
unintended consequences. “That was not what I intended!” is a plausible context for 
an expression of intention: a declaration of intentions. But when things go wrong with 
what I am doing, and fail to do it, I usual try it again. Imagine I wish to write on a 
whiteboard in a classroom, but as I write nothing appears. There is, for myself, a 
relatively thin value in “I intended to write on the whiteboard, that was my intention, I 
know it!” if nothing else happens. The expression “That was not what I intended, let 
me do this again, there it is!” might be an answer to the perplexity an interlocutor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 350.   
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poses when he asks “what are you doing?” because he sees that nothing is being 
written on the board. 
So when the agent conceives of himself as making a contribution towards the 
attainability of his end, – or, in considering, as we shall see later, what Anselm Müller 
calls the seriousness of practical reasoning – the agent gains enough space to discern 
between an expression of intention and the intention in action. And, it is doubtful he 
would exaggerate the knowledge of his intention, although this certainly pertains to 
the moral significance of deliberative contexts where one knows what one intends to 
do. Consider, for example, how my intention to work out a complicated guess (e.g. to 
guess how many M&M’s are inside of a large jar filled with M&M’s) is not the same 
as when the solution strikes me at once. An expressed intention does not have to be 
complete in order to function in action. In this case, if the guess does not strike me, I 
can probably just start trying to work out an answer. And this working it out, say 
trying various answers, realizing their inconsistency, etc., does not, not at all, have to 
leave the overtly expressed end untouched; think, for instance, of the accusation “talk 
is cheap!” as another possible reply to an expression of intention. 
 It is because of the knowledge gained through acting that we might correctly 
discern between the overt expression of an intention I presently have, and the 
announcement of what I still intend to do in the light of certain difficulties (certain 
difficulties that are revealed to me). This is, nevertheless as Dummett reminds us, a 
condition of having learned to talk in the future, of learning to express truth 
considering the future: “we could hardly have the concept of intention unless we had 
the notion of the intention’s being carried out or failing to be carried out”.75 
But, the point of an expression of intention (before knowledge gained through 
acting is in place), is not pointless. For instance, consider another plausible context 
for such expressions: a child may need to learn how to express things she intends to 
do, precisely because she does not know how to do these things, or does not have the 
means: “I want to draw a picture of my cat!” When we respond: “Here are your 
crayons!” we recognize the expression of an intention as a request.  
The child’s request is a form of orectic humility; it is the dissemination of her 
want as a spontaneous and innate form of reliance. She is requesting, presupposes, or 
rather, assumes as a matter of course, her presence in the near future. And, as reliance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Frege: Philosophy of Language, p. 350. 
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she presupposes that her reaching this near future will not be achieved without the 
help of another – someone who is expected to answer to her requests, who is worried 
about her intentions and desires. And there is still, of course, the possibility of the 
frustration of this expression of intention, perhaps on the account of another, or 
because of her own self. This can be termed as Disappointment with another, or with 
oneself – and this distinction is fundamental, or shall I say, unavoidable for a moral 
mind (this is someone who does not accuse someone else falsely, that is, someone 
who can truly be said to rely on someone else).   
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 4. Our irreducibility and the irreducibility of our actions 
 
The irreducibility of Practical Knowledge  
60. Anscombe asks in Intention: “Would intentional actions still have the 
characteristic ‘intentional’, if there were no such thing as expression of intention for 
the future, or as further intention in acting.”76 This question pertains to the isolation of 
what makes an action intentional. Let us therefore address this topic in a context 
introduced by Anscombe: that intentions may be conveyed as imperatives. I will 
impose this context on a Wittgensteinian form. 
Anscombe warns us about the assumption that commanding someone, as a 
species of making someone act intentionally, exhibits a false simplicity if merely 
conceived under the guise of usefulness; this is a warning I wish to take very seriously 
in what follows. And furthermore, I ought to add this proviso: I am not interested in 
commands, orders, and requests because these are final criteria of what an intentional 
action is, but rather because these are a feature of intentional actions. This is a feature 
of at least some of them (e.g. that we can command and so forth), which is, obviously, 
more faithful to the spirit of Anscombe’s text.  
In this regard, Anscombe tells us: “Don’t say ‘But the distinction relates to an 
obviously useful feature of certain actions, namely that one can get a person to 
perform them by commanding him’; for ‘usefulness’ is not a concept we can suppose 
retained if we have done away with ‘purpose’.”77 Wittgenstein’s builders are an 
expression of this very problem.78 The continued activity they share is intentionally 
structured; it is a set of connected performances where they address each other in the 
context of building. This addressing implies the suggestibility of B to A’s orders; or, A 
exploits B’s capacity to execute the descriptions of his commands. Since the activity 
of the builders extends temporarily, A might at this stage be assuming the capacity of 
B to share with him more than just the rudimentary description mentioning an 
intentional dependent concept and a physical object – that is, the difference between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Intention, §20. 
77 Intention, §20. 
78 Philosophical Investigations, §2. 
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“bring that slab!” and “bring that slab!... so we can build the house.”  And I believe 
we are licensed to make this assumption, given that it was asked of us to conceive of 
this activity as the activity of an entire tribe, which can, of course, not have a merely 
instantaneous existence.  
We have enough here to discern the sense of command that interests us. The 
point can be put in this way: the description of a command will not have the form of 
an arbitrary suggestion of an executable movement. Of course, we can command 
people to move their limbs without giving them any reason to do so. But nothing like 
that is implied in the case of the builders (perhaps in a gymnastics class, we would be 
closer to something arbitrary, or independent of something that is further done, 
although I am not entirely certain of this).  
For B, let’s call him the servant, there is a difference between the answer 
“because you told me so,” simpliciter, and “so we can continue building the house,” 
assuming, as we are, that he belongs to a tribe. For example, A tells B to bring the 
slab, but he might not tell B specifically the path he should take to bring it, and he 
certainly cannot foresee the difficulties that B might encounter. Is A’s description 
therefore incomplete or even unsuccessful as a command? The answer, I believe, is 
no. A command allows for a more or less complete description of its execution, but 
this difference might be something to be completed by the executor of the order. What 
this completion amounts to can be put this way: Imagine A asks B the following 
question: “What took you so long?” And now suppose B replies something like: “The 
slab was stuck in the mud, therefore I had to do such and such.” Even if such and 
such was not suggested by A, it counts as a contribution to B’s execution of the 
command – practical knowledge is irreducible even in cases where the agent is the 
mediator for an end of another. It is constitutive of his contribution to the bringing 
about of the end in action.   
What is noteworthy about this aspect is the fact that we find here the concept 
of a performance. This concept represents one division of intentional action. 
Performances are significant exercises. A conclusion is implied with performances; in 
this case, the conclusion is the building.  
Here we find the following contrast: A is x-ing only if A has not just yet x-ed. 
Performances can form imperatives because they are expressive of something to be 
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executed in the future.79 When an agent acts to conclude his performance, the 
conclusion will bring with it a stop to the performance, which makes it possible for 
the agent to start a new performance if necessary.  
Let us conclude this train of thought: That which brings a performance to a 
conclusion is at a distance, and is not yet here for the agent. In this interval, the agent 
realizes the significance of his acting; he realizes the striving is constitutive of what 
can come to count as practical knowledge, which pertains to him as an agent. What 
exactly pertains to him as practical knowledge is not given to him by the order to be 
executed, but in executing the order – it is in his performance. 
 
On Mediation 
61. A distinct kind of necessity emerges from within the narrow scope of the 
operations performed by the builders. This particular language (again, we are asked to 
imagine this language as the whole language of a tribe)80 has, at its core, the actions: 
requesting and addressing. All requests, and all obedience, depend on the reciprocal 
structure formed actively by both A and B. Of course, we are also told about distinct 
objects, and these are objects necessary to build something, objects necessarily 
conducive to the attainment of the conclusion of their activity, slabs, etc.  
When A requests certain objects, this turns B into the mediator of A’s 
intentions. In this language game, he exhibits the capacity to vouch for an end given 
to him by another. The end, in the case of the builders, implies the interaction with 
some necessary objects. And these objects make specific demands upon the agent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Action, Emotion and Will, p. 175. 
80 This idea is not without its own difficulties. In one sense, it seems to be asked of us 
to make an effort in abstraction in order to consider only a small section of a language 
– a language game. This would be connected with the contrast between a system of 
communication described by St. Augustine and everything we call a language.  But 
we can think of it as the presentation of the core of a language, not as a mere 
abstraction in the sense that we might have abstracted another aspect of language in 
order to scrutinize it (we might be studying some other, any other, language game). 
To think of this paragraph (§2) in this second reading would imply conceiving of it as 
illuminating the idea of language game by providing the definite actions that structure 
language games. For example, the builders would figure in the definition of language 
game the determination of distinct actions: asking for something – obeying the 
request. This would be important when we consider languages conceiving of 
languages as being inherently social and not merely individually expressive. The 
complete elucidation of this last thought is beyond the scope of the present work; the 
idea of the constitutive character of these actions, however, is not. 
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who is ordered to bring them. Now, the particularity of the action, the specificity of 
the objects with their own demands, pertains to the execution capacity of the mediator 
and not to that of the commander. Of course, acts of mediation do not have to imply 
transitivity in this exact way. We have to preserve the possibility of two agents 
sharing an end, which is only attainable for one of them and not equally attainable for 
both; or, to make a stronger point, it could only be achieved by one of them. When a 
trainer trains an athlete to beat a world record, they share an end without sharing the 
equal possibility of its attainment. As a matter of fact, this end implies a sense of 
uniqueness; this is something that pertains, as a value concept, only to human action – 
it presupposes human action as a measure, or as individual achievement and, 
therefore, finally as human history; under this concept, we consider the fact an 
individual human action can be seen as a breakthrough that is significant for the entire 
species.  
We consider now an important aspect that is suggested from our example of 
the builders: the master is requesting the mediated prospective act. He assumes that it 
is executable, which is to say he assumes its completeness, and this lies outside of his 
immediate practical control – the contribution of the servant is practical knowledge, 
while the master knows his intention. But the master, – I have now unashamedly 
given Wittgenstein’s builders a Hegelian guise – unlike Peter Schlemihl, does not 
become traceless, he is not without a shadow within the world; and hence he does not 
separate himself from others in resignation only to return to them when in need. He is 
within the world, and he casts his shadow onto the world (although, perhaps he is, and 
I do not mean that builder A is, indifferent to this very fact). And I would like to add 
that Wittgenstein’s builders are simply a tribe that illustrates their dependence. We 
can even say that they illustrate the dependence of their language upon each other. 
While Hegel saw, in the actuality of mediation, the condition of possibility of a 
historical institution; in the particular case of the Phenomenology, an institution that 
bares the very origin of inequality, or, the annihilation of reciprocity. 
The master is not praying for the act to come about, because praying is 
different from requesting even if they both concern the future; I am thinking of 
praying as in praying for things to happen:81 both request, or wish, or humbly ask for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Peter Geach, “Praying for things to happen” in God and The Soul, p. 86. 
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the coming about of a prospective mediated act, but the answerability of the mediator 
is different in both cases: 
 
In requesting, the mediator changes; in praying, he does not.  
 
62. The change in the mediator comes from his action. And now, the mediator, 
or the servant, gains the capacity to impede the action because: he refuses or is 
unable, he is not the automaton, his capacity for work does not exist in him as pure 
potentiality (not in spite of him, not in spite of his limit, not even in spite of his body).  
 
A non-generic conception of a power and the irreducibility of practical 
knowledge 
63. Dependence on another as another is dependence on the other’s work.  Of 
course, just as this stands, it does not tell us anything about the existential aspect of 
this dependence; this is to say that it does not tell us if this dependence is cooperation 
or violence. And I mean this remark to entail what Strawson spoke of as a way of 
appreciating the conceptual scheme that we have at this present stage of the history of 
the philosophy of mind.82 Like Strawson, I do not intend to contribute to an a priori 
genetic psychology. Although I read this as entailing, and I do not wish to say that he 
does, that the aspect of our conceptual scheme in the present history of the philosophy 
of mind owes its existence to both just and unjust institutions.   
 So, I wish to consider the possibility of abstracting from practical knowledge, 
which is the possibility of addressing action as a generic power. And I wish to do so 
in order to show that what I have termed the irreducibility of a species of knowledge 
carries with it the irreducibility of persons, namely the irreducibility of those who act. 
I shall illustrate this idea with recourse to a pair of Marxist concepts: work and work-
power. But I would like to make an addendum with respect to my use of these 
concepts: I am far more interested here in what kinds of circumstances an abstraction 
can work in. In other words, I am interested in both the metaphysical conditions of 
abstraction and their practical reflection in human practices. This is not at all the same 
as saying that I do not recognize (or that I do not wish to retain) the moral 
implications behind the employment of this abstraction as wage-work. Some of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Individuals: an essay on descriptive metaphysics, p. 112. 
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moral implications of this idea shall be addressed by this thesis further on. However, 
for now, I am interested in how Marx conceptualized an abstraction that had puzzled 
Aristotle when he asked himself how bricks and mortar could turn into a house. I 
believe that what puzzled Aristotle, the same thing that puzzled Marx, tends to be a 
puzzle only for philosophers. I believe this, nevertheless, does not diminish the 
question’s importance. I find that the importance of this question resides in an honest 
attempt to apprehend our dependence upon each other, which I read as being a 
question about our mind. 
 
64. Marx thought that the distinction between work and work-power concealed 
not only an insight about the generation of profit, but also a particular metaphysical 
problem. The metaphysical difficulty lies precisely in the right sort of quantification 
of the value of something and, moreover, that value is defined in a potentiality. The 
idea of value latches onto the generic notion of work-power as a commodity.83 A 
qualitative conception of the work done retracts from the abstraction, and this 
retraction emerges as a critical point in political philosophy. But, for the present 
purpose, the focus should be on the very possibility of abstraction.   
For Marx, this distinction had a clear practical consequence, namely, the fact 
that, in the elaboration of a contract, the actual activity of the worker has to be 
quantified as a precondition. Therefore, establishing the value of the object called 
work-power precedes its actuality. This necessity is obviously a matter of 
practicability, but the philosophical point emerges only if we focus on the possibility 
that the differentiation between the abstraction and the actualized work is palpable. 
The difference may stand out firstly as the problem of crystallizing the initial value 
attached to work-power as an object. We may suppose that if the proper metaphysical 
distinction is in place, then there will be sufficient ground to identify the developed 
work as the actual productive force. Therefore we will be able to attach a value to this 
actual instance of it, rather than to the initial assumed object (in practice, this is often 
the case, such as in the event of a raise).   
Here the critical point, the moral point, returns via the metaphysical 
illumination. The possibility condition of a structure that generates value does not 
ignore the value of the concrete work; on the contrary, it exploits the proper 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Das Kapital, p. 497.   
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demarcation between its value and the postulated abstract object. These 
considerations serve the purpose of showing a practical approach to the position 
where reflexive knowledge is applied – the postulated object, work-power, contains 
the differentia; it contains the actuality it abstracts from. Therefore, work-power, as it 
figures in the initial assumption, is developed into a proper, actualized existence 
through the worker.84 The proper metaphysical distinction between work and work-
power presupposes the individualized existence of the worker – he who could, in 
principle, have practical knowledge of his actions – the metaphysical distinction 
presupposes the concept of agency as the actual work.  
The individual agent may be outside the scope of the abstracted object, but as 
soon as we conceive of its actuality in concrete work, he becomes, as a worker, 
answerable to our reciprocal knowing. For instance, in applying his power, the agent 
or worker, uses up some of his potentiality, a potentiality we know is not 
inexhaustible. In the abstract form, as a contrast, the work appears as the pure 
application of a potentiality without any impediments. The conception of an 
individual agent involves various kinds of impediments to which, as an agent, he is 
susceptible to; In other words, the agent is susceptible to the various demands on his 
practical capacities and, I may add, also passively, as the patient of the effects of his 
action, or the counteracting of the world. The knowledge I am applying in this case is 
reciprocal. And the deployment of intentional dependent concepts in a prospective 
mediated context – work-power – does not obliterate the application of reciprocal 
knowledge. But the abstraction may figure as a provisory condition in a practical 
context.  
We have now discerned work-power as anticipated work.  
 
65. Here is the Wittgensteinian dictum addressing the present difficulty: “A 
machine as symbolizing its action.” And further, “And it is quite true: the movement 
of the machine-as-symbol is predetermined in a different sense from that in which the 
movement of any given actual machine is predetermined.”85 Perhaps the different 
sense that Wittgenstein speaks of can be paraphrased as the difficulty contained in the 
generic application of knowledge about intentional dependent concepts and the later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Marx does indeed refer to the personality of the worker. Das Kapital, p. 497.   
85 Philosophical Investigations, §193. 
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emergence of an individualized conception – the way in which the generic application 
anticipates the proper non-generic conception.  
It is, as Wittgenstein notices, after all, quite true that this distinction has some 
palpability. He, of course, partially imputes the distinction to a failure of perception 
on the part of those doing philosophy; and I believe there is a point to this accusation 
– since, the abstraction may seem to easily lead to a clear-cut idea of the machine, or 
of its movement as such. We would have to struggle, nevertheless, to maintain that 
the notion of work-power leads us to the idea of the worker as such, perhaps not even, 
of work as such. 
There is, nonetheless, a more important aspect in Wittgenstein’s observation: 
the detachment of the knowledge of the movement of the machine from the 
knowledge of its mechanical constitution. Now, the point is to avoid an appeal to a 
form of explanation by reduction, in this case, by mechanical reduction. And by 
steering clear of this sort of reduction, – remember we are after the movement – the 
discussion focuses instead, firstly, on the queer sense of possibility present in the 
knowledge of the movement of the machine-as-symbol. The sense of possibility 
contained in our view of the machine-as-symbol does not impinge on our expectation 
in the same way the possibility in Kant’s stone does; it is more like the eye in this 
respect – the movement of the machine is apprehended within a teleology that is 
peculiar to it. Its possibility of movement is the possibility of one categorical type of 
movement and not another; what the mechanism allows for is in the diagram of the 
machine itself. But, what Wittgenstein is pointing out here is that the sense of the 
possible movement of the machine-as-symbol is already an imposition of a limit on 
our knowledge. It is in this sense that the knowledge of the movement recognized in 
the machine-as-symbol does not have to fall short of the difficulties we know attach to 
it (e.g. practical knowledge contains that which impedes it).  
The machine-as-symbol is the putative use of the machine, abstracting from 
the obstructions that may befall it (we forget about these or simply do not think about 
these obstructions in certain circumstances, as Wittgenstein puts it). In a diagram, the 
machine figures as the intentional principle it embodies; it functions as a counterpart 
to the physical machine that potentially has defects. And yet, a machine is 
inconceivable without the latter.  The machine-as-symbol, the abstraction, is pure 
simplicity. And I believe that Wittgenstein is, as we are, drawn to this simplicity. But 
why is this, as is the difference between work and work-power, a matter for 
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philosophy? I do not want to suggest that the reason is because it is the business of 
philosophy to know, or to make explicit, everything there is to know; I do not want to 
pretend I know what everything means in this case. To speak plainly, I believe that 
this sort of thought imposes itself on the philosopher the minute he recognizes a threat 
in this simplicity.  
 
66. Let us return to the machine. I may certainly recognize a machine without 
knowing what it does, without recognizing what it is for. But I can only say in a 
derivative sense that I know this machine. (Perhaps we can say: I know it as belonging 
to a kind, but there is a risk here because it may be just an assemblage of parts without 
any usage – this assemblage would have not fooled a mechanic with some 
experience.) In this case, I recognize it, perhaps because the shapes of its parts, but I 
do not know what it is, and in virtue of this I cannot use it. But there is also the case 
where I know a machine, I know its use, I know how to use it (i.e. I know what it is, 
what it does), but I have no clue about how it is built – the explanation by reduction is 
now in perspective. 
We can give an approximation of how we deal with such knowledge: this 
knowledge is manifested in our advertences to what may impede the movement of the 
machine based on how it moves. Prescriptions for these advertences may figure in the 
owner’s manual: (a) In x-ing, if M encounters an A, this will block and brake it. (b) In 
x-ing, if M is in condition C it will malfunction. We also know that the machine will 
suffer alteration with its continued activity; it will get old, and it will get used. We do 
have the need to go beyond the diagram of the machine. We have to possess some 
considerations pertaining to its actual use such as a warning about its use. The 
knowledge we apprehend in the diagram becomes insufficient; and so we go beyond 
the anticipation of the teleology of the machine – we move towards the actual 
machine.  
But the need to go beyond the limit of the machine-as-symbol, as such, does 
not have to avoid the threat of reification. It may retain it in a more sophisticated 
variant in the notion of a process.86 This notion appears at the end of the discussion as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86  Philosophical Investigations, §196. Marx discusses the same point. He 
characterizes the distinction between the process of work  and the process of 
exchange of work as a commodity as separated processes. The latter fails to be 
contained in the former. This sort of unessentiality of the real process of work should 
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taking the place of the machine-as-symbol as its non-inert version or as a shadow. At 
this stage, the step the argument takes is precisely an answer to the sort of pressure we 
are discussing. In the face of maintaining the stability of the knowledge of the 
machine-as-symbol, we are led to try to accommodate the knowledge we manifest 
about what might impede it. We can identify this as an attempt at absorbing back 
what the anticipation concealed.  
A description of a process that in principle might accommodate such facts is 
different from the description of the machine-as-symbol. But instead of upgrading the 
abstracted conception, we can come to appreciate the obvious utility of the abstraction 
in its provisory character. The importance does not reside in the possibility of 
abstraction, but in the non-survival, within philosophy, of the actual of movement of 
abstraction in its unique way. This is the correct sense of possibility, or the sense we 
are after, which is the sense Wittgenstein characterizes as being closer to the actual 
movement than a picture is of its subject – the movement as presence. But this 
presence, this abstract uniqueness, is not yet the uniqueness of the historical record of 
the athlete, which might not have been anticipated. Of course, we have moved away 
from machines to persons, but this is merely because we have understood the 
example. 
The movement of abstraction enters philosophy in its unique way: it becomes 
a shadow of the actual moving, or it becomes the shadow of a movement that has not 
yet been, but could be; now we have animated the notion of the anticipation. As 
Wittgenstein puts it: not just some picture of the movement, but the picture of this 
movement, or of every possible movement. The meta-philosophical point of 
Wittgenstein’s text now strikes us in a lively manner. The limit of philosophy, and 
there is one, lies in the capacity to get closer to reality without falling prey to its own 
descriptive resources, without giving itself the impression that it could anticipate all 
there will be. The shadow, the machine-as-symbol, the movement as anticipated, the 
subject as a condition of cognition, the work-power as a commodity are all concepts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be discussed by noticing that work implies a different kind of exchange from other 
commodities. Noticing the failure to represent the actuality of one form of exchange 
is a step towards the elucidation of the abstraction: the process of exchange. See 
Grundrisse, p. 274. 
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that have a logical secondary existence. Of course, there is nothing wrong with their 
secondary existence, as long as we know this form of simplicity. 87 
 
67. As Strawson has said, the notion of a pure individual consciousness (and 
we might add, the pure individual movement, or the pure individual work), cannot be 
used as a primary concept in the explanation of a person;88 it might survive in the 
theological notion of personal immortality, although, I suppose, its survival implies a 
sort of trap –the pure individual consciousness has but memories of things it can no 
longer do, that were nevertheless all-defining, back then, when it was able to do or 
experience these things. I want to suggest that we have to move towards a philosophy 
of manifest agency if we wish to address the problem that both Marx and Wittgenstein 
expressed. And now the moral aspect of our investigation gains more definition; we 
begin to appreciate the connection between Marx’s need to apprehend the personality 
of the worker and Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with the autonomy of philosophy 
(and, in Marx’s case, the autonomy of economy). The abstraction into the generic 
conception of a power is always provisory; it is a possibility. And this possibility, in 
its closeness to reality, cannot dispense with an actual person – the generic conception 
of agency stands as the possibility for mediation, but not as the actual mediation.  
 
The distinction between categorical and reciprocal knowledge of movement 
and rest 
68. Consider the interest we take in our favorite animals. These animals are 
capable of having meaningful representations of their environment and being the 
principle of their own movement, we apply intention-dependent concepts in 
descriptions of what they are doing. But our knowledge, as to the extent of their 
experience of their own movements, and the significance of these very movements, is 
limited. If we adopt a non-eliminativist conception of their experience, we leave 
enough space for a peculiarity that would not be captured by our descriptions of what 
they are doing – the non-eliminativist conception of their subjectivity implies a non-
reductionism about their experience. This is showed by rejecting any privilege to 
descriptions of their experiences and actions as organic mechanisms. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Philosophical Investigations, §195. 
88 Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics, p. 115. 
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The movement of these animals has a significance for them, one that may well 
lie beyond what we can grasp.89 Is there any difficulty in imagining this? To us, their 
movement is intelligible, but we lack the knowledge of their subjective experience. 
We know how they move, but not what it is like to move like they do; in this sense, 
our reflexive knowledge does not apply. So, do we encounter any difficulty in 
conceiving a limit to our reflexive and hence, reciprocal knowledge? Does the world 
disappear from my horizon if I were to admit to myself that I do not know, nor could I 
ever know, what it is like to be a queen bee, or a worker ant? Philosophy has a limit, 
knowledge has a limit, and I have a limit. But when an ant precipitates itself into a 
swimming pool, I may shiver – I stare at it as it moves its legs franticly without any 
traction. The ant is slowly drowning because it cannot swim. It does not know how to 
swim, like I do, it does not know that some movements keep you on the surface of the 
water. It does not know that these movements can even be quite enjoyable once you 
get the hang of them. But then again, perhaps its body cannot float. The ant could not 
have learned from other ants how to save its own life in this situation. I do not think 
any other ant could have prevented this. No other ant could have imparted such vital 
knowledge to this particular ant. And I do know the ant belongs to a species, one that 
does exhibit the sort of dependence I am often tempted to transfer onto my own 
worldview. And so, finally, I rescue the ant from the water with my hand and put it to 
the side of the pool. I am not sure yet if it will survive or not. But the ant picks itself 
up. Its movements have now gained traction on the hard floor. Its legs seem to have 
recovered their purpose, and so the ant eventually disappears from view. I could not 
stand the thought that the ant would die alone, that it would die out of a precipitation I 
do not even understand. Why did it fall hopelessly into the pool? Do ants know they 
are unable to swim? Do they recognize water as a threat? I do not expect any answers 
to these questions, although I am fully aware that there are some answers. I mean, 
there are answers of the type Nagel analyzed, facts about the ant’s perception, and 
perhaps even facts about the meaningful differentiation made by the ant about its 
environment. I find these answers absolutely adequate; they are adequate because 
these answers are, simply, as far as we can go.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 I am paraphrasing Nagel’s comment on the concept of conscious organism and the 
actuality of subjective experience: “But fundamentally an organism has conscious 
mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – 
something it is like for the organism,” in “What is it like to be a bat,” Mortal 
questions, p. 166.  
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What I do not believe is that we can fully understand the possibility of the sort 
of tragedy I projected onto the ant; I do not dare to speak of the ant dying in the pool 
as an actual tragedy. But I do not know, and I will never know, if it is a tragedy for 
that very ant. I do not know if the thought about the anonymity of its death could 
anguish the ant; I do know that such thoughts anguish many others like me. 
Admittedly, I do find great sadness in the thought that, had the ant died, its body 
would have been deprived of a final destination. The fact that its body would have 
been deprived of a burial place, or that its death would have no meaning for other ants 
that depended on it, that there would be no remembering of that ant after its death. 
And now I believe we have given some content to the limit of categorical 
knowledge; it can, indeed, be established, but it leaves something out. It leaves out 
something we know in our case. In this particular sense, the subject is the limit of the 
world. What lies beyond this limit is another, and it can be known; it can be simply 
known. Certainly; but in some cases this simplicity might turn into violence of the 
sort that spring from ignorance, or rather, of the sort that refuses the possibility of 
ignorance, that refuses a limit. And so we can definitely know that the world does not 
disappear from our horizon if there are things that we do not know. And in the case of 
many animals, these are things we shall never know; these things, nevertheless, do not 
impugn my inability to be indifferent to the ant that was drowning. These are things 
that do not impugn that I save the ant, even if that ant could never save me. And 
perhaps this belongs to the order of the world, in other words that I could not be 
indifferent to the ant dying, although the ant could be indifferent to me dying, even 
though it would not be a crime if I had been indifferent to the dying ant.  
Here we make our approximation to Aristotle more explicit. And I think that 
this approximation, or this form of revisionism, emerges in our preoccupation with 
the notion of rest. Now, I do not mean rest from exhaustion, which is to say rest as an 
imperative. In this case we mean definite rest or rest as death: the absence of a power 
to act, the absence of life that leaves a body that is no longer a person at all, as 
Aristotle put it. When I see the body of a dead ant floating in a swimming pool, it is 
no longer an ant; it is, if we take the Aristotelian definition to its furthest implication, 
no longer anything commendable. It has, finally, lost all its power. But what about the 
human body that rests in a cemetery? I mean, that human bodies are not simply left to 
float somewhere, like all the dead bugs in the pool (unless they are to be concealed or 
disrespected, because you do not step over a dead body you find in your path in the 
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way you step over the trunk of a dead tree); finally, what about, as Hegel said, the 
responsibility of the family, the wedding of its blood relation to the bosom of the 
earth? (§452) The power to act has perished, and the body is laid to rest at a fixed 
address, but the worry of those who love the person does not cease – this is the way in 
which we know our ultimate rest, the dead human body. Those who love the person 
who died continue to do so, and continue to care for the gravesite by weeding it and 
cleaning the marble headstone. They refuse to let the grave succumb to the violence 
of nature, since they cannot keep the body from the same harm. And this refusal does 
not consist simply in the generation of an ersatz activity as an empty symbolic 
gesture. This care says no more than what it is, namely the giving back of the body to 
the earth, the giving up of a material distinction between another and the human body 
as it slowly becomes part of nature; but still, it is the refusal to let this individuality, 
the very principle of the difference between the individual and nature, succumb to 
such deterioration. It is founded on very impossibility of being indifferent to a loved 
one, even under the unavoidability of death; it shows that love does not cease to exist 
when its object does.  
 
69. We possess categorical knowledge of different forms of movement, but we 
do not have reciprocal knowledge of the experience of all of these forms of 
movement. Our attribution of intentions to other animals is perfectly functional, but 
we still lack something that is very much in place in our case. We apprehend a seagull 
gliding against the wind. But the extent of the enjoyment of the seagull, or the 
absence thereof, is concealed from us. It is something that pertains to the existence of 
seagulls, it is something that holds significance within their experience of the world.  
This categorical way of knowing their movement is expressed in our 
classification of species relative to forms of movement: to run, to fly, and to swim. 
We conceive of these as subservient to the attainment of what these animals, that 
belong to these forms, need or want. As Aristotelians, we apprehend these forms as 
the principle of their vitality. But this functional characterization does not prevent us 
from allowing their experience to have any significance for them as ours does to us. 
After all, the reciprocal knowledge we have about our own movement encompasses 
more than the functionality of our movement, it licenses us to critically assess the 
reasons and motives of our movements as well as the manner in which these are 
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performed – this encompassing knowledge is knowledge of our movements as 
actions. 
The distinction between categorical and reciprocal knowledge of movement is 
based on a lack. And this lack is brought about by the impossibility to apply our 
reflexive knowledge to other species.  
We may put the point this way: when you observe an athlete walking on a 
balance beam, you observe him acting. His movements on the balance beam are an 
exercise of control against some tendencies of our body; indeed, his movements are 
defying some material difficulties. This is perhaps something you could never 
imagine being able to do, and although you do not have that experience (you are not a 
trained gymnast), you do know how difficult it is just to stand straight on a beam. The 
possibility of a reciprocal relation is grounded on the possession of reflexive 
knowledge. And this knowledge is not insubstantial, nor empty; in the case of the 
athlete, it may even be the basis of your appreciation of the difficulty of his 
movements and your appreciation of the individual athlete – in this regard we see 
reflexive knowledge as the measure of subjective recognition. 
Our notion of an individual person is now summoned. My apprehension of the 
athlete’s actions implies my reflexive-distance to him; this is to say that I apprehend 
him as another person. The significance of his movements exhibits the dignity of his 
person. I know him as that athlete and through the difficulty of his actual movements. 
I apprehend the exuberance of his strength, the intelligence of his agility, and the 
endurance of his determination. I know the athlete reciprocally as another person and 
I apprehend his actions as having him as the source of their reality. The athlete does 
what happens. If he breaks a record, he enters human history because of his 
achievement, because of who he became – and here we find human history is 
conflated with the history of individual achievement. 
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Dread of limitation is dread of existence. 
The Essence of Christianity, p.15 
 
 
 5. Becoming 
 
On the importance of investigating a non-traditional multiplicity of practical 
concepts to obtain an adequate representation of agency 
 70. Agency is a central notion pertaining to practical philosophy. A manifest 
representation of agency will contain a multiplicity of practical concept that may lie 
outside the traditional scope of an investigation into practical reasoning. 
This is a necessity of a theory of agency with a materialistic aspiration. Agents 
within the world and in possession of a shared power to act acquire personal beliefs 
about their individual capacities and natural talents – they are individuals within 
history. A theory of action could hardly restrain itself to a definition of action per se, 
while leaving the concept of agency untouched. The consequence of doing so 
amounts to the introduction of non-historical agents (time-sliced agents). These 
agents, unlike us, are incapable of valuing the essence of the concept of human action, 
namely, achievement.  
The idea of achievement introduces a set of related concepts that are crucial to 
the understanding of agency: the concept of failure, the concept of activity, the 
concept of a personal limit, the concept of privation, the concept of activity, and the 
concept of improvement. Before inquiring into these, I want to begin by addressing 
another concept, namely, the concept of an impediment. The concept of impediment 
divides, I want to suggest, into two different directions – internal and external. To pay 
attention to the concept of impediment is to pay attention to an initial intuition that 
situates agents in their world by conceptualizing the familiar friction they are bound 
to experience. 
The content of a manifest representation of agency lies within this friction. 
The sort of agents I want to consider improve their talents through practice and build 
tools to, for instance, curve hot metal. They act, rather than bring about events, which 
is to say they achieve something when they do.  
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I shall contend for the thesis that the correct representation of agency is the 
manifest representation of agency. And for this particular picture to be in place, I 
must position the notion of agency at the center of the picture. The manifest 
representation of agency is therefore nothing but an inquiry into the triviality of 
human action – which I believe reveals the ground for the formation of personal 
beliefs (and is how one becomes a person). 
 
71. The consideration of the manifest image of agency is equally a 
consideration of realized freedom. It is neither an investigation into the concept of 
human freedom as a presupposition, nor as a problematic hypothesis, but rather, an 
investigation into experienced freedom. By realized freedom I simply mean the 
experience agents know of achieving and failing; for example, the sort of resistance 
that comes with some of the ends they strive for, such as the exhaustion of rehearsal 
or the enjoyment of accomplishment.  
This way of looking at human action aims at rescuing instrumental reasoning 
from the accusation that reduces it to the bare bones presentation of it. The notion that 
there should be such a thing as dignity in knowing how to do a certain thing, or in 
accomplishing a certain thing, does not come as a surprise to practical philosophy. 
Practical philosophy is, indeed, reason in the service of practice, and practice could 
hardly be conceived apart from those who bring it about.  
The variety of practical concepts I am proposing to introduce as one 
philosophical topic carry with them a continuation of the theme of reductionism. A 
putative philosophical behaviorist would assume that the safest way to explain these 
concepts would imply the search for adequate behavioral criteria. As said earlier, I 
wish to locate these agents exactly where we find ourselves every day, doing 
something with our bodies in the world. But I intend to treat these practical concepts 
from an internal perspective – from the perspective I know from myself and apply to 
others.  
The delineation of this peculiar position may be of marginal interest for the 
behaviorist. I believe that attention to the position from which we address this 
philosophical topic grounds our explanations in the familiarity we have gained. What 
is marginal to the behaviorist ends up unsettling that which he knows, or at least 
expects, in virtue of being a person. We understand that there should be a describable 
mechanism of how we acquire beliefs about ourselves through acting, and this comes 
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hardly as a surprise to us; this is not the same as saying that this description will be 
unproblematic and self-evident.  
The chief defect of old materialism, maintained Marx, was its contemplative 
aspect. Behavioral criteria from contemplation may, in the end, prove to be in a way, 
too general for my purpose. The behaviorist, like many of us, might still have to ask 
someone why he or she is smiling. And this stands as proof that the generality of 
behavioral criteria has not, in the end, solved all questions both the world and other 
persons might elicit from a behaviorist.  
 
 On internal impediments 
72. Suppose you are trying to play a rhythm on a bass guitar in accordance 
with a metronome. You notice you keep phasing out of time. Keeping up with time is 
proving to be difficult, and yet, what you want to achieve depends precisely on you 
being able to keep in time. 
When you notice this difficulty, you are put in a peculiar position: you can 
distinctly discern a direction in what is impeding your end – it runs from the 
metronome in your direction. You do not complain about the accurateness of the 
metronome, or, say, the strings of your bass guitar. If you discern the direction of the 
impediment, you co-extensively discern what you have to address – your sense of 
time. 
Your sense of time is disclosed to you in this fashion. As an impediment to 
your action, your sense of time is practically qualified. It is not up to your end; it is 
defective or in need of improvement. It is impeditive to you in a quite unavoidable 
and distinct way; it comes to light at a particular moment of your activity, and in an 
unavoidable connection with the continuation of that activity.  
Now you know your sense of time. You do not know it plainly, for instance, 
that it exists, that you already knew before just now, but rather, you know it as having 
a limit, your limit. But we have not yet fully addressed the notion of a limit. 
Provisionally, we can say that what lies outside this limit lies outside of who you are. 
But the belief you have, what has been disclosed to you, is something about your 
sense of time (rhythm) and is something about yourself. 
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On external impediments  
73. Before me is a blacksmith who is trying to curve iron into a spiral shape. 
As he heats the iron, the material loses more density than he expected. As he curves 
the metal into a spiral, the iron snaps. The blacksmith has now to reconsider what he 
is doing. What impedes him from attaining the spiral shape is in the loss of density of 
the material. Like a storm, too powerful to let me get to where I intend to go, the 
impediment is outside. The blacksmith gets a thicker piece of iron. He repeats the task 
and the spiral is done; similarly, the storm quiets down, now I can leave the house.  
We make these distinctions as a matter of practicality. The distinction is 
implied in whatever it is we are going to do next. 
 
 An interpretation of the concept of limit as ‘My limit’ 
74. One specific way to address your sense of time is practice. The 
powerlessness of practice is failure.  
In this context, addressing your sense of time means to rehearse and implies 
time spent in addressing the possibility of a strict conformity to the metronome. 
Behind the structure of practice is the possibility of achieving a given end. It is the 
possibility of reaching a certain level of musicianship, for example. And this is time 
spent addressing oneself, but not in the manner of the Aristotelian doctor who cures 
his own wounds.  
Medicine is applied as a body of knowledge to the wound. It is, as Aristotle 
puts it, a happy accident that the wounded man is also a doctor. Contrariwise, it is not 
an accident at all that the musician who addresses his sense of rhythm is doing so. I 
mean he would not be doing so if he had no aspirations of becoming a certain kind of 
musician. On the one hand, the Aristotelian doctor does not have to be doing, nor 
even attempting to do anything in particular, in order to get injured. And it is, in any 
case, simply as a man that the doctor gets injured, not as a doctor. On the other hand, 
the musician discloses his sense of time as a musician, and by this I mean, only as a 
musician, and therefore, because of his musicianship. Virtually any person can tap 
their foot to a rhythm of course, but it is not just any person tapping along with a 
rhythm who is concerned with the stability of their sense of time; the person who 
merely taps their foot to a rhythm does not have to think about, let alone know, any 
facts about their sense of rhythm. Such facts about themselves, and their sense of 
rhythm, do not impinge on their future. These facts do not impinge on these people, 
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perhaps because their sense of rhythm could never define them before themselves; or 
conversely, they will never feel tempted to reduce themselves to their sense of 
rhythm; and now I am assuming that this is indeed something that might threaten the 
musician at one point in his development.  
Back to the Aristotelian doctor: the wound is a felt aggression, as is any other 
pathology; it is something that attacks one in an instant, and sometimes it is 
something that develops surreptitiously, not something that is developed as a form of 
aspiration. For this reason, the wound, or the pathology, may be a form of discovery, 
but not at all in the sense we are after. The bass player is, through practice, trying to 
improve his sense of rhythm; he is after the acquisition of a piece of self-knowledge. 
In the end, some circumstance may prove the inconsistency of one’s belief in the 
curative power of some particular medicine, while the failure of improvement will 
exclude the bass player from a certain performance – it will taint his future as a 
musician.  
If the Aristotelian doctor fails to cure his wounds, even though he did 
everything he could, he proves the limit of his medical knowledge. If the bass player 
fails to improve his sense of time, after he did everything he could, he proves his 
personal limit as a bass player. And now, my limit, and the knowledge I have of my 
limit, is not a simple matter of knowing what I am not. It is not an apophatic stance I 
take towards myself. I do not simply want to know about that which I could never 
become, or as Fichte puts it, I do not want to try what has been made impossible to 
me by my nature90 (I take it that nature means here nothing but the species-generic 
thought). And unlike the Aristotelian doctor, I do not want to know further what is 
perverting my intact form, what may threateningly develop in me, and in the end, 
even deny my existence. In discerning my limit – say, in discovering the limit to my 
sense of time – I am discovering what I can become. And this becoming is not 
independent from what I now aspire to, nor from the history of my aspiration, a 
history susceptible to reappraisals I cannot predict at the outset; and, finally, it is 
certainly not independent from my activity, the practice of being a musician, a 
practice that did not begin nor will end with me.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The Vocation of Man, p. 112. 
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‘I and my activity’  
 75. When we are asked what we do, we often reply ‘I am a…’. For example, 
to be the bass player in question is to be the bass player with that particular sense of 
rhythm. On the other hand, the illness that afflicts the Aristotelian doctor is, as an 
illness, to be removed or controlled and thus not developed; or, its presence in the 
doctor as a patient is wholly perverse. Again, ‘I am an asthmatic’ defines me as a 
patient; ‘I am a bass player’ defines me as an agent.  
We can discuss the history of my asthma – it is documented in a hospital file 
somewhere; the author of this history is my doctor. But this history is the history of 
something that happened to me, even if, right from the very beginning, it something I 
try to control (I was told to do so) by mimicking the Aristotelian doctor’s reflexive 
gestures. I take medicine in order to prevent the flaring up of this perversion or to 
prevent the further deterioration of my health. But the history of my asthma is not 
marked by improvement – not in the exact same sense –, nor is it marked by my 
personal development; it is, instead, marked by crisis and the successful prevention of 
future crises. (The need to bring out this contrast springs from having to clear up the 
sense of addressing I wish to consider and also from the sort of limit I wish to 
consider, since, both my limit and my asthma exhibit a permanence in me.) 
In rehearsal, the bass player practices in order to improve his sense of time; he 
practices in order to be able to play the more difficult piece he was unable to play at 
first. The improvement of his sense of time brings out the future directedness of his 
activity in connection with his past playing. Rehearsing for something (e.g. a 
performance or audition) is not simply exhausted by the meeting of that particular 
end, but is, as an activity, as musicianship, the active structuring of the existence of 
this individual agent. By this, I am implying that there is an important existential 
meaning in the overcoming of, say, a tendency in one’s playing; this might even be 
something that seems rather trivial to others, but it may nevertheless be (and it often 
is) something that assumes a crucial importance to me; it is something that is, for me, 
the expression of genuine humility before my practice – we determine this as the 
absence of indifference towards oneself as a member of one’s practice.  
Of course, a limit may exclude you altogether from an activity, but it may just 
limit you inside that very activity. A beginner, who lacks any sense of time, may not 
find his way to any sort of improvement. If so, he is excluded from the activity of bass 
playing, although not in the sense of an individual who suffers a privation, e.g. a 
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person who loses a leg and is excluded from running; strictly, this sort limit emerges 
in practice, and it is not an attack on the body. Within the world and within history, 
the bass player exists within his limit and the choices that are available to him. And 
now, he has been given the responsibility for the continuation of his practice; he is 
now before his future as a musician, and all of this is nothing but a demand on his 
personal intelligence, or a demand on his self-consciousness, and also a demand on 
his dignity if someone or something threatens to take this future away from him.   
My limit is discerned in my acting, it is belongs to my moral sense of 
achievement. Practical philosophy occupies the internal position of agency the minute 
it becomes concerned with this particular interpretation of the concept of limit. And in 
doing so, it brings the concept of an individual person to the foreground. This 
amounts to a philosophical consideration of one’s activity, or of one’s profession, or 
of one’s vocation as one’s sense of achievement and as one’s sense of self-identity. 
 
The notion of activity demands the consideration of the internal perspective of 
the agent – the connection between self-identity and activity within time  
 76. An internal description of this kind is immediately recognizable to us, 
even though it might elicit our reflexive distance towards another; one might not 
recognize such a description as the position one holds, but we certainly recognize the 
form of such a description when we see an example of it.  
Here is an example of the internal perspective on an activity:  
 
In the eyes of others a man is a poet if he has written one good poem. In his own 
he is only a poet at the moment when he is making his last revision to a new 
poem. The moment, before, he was still only a potential poet; the moment after, 
he is a man who has ceased to write poetry, perhaps forever.91 
 
The before and after Auden speaks of are anchored in one’s capacity to sustain 
one’s practice. To become a musician is not simply to learn how to play the bass, but 
to actively engage with bass playing from now onwards. And this engagement is 
immune to indifference; it is, perhaps, even immune to the eschatological indifference 
Weber saw in St. Paul.92 The idea that I cannot be indifferent to my bass playing, that 
is, to the quality of my bass playing, is here the same as saying that I cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Auden, “Making, Knowing and Judging” in The Dyer’s Hand, p. 41. 
92 The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism, p. 31. 
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indifferent to myself; and, therefore, if I cannot be indifferent to myself, then I cannot 
be indifferent to my activity. But the position Auden describes implies the 
acknowledgment of a threat: the acknowledgement that my stopping to be a musician, 
or a poet, is, possibly, a threat to myself, to who I am; I may be able to merely intuit 
the extent and seriousness of this threat without honestly being able to say I fully 
understand it. And if this activity stops, this absence of indifference may turn into a 
form of sadness I cannot shake. The forever Auden intuits is a threat that may very 
well be ahead of me. And I do not wish to say that I am just a musician, and in a 
similar way, I do not wish to say that I am, simply, my sense of rhythm. My 
musicality could cease to be for various different reasons, and if it does, I will then 
simply be an unmusical man again. Perhaps the Pauline indifference is but a form of 
consolation; it is the assurance that my soul may have it better than I did, even if it is I 
who hears the calling and not my soul.93  It is the assurance that even if I am a slave to 
others and cannot therefore enjoy myself I am still a person. But all this comes too 
late to avoid one’s own knowing of this threat. It has already become clear that with 
the deterioration of a part of me comes the deterioration of my happiness. And with 
all of this comes the deterioration of freedom. If I am deprived of enjoying myself I 
can still be free, but I cannot apprehend my freedom as a gift. 
Barth asked: “Is not the free theologian also a man and as such a recipient of 
the gift of freedom?”94 He then goes on to list the precepts he deems as reasonable for 
the apprehension of his freedom according to his own talents. And so he begins every 
single time with the phrase “A free theologian…”, a phrase he understands, strictly, as 
expressing his self-conscious life according to his vocation. As such, this vocation is 
pro me, that is, he who completes this phrase apprehends his personal freedom as a 
gift. But, of course, this gift is, if shared, also pro nobis. And it is so not in the manner 
in which Pauline bondage may also be for the sake of others; in St. Paul this harmony 
has been broken, perhaps forever.  
But should we not invert the order of Barth’s question? I mean, a man 
becomes musical, but first he was a man. Auden is aware that the poet came into 
being, and his anxiety is not over when this moment of becoming, but rather over the 
moment where it could cease to be. And if it does, then the unmusical man is still a 
man, although perhaps no longer a musician.  But we do understand Barth’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 1 Cor. 7:17-24. 
94 ‘The Gift of Freedom’ in The Humanity of God, p. 88. 
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forgetfulness, we do know a gift can be lost, but we also know that to have been in the 
possession of such a gift, even if only for a time, is bound to have an enduring effect; 
and this effect cannot dissipate without dragging the entire identity of the man in 
question along with it. So, finally, and although I cannot argue for this thoroughly just 
yet, I believe that Barth’s association of vocation as a positive human action. 
Personality and human dignity are not simply a matter of doctrine, but rather a deep-
rooted problem of political philosophy. There is, always, a latent political concern in 
theology, namely, that a society may grant freedom, but not as a gift; or that there is a 
connection between the self-enjoyment and self-constitution of personality and 
justice, which is a connection that can be destroyed.  
 
77. My becoming a musician is a concern I have all the time. There is a before 
and an after to my being a musician, and a before and an after a particular phase of 
development, or to my overcoming of particular difficulties. The first personal 
perspective of an activity is therefore not instantaneous; I become a musician within 
history.  
The disclosing of one’s limit and the knowledge of one’s aspirations, in sum, 
our self-conscious existence shapes our individual representation of time. The before 
and after Auden addresses pertains to a representation of time as history, and history 
as the individual history of a poet. Here, the sense of before and after is plagued by a 
distinct notion of failure, as much as the existence of a particular poem is by that of 
achievement. To have ends such as to play slap bass technique, or revise a poem, 
constitutes the fabric out of which being a bass player or poet is made of. And, 
equally important, to cease doing such things as playing slap bass or rehearsing would 
put an end to being a bass player – the continuity of the activity is the doing of those 
things that constitute it. This form of continuity represents the continuity of one’s 
identity as a musician. And therefore, this continuity all of the time is to be 
understood as a nexus comprising practice and identity. Time can be merely felt 
through its passing, in a dream for example; it also can be felt as boredom; it can even 
be felt as a threat. I do not wish to argue that what I am calling the practical 
representation of time is exhaustive as an interpretation of time. I do wish to argue, 
nevertheless, that the practical aspect of time is vital for any intact person. Since the 
suspension of the self-constituting activity, whatever this activity is, e.g. of a 
musician, doctor, poet, would be detrimental to a healthy mind, and hence, a healthy 
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person. There is, of course, the retired musician, who is a musician with a past 
history. But it is not at all ridiculous to suppose that his previous musical history does 
not figure to him in the exact same way as it does to us. What was, for him, the end of 
his activity is for us the historical privilege of authorship. He is still the one who did 
this or that, which might not be necessarily a comforting thought to him. 
In a dream I act effortlessly; I act outside real time, and sometimes, I am 
unable to act at all. I dream as a man, of course, and therefore, I dream like any other 
man, although I may sometimes dream as a musician, while another man might dream 
as a poet. But in my dreams, say, in my dreams as a musician, my efforts, or my 
absolute paralysis, are not something I mean to do. All that happens in my dreams 
may mean something, I am sure of this, but I do not mean anything at all by any of it. 
The actions in my dreams just happen to me and before me. They do so while I am at 
rest, while my body is lying down and static (and my practical reasoning is, of course, 
in a similar state). I do not even breathe like I usually do when I am exerting myself 
when making an effort to do something, although I might wake up breathing heavily 
as if I had been making such an effort. And so, time simply passes outside the order of 
practice; time passes as sleep, as a regenerative imposition. Inside the dream, I do not 
think within time, that is, I do not reason practically. And so I might remember the 
action in the dream without even knowing how much time could have been implied 
by that very action – picking up a coin from the ground can take years, becoming a 
bass player can be done in an instant. This simply means that, in the dream, the 
specific nature of an action and its categorical importance is altogether lost; I do not 
act, not amongst others, not within the world, not within time, and therefore not at all. 
Any action in a dream may even destroy the very idea of a recognizable category; I 
might walk like a cat, fly like a bird, and another man might take my shadow away 
from me. This is because, in the dream, all meaning is afloat and suspended in thin air 
without anything that could ever tie it down. What I do may mean nothing to me; 
what I say may be unrecognizable, and now, unlike when I am awake, none of this 
even has to bear any consequences on me. I mean, I am not angry, or frightened, that 
what I say is unrecognizable, or that what I do is meaningless: I am dreaming and this 
is what dreams are made of – nothing gets done, nothing is impeded, and nothing I 
see myself doing in the dream belongs to the history of any activity.  
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Activity as the logos that interprets a number of given connected performances 
 78. The bass player does not spend his days simply being a bass player; 
rather, he plays the bass, tunes it, and replaces its strings. The now of the musician 
issues in connected exercises of instrumental reasoning, a variety of actions that offer 
stability to his activity – the fabric of his activity as a musician resides in his concern 
for the various tasks he has to perform.  
But I wish to address the notion of connected performances for another reason. 
There is something important in the thought that agents are within the world. And this 
world is the one that our instrumental reasoning grabs on to. This is to say that no 
matter how my practical thinking spans, it does so within the world as a relevant 
constraint – it spans non-indifferent practical reasoning, as reasoning towards 
achievement. And both the bass player and I are not outside of this connectedness; we 
are the source of this connectedness.   
I am suggesting that there is some gain in an investigation of practical 
reasoning that starts with the personal reality of a given agent. My reason behind this 
starting point is that by avoiding a representation of agency as such, we also avoid 
agents as such or generic agents. For example, an understanding of a musician’s 
rehearsals has to make sense of a series of repeated actions. A practical representation 
of this form of repetition cannot only make reference to the end sought in the future; it 
also has to understand the connectedness amongst the various performances spanning 
from the past up until now. It has to make sense of the gain in each step taken. These 
steps contain the specificity of what the musician is in fact doing, e.g. addressing 
problems related to a piece of music, and/or related to a personal inability to play that 
very piece. The bass player repeats the passage in order to play it at a concert, and he 
repeats the passage in order to get the time right, and also in order to become a better 
musician.  
We have long since passed any form of representational simplicity. The 
rehearsal may go well or it might not. And none of this is a simple a matter of 
repetition, although I do absolutely need to repeat these things. I am behind the 
continuation of this repetition, or even better, this repetition is what I absolutely need 
to do and I only stop when this repetition has affected me; I stop when I finally know 
how to do something. And my repeating is not a mechanical event either; I do not 
produce something entirely different from myself, for example, in the way a machine 
that cuts the vinyl record does, not insofar as it is I who produces the performance and 
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so it is my performance (even though I could sell it, and therefore treat it as a 
commodity); and also, it is not a mechanical event insofar as I reproduce myself as a 
musician, and this reproduction does not even have to happen on the same scale. (For 
example, I have now become a better musician, which is certainly an effect of diligent 
rehearsal and not of simple and senseless repetition.)  
All of these steps represent deliberative episodes; they are subsumed to an 
end, but they are, as real episodes, constrained by the difficulties of particular actions. 
These episodes are constrained by how things go, and also by things that one did not 
foresee. The action, what one did, or what happened, does not have to simply be an 
outcome, that is, a functional output (think again of Wittgenstein’s machine). It rarely 
is for the practicing musician or poet. And therefore, I believe, it should also rarely be 
for the philosopher of action. The philosopher who interprets the actions of the 
musician, or of the person who waits for the bus to go to work, interprets the logos 
that joins everything that gets done. This logos is sustained by a personal conception 
of an end, it is but incarnate self-consciousness.  
Still, this sort of concern regarding personal agency is not necessarily a 
demand for all theoretical representations of the category of human action. But it is a 
given pertaining to the manifest cognition of action. Our investigation presupposes a 
certain kind of agent. One that is not indifferent to a great number of things, including 
him. The presence of connected performances is unavoidable for the apprehension of 
meaningful human action, and we have to further address these concepts in an inquiry 
into practical reasoning. Of course, there is such a thing as pathological disconnected 
action, and there is, also, forced senseless repetition. But the existence of these forms 
of agency do not undermine the present investigation – they simply give us one more 
clue about the moral aspect of human action. 
 
 The required permanence 
 79. By addressing the notion of permanence, I am, in the context of the 
present discussion, trying to offer an interpretation of its function in the formation of 
first-personal beliefs. Without the acquisition of first-personal beliefs, we are unable 
to think of the gain we have previously discerned as a form of connectedness, and 
consequently, our interpretation of the notion of logos would be incomplete. 
This sort of permanence is often manifested when beliefs regarding the 
stability of a capacity become blatantly apparent. For example, the first time you 
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stepped on a bicycle, after you removed your training wheels, you may have 
entertained the belief that you would reach the end of the street; you even might have 
had some reasons for that confidence. But if you do not reach the end of the street, 
and you decide to attempt it again, you do not have a permanent belief that you do 
indeed know how to ride a bike. And so you may attempt and fall again until you do 
not fall anymore.  
Such a concern is quite common. It pertains to what we simply call knowing 
how to ride a bike. Acting pertains to this form of knowledge in an essential way. It is 
a condition of its acquisition and a condition of its permanence. Its actuality is part of 
the plans and considerations of the person who knows how to ride a bike. It is simply 
something she considers whenever it is pertinent – she relies on the stability of her 
capacity because this capacity is permanent, that is, it is not present in one moment 
and absent in the next.95 
This permanence is an implied element in the representation of practical 
reasoning. For instance, consider how the aspiration of an apprentice is structured: the 
apprentice may intend to play slap bass technique, but not instantaneously. He wants 
to achieve that technique and starts therefore with exercises for his fingering.  The 
permanence that issues in being able to play slap bass on command will involve 
sustaining a first personal intention throughout practice. Now, this gaining of 
knowledge will sustain our capacity to refer to ourselves, that is, this permanence will 
be behind the apprehension of the bass player as the bass player he has become. This 
sort of first personal knowledge can, of course, be challenged, although the 
circumstances under which it can be are in itself a topic too wide for the present 
argument. It suffices, therefore, to say that self-reference cannot dispense with the 
ways a person has of gaining knowledge about herself, since it is not simply a matter 
of knowing a guaranteed reference, which is the capacity to putatively be in a position 
to answer the question about who these thoughts or beliefs belong to. And so, we 
cannot do without action as the source of such beliefs. Perhaps we can simply recall 
the present matter by imagining the difference between answering the questions “who 
here knows how to play the bass?” and “how do you know that you know how to play 
the bass?” And I do not simply mean that a reply to the second sort of question may 
differ significantly in kind, that is, that I might give you an example instead of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 I am taking this phrase from Hampshire, Freedom of the individual, p. 65. 
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explanation. The difference I am pointing to concerns the fact that there is a history of 
my learning how to play the bass, and this history cannot be told without firstly 
appreciating the primitive status of the concept of action. It is not simply the history 
of what happened to me, as say the history a kidnapping is. It is, instead, the history of 
my learning, of the structure of my learning, that is, the history of my practice.  
To learn how to do something takes time; to become a musician or anything 
else takes time. We have aims within time, as the time necessary for the development 
of our abilities. 
 
 Achievement and failure as personal history – Becoming  
80. Consider the following thought: “I have become the musician I am now.” 
The proper understanding of this assertion is personal-historical. It is the self-
conscious thought about the connection between the principle of personal identity and 
one’s temporally extended activity. This presupposes action as personal-history; it 
orders what has happened into categories of achievement and failure, that is, as 
meaningful action. Therefore, “I have become the musician I am now” is not 
necessarily co-extensive with “I am the musician I aspired to be,” but neither does it 
exclude any sort of achievement. One putative interpretation for the latter statement 
would be a sort of self-imposed demand – a form of perfectionism. Such a stance is, 
very often, accompanied by something to which the notion of achievement has 
applicability, although the degree of satisfaction is, of course, personal, as are the 
reasons, or lack of thereof, that may come to count as achievement. But, in any case, 
to aspire to be a certain kind of musician could hardly be some sort of frictionless, 
instantaneous guaranteed want. And therefore, I do not believe we can address this 
thought without addressing the concept of failure.  
Anscombe was aware of how much failure interested us – the sort of interest 
that leads to a philosophical investigation –, but she did not place this interest in its 
proper context.96 It is not simply that failure occasionally debunks our confidence in 
action, that the notion of stability we expect goes amiss, but rather, that in the context 
of becoming someone failure is endowed with moral significance. Perhaps we can 
begin to approach this thought in the following manner: what would the absence of 
failure mean? I know I cannot apprehend myself, my complete self, at once. There is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Intention, §48. 
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no Archimedean lever I could occupy in relation to myself. But, if there was one, and 
I could see myself perfectly given in potentia, what would the rest of my life look like 
to me? Would I be merely waiting for it? Or avoid it? Would I surrender to it? Would 
I try to speed things up? And, would none of this have an effect on those very 
potentialities, I mean, what if speed things up in a hasty manner? Of course, all of 
these questions are senseless, but I intend to recall something when I ask them, 
namely that the possibility of a sane life would be entirely lost if I were to stand 
before this final list of my being in potentia. Happiness or sadness over oneself would 
be in an instant, and so life would pass in an instant, even if not biologically-speaking. 
In this absolute moment of self-apprehension, I would merely stand frighteningly 
before myself; and the fact that I might not even recognize myself in this potentiality 
is not entirely out of the picture. We often try to do things for virtue, as Anscombe 
puts it, or even for pleasure, with complete and utter failure. And these are but 
moments of discovery. The question “why do I not enjoy this any longer?” may well 
catch me off guard, and is it not the case that I will probably not be able to give a 
proper reply to this question, at least not for a while. But when I discover such things, 
I am, like the bass player, before myself. There is a parallel here to the movement of 
conversion.  In the moment of conversion I am, evermore so, before myself. I cannot 
conceal anything from myself, not even attempt to do so. There is no partial 
conversion, but only failed conversion. And so there may well be such a thing as 
reiterated failure. There is, as Barth says, an attempt by man to be man – which is a 
history that interests God.97 This history is, of course, a postlapsarian history; it is 
history as power, or history as injustice.98 But still, it is in the interest of God; it is a 
worthy attempt: it is both a fall and the receiving of a gift. And so, there is such a 
thing as an attempt to be oneself. I mean, without failure there is no fathomable life 
and there is no worthy history. And even if a history without a fall would perhaps be 
the most blessed kind of history, such a history would not even amount to the history 
of a Saint. If there is such a thing as a life without failure, or conversion without fall, 
we cannot but praise it, of course; but for all those to whom this does not apply, there 
is the virtue of charity, even if it is before oneself. 
“I have become the musician I am now” is of course a form of achievement. It 
is the enjoyment of one’s freedom, of one’s activity as a reality. It is the knowledge of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 ‘The Humanity of God’ in The Humanity of God, p. 54. 
98 The Epistle to the Romans, p. 77. 
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the many things I can do, the knowledge of my history, or the history of my activity 
up until now. But the way I know this history is in a very peculiar way. I am always 
before it. To be before it could cease to be, and if it did cease, this ceasing would be, 
in a way, my ceasing. So I do not merely tell my story, I make my story, even if not 
alone. Perhaps, in a similar but not entirely coextensive way, I become virtuous. I 
acquire virtue, but I could never do so in complete solitude without anyone to teach 
me. Is virtue, or vocation, still virtue and vocation if never tested? Is there, for the 
human mind, I mean, an absolute, eternal, potentiality? (I observe this with respect to 
myself such as the contortionist I will never be, the perfect man I will never be.) In 
my case, and I suppose in almost everyone’s case, when I tell the story that led up to 
the man I am now, or to the musician I am now, such an eternal potentiality is entirely 
out of the picture. I do not, not even for a second, feel the metaphysical pressure to 
discern the status of vocation or virtue; these may well be natural or unnatural kinds, 
but virtue and vocation are, as existence, as my existing, fully material. They are as 
much in my actions as they are in the reactions of others – in their faces, in the way 
they look at me. These were my aspirations before, and are now in my achievements 
and failures, in sum, what happened. And that is the only story I have to tell now, that 
I have fulfilled some of it, although I am not done until I cease to be.  
 
 A first approach to the postlapsarian being of man – an anticipation of the 
argument to come, which is demanded by the present course of argument 
 81. Perhaps we can now better understand Barth’s idea. His humanity of God 
is a form of theological humility. It rescues our attempts to become ourselves from 
despair; it rescues this effort from complete anonymity, from being undone with every 
failure, and it does so before God. God’s interest in these personal histories, and in 
human history in general, is his interest in our condition as his creatures; but we are 
also, even if in a significantly different way, the creatures of ourselves. And this is 
how far Barth is willing to go in order to bring God closer to us, and closer to what 
may seem the insignificance of our attempts and aspirations. He is willing to 
confound our interest in ourselves, and in each other, in sum, the totality of what 
resides within the confinement of our reciprocity, with our understanding of God.  
Our being is not an ex nihilo perfection – it could never be, not from the very 
beginning; and so there is much to do be done, and much to be hoped for.  And all of 
this depends on time, firstly, in the truistic sense that history depends on time, and 
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then, secondly, and perhaps more complexly, on human action. And this is, namely, 
what we come to do in the absence of that which often impedes us. The humanity of 
God, the interest of God in human action, dispels our belief that humanity fell from a 
perfect state of nature. It brings into view the awful truth that this fall was, is, and has 
been, continuous; to fall is to give in to nature, to declare as frivolous the aspirations 
that mankind could entertain for the future in light of contemporaneous failure. But 
this conception of understanding, or of reciprocal comprehension implied by the 
liberty to predicate humanity to the existence of God is, equally, the evocation of the 
feeling of a humble kind of self-love. It is, certainly, a blow to the feeling of self-love, 
which is to know one’s faults as a sin, and to know one’s failures; but it is also to a 
calling to have genuine humility before oneself. This is simply to know, once and for 
all, that humankind has always been more like Rousseau’s philosopher than like 
Rousseau’s savage (in other words, humankind is always unable to sleep soundly at 
night). And therefore, humanity could never be taught without first thinking the 
perennial reflexive gestures it is bound to think. It could never be taught without 
thinking about the Aristotelian doctor, or the bass player, without first thinking about 
its faculty of self-improvement, and finally, it could never be taught without firstly 
thinking about its self-inflicted wounds, the wounds Rousseau ardently wished had a 
definite historical beginning.  
The self-conscious apprehension of the faculty of self-improvement brought 
into human life the attempt to be indifferent to its demands, and so, finally, it brought 
guilt into humanity.99 Other mammals, Rousseau once observed, took a surprisingly 
short time to fully develop. Perhaps, and I am not entirely sure about this, it is because 
their being is so closely related to the strength and development of their bodies and 
organs – nature makes them fit in an amazingly short period of time. Amazingly short 
for us, that is. For we are dependent on reflexive gestures to address ourselves in 
order to bring about change in ourselves, and to develop our own talents and to cure 
our own wounds. And now, once again, we are closer to Fichte, who could not 
imagine progress as anything else but a legacy, something one generation leaves to 
the next, than we are to Rousseau’s savage, who can hardly think beyond each day he 
manages to survive. We have to abandon the history Rousseau wanted to tell, because 
of what, I believe, is an imperative reason: Rousseau’s history is not the history we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, p. 11. 
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have made, and, consequently, it is not the history that interests God. This history of 
the savage, the history of the absence of self-consciousness, is nothing but an attempt 
to evade the reality of evil. It is an attempt to retreat into a pure heart, a heart that 
could naturally do no harm, or that could, at any rate, never know the harm it had in 
fact done. And so, the savage of the Discourse became the man who later, in the 
Social Contract, professes to an abstract faith (a faith purer than any traditional faith). 
And slowly, after managing to evade, if I am permitted to use the following 
anachronism, his responsibility for the history of Spirit, this man of a pure heart, the 
man who refuses any darkness inside of him, who refuses any blow to his self-love, 
became the tyrant who was, very much like the savage: blind to the evils his pure 
ideas and heart could engender.  
  How absurd it is to attempt to invent a beginning for human history. And yet, 
for Rousseau, the history of humanity could never be the history of guilt. If he came 
to see this very truth, “nature” as he conceived of it, would disappear. Mankind would 
not have started to deteriorate after its knowledge of the faculty of self-improvement, 
but after its surrender to it.  
As unlikely as it may seem, Feuerbach was in this respect a perfect 
Rousseauian.100 What he saw in the language of theology was an attempt to conceal 
its very anthropological nature, and in turn, he saw in this concealed anthropology the 
danger of an indirect love. He saw in the humanity of God mere humiliation, and no 
humility. And coextensively, he did not discern any danger in his proud reductionism. 
Man should love mankind directly, and not through the existence of God. And this 
love is the possession of a heart; but in the absence of history, or in the absence of 
guilt and humility, this direct self-love has proved to turn quickly into terror. In the 
absence of God, there is only the truth of my heart, and so, how could my heart ever 
do anything wrong? Mankind can no longer attempt to be itself before God, and it can 
no longer sin when it gives up on itself. And finally, when Rousseau’s thought has 
approached its completion, and a form of spiritual monism has taken hold of our 
thinking, supported by a surrogate civil faith, then the final question becomes: how 
could nature ever be wrong for the book of nature never lies? Becoming, even in the 
face of a distorted nature, in the possession of a heart that is permeable to evil, is very 
different from this Rousseauian nature. And now, action also means an entirely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The Essence of Christianity, pp. 56-57. 
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different thing. The teleology of aspiration lies outside the invented history of the 
savage because it is meaningless for the savage; for him, there is no becoming, at least 
not of the sort we have described so far. Of course, there is no such history as the 
history of the savage; there is only the history that Barth described as the display of 
power, the history of guilt, of failure, both before ourselves and others and before God 
– this is the history that interests God, the history that never reached the perfect 
justice we apprehend in revealed truth. And so, political philosophy always despairs 
for the restoration of the concept of personality, which is a concept theology cannot 
do without. It needs to avoid contempt amongst men, but it wishes to incite their self-
love; it needs to preserve authority, but it has to deny the authority of religion. And so 
it begins to harbor many ideas pertaining to theology, always unable to predict the 
effects of the surrogates it created. We are indeed the political animal, but we cannot 
see ourselves entirely in this manner because we cannot simply reduce ourselves to 
savagery. And so, when we act towards others, and ourselves, we begin to discern 
how our politics only imperfectly follow from our nature. And, of course, we discern 
how indifferent we are towards this imperfection, that is, toward each other.  
Feuerbach’s anthropomorphic God constantly misses what his materialism 
correctly discerned in the concept of action: the moral truth that our limit as persons is 
revealed to us in the course of our self-conscious active lives; and so, no political 
stability can survive if men are to be thought as beyond redemption, or as having 
ceased to be good savages, or as subtracted from their abilities and vocations. But for 
now, and before I suspend this train of thought, only to resume it later on in the 
following chapter, I believe we can conclude that all these determinations, to know 
and say what man is, is a form of power – there is an essential connection between the 
concepts of power and personality.  
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 6. Dependence and Tyranny 
 
 
The emancipation of the state from religion  
is not the emancipation of actual man from religion. 
On the Jewish Question, p.227 
 
Introductory remarks  
82. The origin of tyranny divides between forms of brutal instrumentalism and 
pureness of heart. Tyranny is always insatiable; its stability depends on the degree of 
personal elimination a given group of people is capable of tolerating – tyranny is 
nothing but the perversion of human dependence. 
For the Tyrant, the party, and the market there can be no genuine moment of 
difference. There is indeed utility, dependence, and imputation, as Lukács sometimes 
puts it, but all of these may co-exist with utter indifference to other people and their 
situations. 
The socialist tradition, specifically in its Marxist form, carries within itself the 
perversion of hope as a social virtue. The concern Marx often expressed with the 
entropic tendency any revolutionary movement is bound to experience degenerated 
into the brutality of Bolshevism. But the Bolshevistic movement was no different than 
many other revolutionary movements. The brutal actuality of elimination – that in the 
case of Marxism owes its root to the psychological and anthropological reductionism 
of Feuerbach – is the fight or flight response of any ideology that has no established 
tradition – it is nothing but its despair for legitimate power. 
 This sort of protective reflex is not absent from any liberal democratic 
society; plainly, because power is necessarily an element of any political society. And 
so, in the end, the achievement of the great society depends on the allocation of 
power, as well as on the avoidance of power in the service of evil – power is for 
protecting the good. 
Revolutionary thought and action despairs for the Aristotelian initial position. 
It self-establishes its epistemic privilege, or its historical Archimedean lever, in order 
to legitimize its use of violence in bringing about a farcical initial point from which to 
build a new society. If Leo Strauss is right and the Rousseauian state of nature, from 
which evil is wholly absent, is in fact the beginning of a crisis in natural right, the 
modern tyrant is the heir of this crisis. The epistemic privilege of the modern Tyrant, 
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his existence as a singular tantum is the annihilation of humility before God, and 
finally before all others. And it is, also, and perhaps more dangerously the 
transference of an intuition about the vocation of a species into the vocation of single 
man; while the very idea of laissez-faire is the removal of the tyrant while 
maintaining the absence of vindication, and hence, ultimately waiving responsibility 
for the active realization of the vocation of man. 
Recourse to these theological notions should not be understood as harboring 
an animus dogmatizandi. That theological concepts are unavoidable in the correct 
appreciation of the concept of power is widely accepted, as is the subsidiary question 
regarding the nature of mankind (regarding the radical nature of evil in any given 
personality). For example, here is Guy Debord’s understanding of the same problem: 
“Philosophy is at once the power of alienated thought and the thought of alienated 
power, and as such it is has never been able to emancipate itself from theology.”101 Of 
course, like many other Marxist intellectuals, he continues the opposition to theology 
in far simpler terms than Marx himself did: the annihilation of humility, the 
annihilation of God, is also the annihilation of the possibility to tell the history of 
mankind as the history of guilt (the impossibility of men to seriously stand before 
each other and confess). Debord retains the Hegelian need of a philosophy of history, 
but not its purpose. 
Furthermore, Debord’s notion of a spectacular society, a totalistic image of 
accumulated capital, perpetuates the supposed constitutive blindness of the working 
class. The sort of blindness only the Marxist critic, as a pure mediator of the authority 
of Marx’s theory, can cure. The effects of class situation, the possibility of a social 
accusation and vindication are once again trivialized. In this particular point, Debord 
is no different from Lukács, although their readings of alienation serve different 
purposes: Debord is interested in the pathological condition of those who possess a 
false consciousness of their own situation in society, Lukács on the other hand wishes 
to uphold a form of dependence upon a paternalistic authority; both theories dispense 
any form of dialogue by reifying the mind of their interlocutors, that is, by dispensing 
with the sort of moral psychology I wish to address next. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 The Society of the Spectacle, §20. 
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In this form of trivialization lurks an anti-democratic desire – a desire for a 
violent break, the very opposite of reconciliation. 
Teleological thinking has to be the inheritor of history; it cannot conceal it: 
We have to recognize, that we are, within history, at a point where we have come too 
late to stop many injustices. From our position within history we can’t but mourn the 
past use of power.  
In what follows I wish to offer an interpretation of a teleological form that 
includes the idea of reconciliation as well as the idea of an aspiration for the vocation 
of man.  
 
On how one should live and one’s outlook on life  
83. The ambition of any political project ought to be the establishment justice. 
The ambition of any political philosophy is to apprehend the difficulties of such a 
project. Political philosophy, being philosophy, cannot savagely abstract from what it 
actually finds in the world – the point of departure for political philosophy is the 
actual world.  
This may be expressed in this simpler form: the actual imperfect degree of 
justice in the world is an object of investigation for political philosophy, and the 
causes of such imperfection will, very likely, tell us something about those for whom 
political philosophy is thought – namely for man.  
 
84. Aristotle set out in his ethics to give an outline of a human good. His 
inquiry demands a particular kind of student, one that knows not to fall back on his 
feelings when choosing his actions. This student has to possess some experience 
derived from action; he has to know the difficulties that come with choosing; he has 
to be able to learn from his actions. These conditions emerge quite naturally; after all, 
the study of ethics is a contribution to the content of a rational principle of action.  
This Aristotelian idea of an addressee for political thinking is perfectly 
sensible, although it represents a limit case – we are considering a student. Rousseau, 
on the other hand, proposed to speak frankly and directly to man, or in his own 
qualification, to what he found to be man suffering from a particular disease. The 
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history of civil societies is a way to study the history of human diseases, he 
maintained, and Rousseau intends to speak102 to men in such societies.  
Now, the question that arises is relative to the pertinence of the sickness. We 
are no longer considering a student, he who has to be capable of reflexively 
apprehending a contrast between his feelings and reason; we are considering men who 
have been befallen by a particular disease. 
The intricate connection between the history of civil society and the history of 
diseases raises a thought about their interaction. The men to whom both Aristotle and 
Rousseau speak are within history, and from within history, justice may very well be 
absent. This precise thought led Engels to compose a catalogue of the diseases 
suffered by a group of men in a particular place at a particular time, and it led Marxist 
theory to address a particular class – the proletariat – as the visible expression of such 
diseases, or alternatively, as the visible absence of humanity.  
There is a difficult problem here: to address a class is quite different from 
simply describing the condition that class is suffering from at present; and to suffer 
can here only mean to suffer as men and women do. It is unlikely that the proletariat, 
as a class, could be as exemplar as the Aristotelian student, and it certainly does not 
occupy an initial position where it is to receive moral knowledge. Marx was correct 
about the moral salience of these particular men as an object of inquiry for political 
philosophy. Marx was right that it were these particular men, those who suffer 
injustice, who constituted the point of departure for political philosophy. But Marx 
could not exclusively address the proletariat, contrary to what was to become a 
dominant part of the history of Marxist thought; Marx himself knew that you could 
not choose, and certainly not invent, your listeners. 
 
85. The identification of the causes of injustice demands a particular form of 
inquiry. But such an inquiry is hopeless if it is not to set an end. This particular end 
admits a generic expression – the abolition of injustice.  
In the absence of perfect justice, the people we acknowledge stand in 
reciprocal relations to each other. This might not be at all clear to them. They might 
be, in various degrees, indifferent to such a fact, as well as ignorant of the moral 
salience of this fact. As individuals, with an individual self-consciousness, they are in 	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possession of a particular world of action. This is a world that expands and contracts 
to include others and certain sections of an environment, but it does not follow that as 
individuals they have to possess a moral judgment concerning their necessary 
interaction. A fact such as this may come to them as a revelation.  
Merleau-Ponty denied that history is formed by a series of juxtaposed self-
consciousnesses; his denial is an anticipation of the moral fact Marxist theory intends 
to reveal. But is the metaphysical assumption about this form of dependence, and 
coextensively of history as the expression of such social dependence, a solution to the 
reality of injustice? If we moved towards a theory of a collective mind, for example, if 
we believed in such theory, we would be constructing a metaphysical shift – a shift 
that would most likely hold little significance for those who, in the immediacy of their 
existence, experience burdens that can only be experienced individually. A collective 
mind could hardly be indifferent to its own working, but people are indifferent to each 
other.  
Like many other images at work in political philosophy, the idea of a 
collective mind is a metaphysical metaphor and it increasingly cancels out sections of 
our common experience the more elaborate it becomes. In the extreme, this canceling 
eliminates a central problem of moral philosophy: it eliminates individuals and with it 
the relation of reciprocity they hold with respect to each other – it eliminates how they 
can become each other’s ends. 
Aristotle apprehended this difficulty. His ethics presents the idea of 
acquisition as the progressive illumination of the importance of morality for a person, 
as the revelation of the place and importance of morals in one’s life. To learn how to 
be virtuous is necessarily an individual enterprise, although it could not be carried out 
in complete solitude. 
This is one characteristic aspect of virtue, its all-encompassing aspect, the fact 
that it offers a guiding principle for other activities any given person might endorse 
such as activities where this person is not the sole participant. Therefore, the teleology 
of becoming virtuous is applicable to a group of people. It designates a form of 
activity that is not restricted to one individual, but expands to a higher end – to gain 
knowledge of a good for a community.  
The virtuous person inherits the end about the abolition of injustice. As an 
element of the teleology of becoming virtuous, this end sets a personal demand; and 
given the all-encompassing character of virtue as an end, this person could hardly be 
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indifferent to this end without being indifferent towards virtue altogether. Hence, the 
expression of a good to be realized is recalled by the reply to the question ‘How ought 
I to live?’  
 
86. As an element of political science, the search for such a good implies two 
related problems: What is the nature of the contrast between the form of activity 
designated by the teleological principle of virtue and an existing society, and what is 
the outlook of actual persons experiencing such a contrast? 
The first question presupposes the possibility of occupying a critical stance, 
assuming the truism that there is no historical discontinuity between the result of such 
an inquiry and actual political activity. This critical stance is located inside an actual 
society, which raises the question of a possible transition, or alternatively, that no 
transition is required. Of course, to assume that no transition is required is the tacit 
assumption that there are no impediments to adopting such moral principles, or at 
least none that would require reflection, for example, on the reproduction of a form of 
activity that already exists. But the stance that dispenses with any sort of reflection 
amounts to a tacit assertion of the full realization of justice. This is the case unless, of 
course, it is a form of indifference – the possibility of indifference belongs to our 
inquiry. 
Marx and Engels described a distinct moment where the conditions under 
which people actualize their relations with each other, continuous with their self-
activity, assume the aspect of an accidental fetter.103 This idea reveals the burden of 
historical continuity – the inheritance of a form of activity that owes its stable 
reproduction to agents who continue their self-activity even though they do not 
identify with that activity any longer.  But the weight of this historical continuity does 
not downplay the moral importance of the realization. Marx and Engels are neither 
simply making history, nor are they simply considering an automatic response certain 
individuals have to a historical and material setting. The recognition of these fetters is 
the result of apprehending the damaging effect of this particular kind of continuity to 
the realization of an Aristotelian human good.   
Marx and Engels’ argument makes a point of differentiating between the 
conditions of possibility of this self-activity, which is between a historically inherited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The German Ideology, p. 91. 
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condition and as a result of a certain form of activity. For the individual experiencing 
this contradiction, a fact about his relation with others becomes manifest; this is a fact 
that concerns the production of his material-life, now under the problematic aspect of 
this relation between him and others. It becomes apparent how his actions can 
reproduce, both for him and others, the unjust past into the future. 
In this sense, any appeal to the use of these Marxist concepts in the 
understanding of a putative contradiction between individuals and their conditions of 
life will have to address the importance of this realization as a moral thought. And 
this implies a revision of some of the central concepts that operate in Marxist theory, 
e.g. the proletariat. The position from which an inquiry of virtue is undertaken, to 
shed light on the notion of how one ought to live one’s life can be realized, cannot 
abstract from the conditions under which this investigation is made. In this sense, 
moral thought is situated here, and relevantly so.  
But the element of succession in time and the inheritance of a particular form 
of activity reveal another problem. It is not clear that, for example, and to use 
Aristotelian terms, advancement in a craft benefits from the study and consideration 
of an activity in the same way as an inquiry about the nature of virtue does. If the 
thesis of historical materialism can easily quote examples of transitions inside specific 
crafts – following the Aristotelian idea that the improvement of a craft follows the 
inherent tendency of a craft to its perfection – it cannot as easily show what has to be 
in position to make the sort of transition that would not reproduce any degree of 
injustice. The thesis of historical materialism cannot show advancement, that is, 
without any substantial account of the present implications of moral thought on 
individuals. The historical model can describe the spontaneous progression inside a 
craft, which makes the previous forms irrelevant, but this model cannot explain as a 
simple succession within the reflective stance any individual has towards his situation 
in society. This type of explanation has a limit that resides in its lack of content; it can 
describe a succession meaningfully, but the stability of a just society is not merely a 
matter of being any member of a continuum, and neither is it simply a matter of 
finding oneself in a particular historical setting.  
 
87. Historical materialism inherited Aristotelian teleology, but how so 
exactly? There is an important difference here; it puts a significant amount of 
confidence in the historically justified emergence of a new form of society. But Marx 
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attributed no autonomy to history itself: “History is nothing but the activity of men in 
pursuit of their ends.”104 This phrase has to be properly interpreted. It counteracts a 
course of argument that would endow history with an autonomous power. And it 
makes apparent that both periodization and historical succession carry, as 
explanations of events, a reductive danger. Marx’s critical task attaches to a present 
point in time, and it cannot, as we have said, leave out the present conditions it 
encounters. The historical consideration is a support for the critical task, in the sense 
that the consideration of the proletariat as a class is a historical consideration. The 
Aristotelian element is revealed in the assumption that underlays the concept of 
reproduction; it is revealed in the thought that history has failed the realization of a 
human good, and that it might continue to do so. 
 Now the following question becomes pressing: does virtue and the adoption 
of its precepts necessarily exhibit a progressive aspect? Marx and Engels mention in 
The German Ideology a qualitative difference in understanding throughout 
generations, a constitutive blindness that comes with being in a particular historical 
moment. But if it is somehow obvious that the mistakes of the past generations are 
more easily accessible to the present ones, it does not follow that any generation 
would be in the position of realizing perfect history. This does not reduce the 
importance of an assessment of past history, but it should also not obliterate an 
important feature of an inquiry into both virtue and political thinking, namely, that it 
exhibits a reiterative character.  
 
88. How can I be virtuous if I do not exist? – How can I be a Marxist if I do 
not exist? In what follows, I wish to show that this question cannot easily be 
formulated from within a certain kind of orthodox Marxism. Of course, this is in no 
way the same as saying that this question does not assume an imperative importance 
for such theories. Rather, and as I will attempt to show in my reading of Lukács, these 
theories succumb under the pressure this question exerts. That is, these theories tend 
to gesture towards a form of political-eliminativism as a solution. This particular 
problem is condensed in contentions regarding the concept of class-consciousness.  
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Class-consciousness is formed by the distortion of the good for a political 
community  
89. Let us consider the Capital as establishing an intellectual milieu, where a 
representation of the actual world is considered. Let us also think of this 
representation as harboring a special concern for a totality. What is the function of 
this particular concept?  
This concept supports the structural ambition of the descriptive task. The 
immediacy of a description of the various features of a political community – 
consumption, production, and exchange – exhibits the reproduction of that political 
community. It is clear that any society will have to reproduce its conditions of 
stability into the future, but how this is possible? In the end, what this totality (which 
is to say an imagined political community) critically establishes is how any immediate 
mode of action resonates with a good to be achieved (in this case a politically just 
good). 
Lukács warned that reference to a totality should not be imaged as an 
unmediated datum of thought or the elaboration of a sort of inverted idealistic picture. 
Such a problem can be avoided if we conceive of the critical aspect as something that 
attaches to a description of intentional actions. The medium of the totality described is 
what people, who belong to a given society, do.  
The force of a critique that aims at the reproduction of a given society – the 
assertion that it is not a just society and not reproduced as one – lies within the 
recognition that the concept of totality is mediated by the description of a particular 
mode of life, that is expressed by a contemporary mode of acting. This particular 
notion of activity appeals to the existing relations between people. Its starting point is 
concrete activity itself. The fact that these reciprocal relations appear in a reified 
form, and that this generates an impediment to the transformation of a society through 
activity, implies an account of how this totality and its reciprocal relations between 
people, could possibly light up to an individual. This is not simply a question of a 
change in a metaphysical perspective – these relations are not fixed but are to be fixed 
or are being fixed.  
If the possibility of praxis is to be generated by the distortion of one’s outlook 
on life – as Lukács suggests – and it cannot be comprehended as a mere residue. The 
possibility of transformation in thought cannot gain its content only from existing 
reified relations; praxis can only be grasped by an individual person, provided that 
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this very person is capable of vindicating the previous conception of praxis that has 
been distorted. This sort vindication is far from a residue: it is not something as trivial 
as a feeling.  
Considering that it is not an unmediated datum of thought, the description of a 
totality of relations within in a society are to be contrasted with a good to be achieved. 
Of course, the question that arises is relative to the explicit character of this political 
good; or, if it is politically (in a constitution, for example), then we ask how actual it 
is in practice. The complex structure of Faith that Hegel puts forward mirrors our 
difficulty to the extent that it represents the possibility of a conception of a good that 
is not fully explicit, but is nonetheless expressible. 
 
90. Lukács’s concern is a programmatic one; there is a tacit assumption within 
his concern about the concept of class-consciousness that is dangerously eliminative, 
in the personal sense. It imposes a restriction on the concept of alienation. Lukács 
substitutes this concept for his concept of reification, on the assumption that a reified 
consciousness is an inert consciousness. It is true that Marx’s reading of the concept 
of alienation does aim at capturing the putative de-humanizing effect of one’s 
immediacy. But this use of the concept cannot be cut off from its larger context; it 
cannot miss out on Marx’s repositioning of the point of departure for political 
philosophy.  
The moral significance of an inert consciousness is the idea of a mob in need 
of elucidation. The acquisition of class-consciousness is, in this particular view, to 
reveal a form of dependence. The inert consciousness is incapable of vindicating the 
distortion of its moral aspirations without the aid of a particular theory. Now, the 
unmediated datum of thought conception of a totality assumes a necessity that may be 
quite alien to the expressive needs of those belonging to a class. There is a dangerous 
implication to this idea – it aims to elucidate this mob about its power, about its power 
as a mass in a certain position. This is far from the notion of spontaneous 
understanding by a class of its position in society, and this form of dependence (a 
society that depends on a specific class) cannot stand without undergoing a critique.   
Marxist critique customarily refers to how a consideration about such a 
conception of the good – conceived as a moral insight by a given individual – 
misunderstands the position of an individual in civil society. Hence, Lukács 
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paraphrases the tenth thesis on Feuerbach105 as a reading of the difficulties Hegel had 
in reconciling the moral insight and action of an individual. The argument 
presupposes the superiority of class-consciousness, and within this superiority resides 
an optimism for class-consciousness to effectively change a society. But if the 
theoretical mythology that portrays the structure of actual society to be immutable is a 
failure to understand human existence, can this not be shown to be the case?  
Hegel argued that it could be shown. His argument was based on the 
vindication of a moral insight in the face of a threatening opponent, which is 
illustrated in the clash between Enlightenment and Faith. The outcome of this clash is 
a corrected self-image made by each of the opponents. We have to understand an 
advertence against the idea of terror in Hegel’s dialogical conception of a culture; or, 
alternatively, we have to uphold the value of preserving the possibility of genuine 
disagreement about the ends of a particular political community. The concepts 
developed within Marxist critical theory harbor an animus that excludes the 
bourgeoisie as a putative audience. An elucidation of the totality of social relations 
within a given society aims at instigating the resilience of the proletariat. But it cannot 
discount the moral value of any organic manifestation of class-consciousness that 
exists outside of it and is not subservient to the mediation of a party. 
But at this point the work of the Marxist critic stumbles upon an internal 
tension: Lukács’s task consists in showing not telling the proletariat what their 
position is. In the absence of a consideration of the eliminativism inherent to the 
theory of reification, the difference between showing and telling in this case is 
imperceptible. 
 
91. I mentioned earlier the difficulty that comes with trying to understand 
what legitimate power is. This question gains its pertinence from a number of 
assumptions; most importantly, we have to understand how the thesis that a particular 
class becomes the mediator of a given political conception is not coextensive with the 
idea that this class is formed by individuals who exist as one and exclusively for the 
service of a historical mission. It is no surprise that Marx himself had to dispel the 
supposed powers of history. The supposed historical task entrusted upon the 
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proletariat cannot be modeled on a simple transfer of power, i.e. comparable to 
electricity passing through a wire.   
 A mediator for a given political conception is distinct from an individual who 
endorses a political conception. A mediator does not inherit power in the same way 
one inherits property. And the actions of the proletariat do not possess a different 
measure than the actions of other members of society – power cannot be separated 
from morality without terror. 
 
92. The Phenomenology of Spirit captures the existence of a virtuous agent in 
its attempt to achieve integrity, a path that seems to have no parallel within Marxist 
theory. This calls for a demand of a proper revision. The concept of class-
consciousness has to be rethought independently of its eliminativistic element.  
I propose we think about both Marx’s position in On the Jewish Question and 
Engels’s on The Condition of the Working Class in England as a way of 
understanding both the pretensions of elucidation and, in Engels’s case, the curious 
ambiguity with respect to the audience of his book.   
Marx very much doubted that the category of political emancipation required 
the emancipation of one’s beliefs as a Jew, and coextensively very much doubted the 
proposition that political emancipation is located at a higher order of political 
understanding – as this is an expression of doubt relative to the possibility of a 
privileged epistemological position.  
His contention with Bauer focuses on the illicit implication between having to 
abandon one’s beliefs as a Jew and full participation in a political community. 
Contrary to this idea, Marx holds that participation reveals the content of particular 
rights as applied to a community (for example, the right to religion), which offers a 
contrast to Bauer’s conception of religion as a privilege. The idea of a privilege is 
designed to bring out the inessentiality of a religious conception of the world and its 
marginal place in the constitution of a society. Instead, Marx’s critique gives 
expression to a democratic impulse: to conceive of the content of a right as yielding 
the very possibility of a state that does not compromise the integrity of individuals, 
which includes, of course, their beliefs.106  
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Marx does not assume any incompatibility between religious beliefs and 
political participation; neither does he ignore that the root of democracy is dependent 
upon the human foundation of Christianity – here he makes the connection apparent 
that exists between the right to religion and the constitution of the democratic state. 
This is not merely a historical argument, but an assessment of the concept of 
participation as one that has already been instanced by those who hold particular 
religious beliefs (we simply cannot ignore History). The democratic state cannot 
oppose religion as such, and it can only be intolerant towards particular religions; this 
generates a tension within Bauer’s notion of a privilege. The Jewish citizen’s demand 
for the freedom to exercise his religion is not a demand for a privilege, but rather it is 
the demand for a right that is granted to other believers as free citizens – it is the right 
to be reciprocally recognized in the exercise of one’s religious dignity. 
The notion of a privilege of faith assumes that the vindication of a right to 
exercise one’s conviction is a manifestation of a cognitive incapacity. Bauer’s 
contrast between the privilege of faith and the universal rights of men postulates a 
qualitative shift within human political consciousness, where emancipation is the 
means for this shift. There is a shared assumption between Bauer and Lukács, which 
is the assumption that only people of a certain kind can understand certain moral 
conceptions. They differ only in their ideas regarding what sort of people these people 
have to be. Bauer believes in emancipation as an active principle for the achievement 
of genuinely universal moral understanding; Lukács believes in emancipation as the 
passive effect of a class situation once the damaging effects of reification have been 
removed.  
But what is the qualitative transition a human consciousness undergoes when 
emancipated? Bauer’s argument would only have any pertinence if he were capable of 
designating a distortion of some kind in the notion of participation. But his argument 
loses its grip precisely because, as Marx argues, what he understands as participation 
is a notion that has no content, except that it ought to be different from the actual 
notion of political participation. In Marx’s argument we find a valuable insight for a 
critique of Marxism itself – it is illicit to imagine that the recipients of the universal 
rights of people could be constructed by emancipation. And more importantly, the 
ability to receive these rights is contingent upon these people being other than 
themselves. 
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The idea that Religion is an impediment to the achievement of a just society 
has, for Marx, some intelligibility, only insofar as it postulates the idea of men outside 
the actual world. And in this respect, Marx was as wrong as Bauer and Rousseau. But 
his argument does not rest on the idea of a constitutive incapacity to understand the 
moral salience of a social fact. His argument rests on the danger of a loss of self, a 
form of transference of one’s spontaneity to something other. His argument is, at 
heart, the identification of the problem of elimination; it rests on a lack of 
consideration for a religious mind, assuming a form of transference where it would 
have found an active principle. It is nonetheless in association with the concept of 
activity that the problem of religion appears.107 
 
 On the notion of social accusation  
93. In The Condition of the Working Class in England, Engels puts into 
question how the way we understand the moral salience of a social fact depends on a 
privileged position. At the beginning of his book we find a dedication. The work is 
dedicated to the Working classes; the book’s intent is to put the conditions in which 
these classes live before the eyes of Engels’ German countrymen. In the book we find 
descriptions of how these people build their houses, what they eat, and what they 
dress. These descriptions are ordered by a principle of relevance as they are 
expressions of the actual economic relations among people. Engels’s descriptions 
show us a moral fact as a totality.  
It is doubtful that Engels’s book would possess any informative value for the 
working classes themselves; this is not to say that a faithful picture of you, or 
something you do, is not important for yourself. It is, of course, very important. But 
Engels declares that his intent is wider than giving an assessment of their situation 
back to the working classes; like many other books, Engels’s book was written for 
someone other than the people to whom it was dedicated.  
 
94. Class-consciousness is tied to the particular situation someone finds 
themselves in, and constitutively so. But the correct apprehension of a social fact, the 
moral precepts put forward by an individual as a member of a class will concern all 
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others in a society – the insights of class-consciousness are asserted as a plural 
concern. 
Understood as blindness caused by ideology, the notion of an epistemological 
privilege refracts any possible illumination of a moral fact. The existence of ideology 
does not preclude the Marxist theorist from presenting the moral relevance of the facts 
in a way that is conducive to a plural understanding.108 Engels plainly asserted that his 
subject was not an exclusive problem of the workers.109 But the point of his argument 
is not restricted to the scope of his concern; it extends to the implications of the 
actions of these workers. Engels expressed an important moral concern here, and is 
one we should understand as a Marxist demand: it is wrong to exercise any kind of 
revenge upon individuals.  
This expression – revenge upon individuals – is difficult. The difficulty lies in 
the formulation of a fair accusation, in formulating a just accusation of those 
responsible for the reproduction of injustice. What is this particular type of 
accusation? The concept of accusation depends on the identification of an intention; 
so why is there a particular difficulty in the formulation of such a kind of accusation? 
The condemnation of revenge is dependent on how it affects individuals, but can there 
be any revenge that is not against individuals? Is revenge against a class morally less 
condemnable?  
Engels’ condemnation of revenge is an expression of a moral prohibition, but 
his thought designates a particular addressee. “It does not occur to any communist”110 
to take revenge on any individual – the attitude of the bourgeoisie is reconsidered, the 
crime of revenge is against an individual not a class, and therefore, not more justified 
if said to be against a individual because of his membership to a class.  
It is impossible to understand Engels’s difficulty without understanding its 
Aristotelian roots. The description of his book assumes the Aristotelian point of view 
with respect to the connection between politics and morals and is presented thus with 
urgency. And as such, it carries the Aristotelian concern that opens his discussion of 
political justice – it is possible to do injustice without thereby being unjust.111 
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Aristotle was taking into consideration the relations of reciprocity qualified as 
political relations; therefore these relations are not only the form of reciprocity 
exhibited by the just person, but by a politically just person. The weight of this 
qualification is revealed by the complex notion of a pardon. Pardon is dependent on 
the assessment of what is voluntary in the consideration of an action. But it is not 
exhausted by this distinction. Given the necessary historical continuation of a political 
community, the notion of resentment is, in many cases, present in the life of many 
communities. Resentment is caused by the absence of recognition. It is a moral 
sentiment that qualifies pardon and it may survive the communal recognition of a 
given moral rule. It may even survive its institution and protection as a law.  
It survives as the relevant past of the community, as the knowledge that at one 
point, that very community exerted its power against some of its members. And it is 
through a history of the concrete use of power inside a political community that 
authority receives its moral aspect. The continuity one has with one’s community is in 
the presence of resentment often expressed as continuity only with those who suffered 
the same injustices; the concept is then substituted by a form of loyalty – in this 
situation the expression ‘we’ gains a clear contour.  
This form of fragmentation obliges us to reconsider the problem of the 
attribution of authority. Pardon implies forgiveness if it is to restore the spirit of 
trust112 inside a political community. And perhaps this is the only way people have to 
recognize the authority of a community when it does not have a just past. Hegel saw 
this difficulty clearly; he recognized the tendency to postulate a primitive community 
as a symbol of the morally disruptive effect this has for an actual political community. 
The authority of a community cannot be founded on a lie about its constitution. If a 
community substitutes the history of its concrete use of power for a mythical picture 
of the past, it does nothing but trivialize the foundation of its existence and, 
coextensively, it trivializes the existence of its members and their loyalties.  The 
continued existence of the community loses its connection with its real past, making 
its present an achievement that cannot be justly attributed to those who deserve it. 
Alienation can start by way of a specific form of communal denial – a denial that does 
not recognize the members of its community, both past and present.   
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95. Let us return to our notion of accusation. We have first to recover a 
particular difficulty about intentional action. This problem lies in the contrast between 
intended and unintended consequences of an action.  
Although the injustice of a society is imputed to the individual actions that 
reproduce it, it would be inconsistent to accuse individuals of directly intending to 
harm others by their banal economic action. In the face of this problem, Engels is 
forced to drop the Marxist animus, declaring that no one can believe that a single 
bourgeois can act otherwise. His statement is, again, difficult. Engels means of course 
to identify the infrastructure of society as the particular impediment to individual 
action. Nevertheless, it is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that it is in a 
moral context that this problem is raised. There are, in this context, important 
differences between the situation of social bondage common to both workers and the 
bourgeoisie. The descriptions of the bondage experienced and lived by the 
proletarians do present a different sort of condition. Apprehended by a reciprocal 
mode of thought, this sort of bondage manifests a kind of urgency given the scope of 
its extension.   
Engels’s descriptions range from manners of brick laying in house 
construction to crime.113 The span of his interest is necessary for apprehending the 
form of life these people have. The dwelling of this particular class reveals the all-
encompassing exhaustion of their way of life. What the mode of construction of the 
houses these people inhabit reveals is precisely a stance towards their outlook on life: 
the inability to build a stable place that offers their dwelling the individual dignity 
humans aspire to. The men and women in Engels’s book do not, properly speaking, 
dwell, but simply rest.  
 
96. We can now understand Engels’s phrase “Communism is a question of 
humanity and not of workers alone” as carrying a sort of collective demand. But to 
understand this demand we have to return to Aristotle’s notion of pardon. Once we 
qualified the notion of pardon as implying a peculiar political problematic, we can 
now better understand Aristotle’s notion of involuntary. The sort of accusation we are 
considering does not attach itself to individual actions. The sort of accusation we are 
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considering concerns the indifference a political community might exhibit towards 
some of its members.  
Once a moral fact is presented as a way to vindicate a particular class, that 
very political community reaches a point of no return. We find ourselves before a 
collective expression of the morality of that community; a vindication that presents 
the stable existence of that community as unjustly impinging on some. Indifference 
may spring from ignorance. But once it is directed towards the vindication of a class, 
it assumes the moral aspect of violence. Ignorance can be pardoned, but not 
indifference, as an act of knowledge and power. 
The sort of demand Engels presents stands in an antagonistic position to the 
idea of an epistemic privilege. It does not however stand against what inspired his 
dedicatory to the workers – namely, the importance of an organization within the 
working class that aims at the preservation of the resilience of the workers as 
oppressed members of a society. Engels does voice his Hegelian impulse when 
alluding to the necessity of conquering any brutal element in a revolution. This is an 
impulse that amounts to hope in the possible revelation that springs from the 
knowledge of history (e.g. the experience of the French will not have been in vain). 
His expression springs, perhaps, from the anxiety attached to the fact that a class war 
may very well deteriorate into an unjust war.  
This is the moral motive behind Lukács’s argument, and we have to address 
his argument with a view to disentangle what he taught as an honest requirement for 
the achievement of a society that is deprived of injustice, from the dangers of a theory 
that postulates epistemological privileges. We are also obliged to take Kołakowski’s 
contention seriously, where the epistemic privilege of a class deteriorated, for the sake 
of practical purposes, into the privileged sight of a tyrant.114 
 
 Class-Consciousness as moral participation and Class-Consciousness as a 
program  
97. Lukács’s reference to the epistemic privilege of the working-class makes 
use of a constitutive contrast between the ideological character of the bourgeoisie and 
the ideal position of the proletariat to understand the totality of social relations that 
are formed under capitalism.  	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Let us focus first on the question relative to how the transformation of society 
is dependent on the acquisition of a set of beliefs. The functionality of class-
consciousness seems to reside in its power to affect society at once. Lukács is certain 
that in virtue of their position within society – by being the patients of the crimes of 
this very society – the proletariat will recognize the reproduction of the totality of 
social relations as an impediment to the achievement of their political emancipation. 
But in the face of an actual reified consciousness, in the immediate existence of the 
proletariat – the subject of his essay – Lukács is forced to recognize that the burden of 
a proper elucidation falls on the shoulders of the Marxist critic. 
This puts the problem in a different light. Prima facie, if a reader of Lukács’s 
critique can understand the moral salience that the concepts are designed to outline, 
then the vindication of an epistemological privilege becomes illicit. Even if we blame 
the existence of ideology for concealing obvious injustice, our blame would not 
merely be justified by an appeal to interest – interest is merely immediate, just as 
appeal to sympathy is inessential.  
Thus, the connection Hegel saw between legitimate power and the integrity of 
individuals is replicated by Marxist theory in the attempt to make sense of class-
consciousness. Since, the effectiveness it might achieve has to avoid the threat of 
circumstantial opportunism, it is not at all clear how we should conceive of the 
relation of dependence between theorist and the proletariat. The idea of opportunism 
is the expression of a moral requirement, but there is the peculiar political danger in 
making this moral requirement a mere external concern or making it into a mere 
reflection on which the guiding conception of Marxism one should follow. This sort 
of procedure circles the content of the theory, but it leaves out the individuals who 
constitute the proletariat – I am not suggesting a nominalist interpretation of the 
proletariat; it is precisely the importance of their shared concerns that we have to 
understand.  
 
98. This problem emerges in Lukács’s text when the contrast between the 
generation of a psychological state and the generation of real class-consciousness 
becomes revealing. The immediate character of what Lukács calls a psychological 
state is, even if not trivial, conceived as an obstacle to the apprehension of the totality 
that is made possible by critical theory. But when we assert that this psychological 
state is not trivial, we conceal the difficulty of this assertion.  
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The notion of psychological state throws some light on Lukács’s pair of 
concepts: crude empiricism and utopianism. Crude empiricism cannot be 
characterized simply as the generation of a residue in the consciousness of an 
individual without trivializing the actual psychological state. And this psychological 
state cannot possibly gain its contrastive force – with genuine self-consciousness of 
membership to a class – through an appeal to a dependence on the external 
elucidation of a theorist. Either alternative reduces the moral character of the 
distortion felt by an individual existence to blind feeling or intellectual dependence. 
And this reduction eliminates the individuals who constitute a class, those who exhibit 
the moral quality of identifying with each other, who are capable of sharing an 
adversity.  
There is a distinctive problem if we consider the self-knowledge of a particular 
member of the proletariat to be no more than the expression of a false-consciousness, 
as long as its object – the totality of capitalistic social relation – is not correctly 
apprehended.115 This, of course, is what characterizes the qualitative shift from a 
moral self-consciousness to a revolutionary one. And it is central to Lukács’s 
qualification of the concept of class-consciousness as practical.116  
The mediated knowledge of the totality of social relations sets a program. It is 
this programmatic aspect of his argument that generates the dependence of any 
percept of social justice upon a theoretician. But let us outline the moral implication 
of his qualification. The concept of class-consciousness is, in its practical aspect, 
transformative of the immediate conditions of the proletariat’s life. It is equally 
transformative with respect to the outlook these members of society have on life. It is 
precisely on the conflation of these two conceptions that Lukács’s orthodox critique 
relies on its very opposition to vulgar forms of Marxism.  We are able to discern the 
teleological aspect of class-consciousness and the emergence of a program for action 
in Lukács’s critique. But is the emergence of this program automatic?  
The notion that the epistemological conflict amongst members of the 
proletariat is real, is completely absent from Lukács’s thought. This conflict may be 
summarized in a simple principle: We may agree with the root of the problem, but not 
with the solution.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 History and Class-Consciousness, pp. 167-168. 
116 History and Class-Consciousness, p. 205. 
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Lukács’s theory carries the burden of having to explain the formation of a total 
coincidence of aims amongst the individuals who belong to the proletariat. The 
programmatic aspect is directly derived from surpassing the immediacy that 
constituted an impediment. There is no hint that alienation might befall the 
revolutionary movement in relation to itself.  To put it plainly, the privilege of the 
proletariat consists in a form of self-knowledge, which reveals a program, and this 
program goes beyond its historical setting – it gives it an aspiration for the 
transformation of society in its totality.117 But disagreement about aims inside the 
proletariat is easily conceivable. Certain considerations that pertain to the morality of 
means, for example, might emerge as incompatible with the beliefs of these 
individuals. It does not follow that one’s socialism necessarily supervenes upon one’s 
Christianity in all actions. The acquisition of both beliefs, and the significance of 
these beliefs for particular individuals, putatively demands a resolution that is not as 
simple as a compromise.  
This idea cannot lie outside of Marxist theory. When Lukács argues that the 
fact that class-consciousness has no psychological reality does not imply that it is 
unreal; 118  he cannot simply formulate this proposition without considering the 
condition under which such a form of consciousness could be formed. After all, the 
danger that has to be philosophically addressed is present as the substitution of the 
consciousness of the class for that of the Bolshevik party. To address the conditions 
under which real individuals form consciousness of their class is to address the moral 
salience of the simple conflation of class-consciousness and party. 
At this stage, Lukács’s argument confronts the limit of political philosophy 
that Bolshevism tried to remove. The explanation of the concept of alienation, simply 
in terms of a form of immediacy, loses sight of the idea that such a revelation, such an 
aspiration for the transformation of society in its totality, cannot simply be class-
specific; the moral dimension of alienation is lost. There is no thought as to the 
particular attachments these individuals, who belong to the proletariat, might have to 
other things besides the revolution. For this reason there is no measure for the 
sacrifice endured by the remoter end of a just society. Aspiration is not always 
unconditional, and alienation is not simply the form of an imposed day-to-day by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 History and Class-Consciousness, pp.174-175. 
118 History and Class-Consciousness, p. 75. 
 161 
capitalistic social organization. Humans develop allegiances even in adverse 
circumstances and are afraid for quite understandable reasons. 
But as I said before, we have to maintain the moral element in Lukács’s theory 
– namely, the resilience of those who are oppressed and the moral vindications these 
persons are entitled to. Simultaneously, we have to detach this idea from the theory of 
a privileged epistemological position on the grounds of the political danger it 
represents. But there is the accusation Lukács makes, that this generates a species of 
vulgar Marxism, a species that does not ultimately order all events to the ultimate goal 
of closing the gap between the psychological consciousness of the proletariat and the 
one imputed to them.119  
 
99. The idea of imputation in this context is very difficult. It assumes at least 
that what is imputed cannot merely be distinct from what is being trivialized as 
psychological. What can be imputed does not constitute a perfect mediation – one that 
exists in immutable conditions in Marxist theory. What can be imputed has to be 
revealed as crucial for those it is imputed to. To close the gap between what is 
assumed to be two types of consciousness often relies on a simple solution, which is 
to remove the analysis of immediate circumstances. As a follower of Lukács, Debord 
embarked therefore on the consideration of environmental planning and the structure 
of time in human work as pertinent considerations for Marxist theory.  
These matters are far from frivolous, but I want to suggest that it is a tendency 
of Marxist theory to turn on the idea of immediacy as the exclusive impediment to the 
lack of association between actual people and theory. The structure of immediacy as 
the particular empirical circumstances of workers is relevant as a form of deliberation 
for the construction of a shared mode of life of a community. Debord reflects on the 
material conditions that are part of a putative outlook on life ascribed to every 
individual in a community.  The consideration of time reveals, for example, the clash 
between time as personal development and time necessary for work. 120  The 
reconstruction of the material setting of a society harbors, in Debord’s theory, the 
explicit Hegelian concern of having to set out the conditions for the needs of social 
organization.121 Both considerations about the structuring and re-structuring of society 	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120 The Society of the Spectacle, §148-151. 
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 162 
express Debord’s concern for what he calls the pervasive attempt to everywhere 
restructure society without community.122 The material setting of a community, and 
the structure of its time, is responsible for the reproduction of the reification of social 
relations. But in order to restructure society, we must understand community as a 
moral principle, and value and preserve its internal relationships. The optimism we 
find in Marxism may tend to fasten on to purely external considerations – time and 
space – but the interpretation of the material conditions of the world demands that our 
materialism be qualified; it cannot simply be a form of empiricism. The absence of 
alienation does not follow simply from a change of scenery – the change of space and 
the re-structuring of time.  
 
100. The limit of an imputed consciousness is the limit of political philosophy. 
A previous problem returns here. Lukács’s position runs the danger of trivializing 
spontaneous organization of class-consciousness just because it serves an immediate 
interest and not an ultimate idea. This is a problem that Marx himself addressed in his 
critique of Bauer in The Holy Family. As an extension of his critique of Bauer’s 
emancipatory ambitions, Marx recognized a danger in the formulation of a concept 
such as that of a mass to refer to the unorganized individuals in a given political 
community. The mass appears as the trivialization of individuals and therefore as the 
incapacity of these individuals to participate in history – in this case theory has 
estranged itself from historical reality.  
But Marx’s argument against Bauer is difficult. Bauer’s formulation of an 
opposition between Spirit and mass is designed to assure the critical superiority of 
Spirit. This sort of distancing leads to an abstract conception of history, one that 
ultimately exists in opposition to real history, just as a supposed total human 
emancipation exists in contrast to actual religious persons.123   
Marx’s critique aims at the idea that spirit embodies an ultimate plan that finds 
in the Mass an enemy (this is Marx’s own term) – here we get closer to an 
understanding of the philosophical foundation of the party as the vanguard of the 
revolutionary movement. But Marx is unable to prescind from the critical element that 
attaches to reading historical events as having political significance. The argument of 
the Eighteenth Brumaire consists partially in the apprehension of the alienation that 	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plagues the revolutionary movement itself – the ghosts of the past.124 There is a 
describable difference between the farcical revolution and the revolution of the 
proletariat. The difficulty that Marx’s argument has to dispel is not about the 
formulation of this difference, but rather about the limit the argument reveals – a limit 
that disappears the minute political theory becomes fully autonomous. 
The difference between the philosophy of Bauer and Marx resides in the fact 
that Bauer conferred autonomy to theory by trivializing the history that theory could 
not absorb. On the one hand, Bauer made historical progress into an archetype and 
therefore situated it outside of the world by contrasting it with real history. Marx, on 
the other hand, tries to understand the alienation of the revolutionary movement as 
non-trivialized historical participation – Bauer’s spirit is outside the world, and 
Marx’s alienation is within the world. 
Lukács situates the reality of his concept of class-consciousness precisely at 
this point of the text of the Eighteenth Brumaire. 125  But his demand that a 
revolutionary movement cannot be defined solemnly against that which it rises 
against requires the sense of a future community. In the end, the argument of the 
Eighteenth Brumaire only historically situates revolutionary interest in the context of 
class-war. And the horizon of a philosophical conception of a political community is 
made hard to understand by Lukács’ demand of perfection: 
 
The proletariat only perfects itself by annihilating and transcending itself, by 
creating the classless society through the successful conclusion of its own 
class struggle. The struggle for this society, in which the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is merely a phase, is not just a battle waged against an external 
enemy, the bourgeoisie. It is equally the struggle of the proletariat against 
itself.126  
 
What we find at the end of both arguments is the conclusion that it all boils 
down to enemies. The moral demand Lukács presents is the culmination of an 
extreme form of eliminativism – annihilation – expressed as the condition for the 
emergence of a new kind of person capable of creating a new historical society; 
compromise is to acquire the fixity of an imputed consciousness. The imputation 
relies on the revelation of a moral idea. The abolition of enmity is the abolition of 
class-struggle, but for a future political community this putative exercise of power is 	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not without repercussions; the abolition of class-struggle is not the abolition of 
resentment.  
 
 History and Enmity: Revelation as the limit of political philosophy 
101. The vision of history presented in the Manifesto contradicts Marxist 
optimism – the inevitability of class struggle as the motor of history.127  
The existence of enemies is an impediment to a society beyond any form of 
class injustice; it represents the persistence of human evil directed at society itself. 
The formulation of this idea necessitates a moral consideration that is beyond the 
theory of historical materialism. Plainly, the theory cannot contain any such political 
community because there has not been one.  
Marx’s theory does not deny genuine political participation to any 
revolutionary movement on this basis. He does not ignore any previous revolution as 
a real historical force, however crude or misunderstood it might have been about 
itself. The story told in the Brumaire is precisely the analysis of the disintegration of a 
common project. The farcical reversal, where the power of a class became the power 
of an individual without authority, is made possible by the existence of enmity held 
by a majority to whom recognition had been denied.128 For Marxist theory, Marx’s 
historical insight points in the direction of a reconsideration of the argument about the 
conflation of party and class-consciousness, and ultimately to the problematic 
conflation of party and tyrant.  
 The genesis of the Bauernreligion resides in the conditions of the bourgeoisie 
in society.129 This accusation elicits some of the differences Marx purported to bring 
out in the Holy Family. The accusation is relative to the reciprocity between both 
classes; it was their indifference that permitted the final resolution by one class to 
stand behind a tyrant who spoke for their interest. The accusation that the masses 
supporting Bonaparte suffer from stupidity is nothing but the expression of a lack of 
moral insight by the bourgeoisie. In the absence of recognition, authority gave way to 
the simple seizing of power. And the same machinery that allows for the possibility 
that a class may seize power, also allows for power to be seized by one individual. 
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People made history under definite conditions, indeed; the story told in the Brumaire 
is the story of enmity.  
In the Holy Family the personification of history is considered as an attempt to 
save the existence of theory.130 Proofs provide the nutrition for theory, and history is 
nothing but proofs. But we have to understand that the text of the Holy Family 
provides a partial critique of historical materialism. The difficulty resides in the 
comprehension of how a political community is not supposed to reproduce its mode 
of life into the future if its mode of life is an unjust one. But the elaboration of an 
Archimedean point, such as the one described in the German Ideology, does not 
remove what seems to be a further limit to the adoption of precepts of justice – 
namely that it should be revealed to the members of a political community that they 
can no longer act with indifference towards each other. Moral truths cannot only exist 
in theory; they ought to become the practice of actual political communities.  
An Archimedean point like this one has in fact often enough been confused 
with a complete moral and political legitimacy. The underlying thought behind both 
the Jacobinian Reign of Terror and the Bolshevik terror was that they were carried out 
by the generation capable of realizing perfect history, capable of making history 
according to one single plan held by one faction and valuable enough to be put into 
practice at any cost – and this is the danger of belief in a privileged sight. 
Marxism aspires to a form of society that necessitates the rehabilitation of 
hope as a social virtue;131 it expresses the idea that what is a moral precept of its 
critique will inspire the allegiance of all members for a future political community. 
The form of historical idealism Marx criticizes in Bauer contains the idea that the 
achievement of any kind of genuine political community demands that it completely 
break with the past – which is to break with the beliefs of people. It is internal to 
subsequent forms of Marxism to suppose that history thus far is merely the history 
enmity, but the genuine difficulty resides in the preservation of Marxist optimism. If 
the only condition of a classless society is the emergence of a subject of a new 
metaphysical kind – fully emancipated, without history nor any allegiances – then the 
future seems to be the future of enmity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique, p. 107. 
131 I am taking this expression from Alasdair MacIntyre’s Marxism and Christianity. 
In my reading, this phrase condenses the argument of this difficult book.  
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This form of discontinuity can be described as a form of religious thought, as 
having the strength of revelation. But I want to argue that there is a fundamental 
difference between a formulation of revelation as something that completely breaks 
with history, a demand inherent to some Marxist theories, and revelation as 
reconciliation.  
 
102. Reconciliation cannot morally ignore its past and it cannot start by 
ignoring the history of the use of violence as power. From the Marxist perspective it 
cannot ignore the class society from which it springs, just as most political 
communities cannot ignore the violence that is attached to their founding moments 
(the military uniform as a symbol of a nation – the military parade as a celebration of 
the foundation of a nation).  
The problem of a putative transition to socialism cannot avoid the moral 
problem of the future co-existence of what are simply deemed as enemies in Marxist 
theory, namely individuals who pertain to different classes. The thought that a 
socialist revolution creates a generation of people plagued by resentment inside that 
very political community is something wholly absent from Marxist thinking. In 
Marxist thinking, the notion of a transition assumes that it will spontaneously generate 
a stable community that recognizes the authority of those who motivated the 
transition itself.  
History has shown that this is not the case. The optimism of Marxism cannot 
be purchased simply by imposition and compromise.  
The optimism Marxism contains can only be expressed as a religious idea. 
When we remove this connotation, Marxism becomes enlightened as a science and 
loses its human face. History becomes deterministic and the proof for the need of 
subjective intervention made by individuals who conflate class-consciousness with 
themselves.  The society Marxists aspire to implies the abolition of enmity, and the 
abolition of enmity is the absence of indifference. The concept of class, and hence of 
class-struggle, is not simply an element pertaining to Marxist theory; it does not 
simply serve a functional role inside of the theory. The historical observation of the 
Manifesto carries a moral problem for political philosophy, one that it cannot solve in 
theory. It is a problem, nonetheless, that it is obliged to formulate.  
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Marx maintained that the Phenomenology showed the elements of a true 
description of human relations.132 We have to understand the concepts involved in 
such a description, since the content of the idea of revelation resides here. Marx 
himself recognized the religious element I mentioned before. Subsequently, Marxist 
thought removed all of the Hegelian substratum and with it the possibility of 
understanding the religious element present in all political thinking – be it in Marx, 
problematically; in Hegel, explicitly; or in Rousseau, unavoidably.  
 
103. Aristotle made the concept of community depend on the all-
encompassing idea of a political community. The exercises of virtue should be 
directed at preserving friendship inside a political community and therefore secure the 
possibility of other more local communities the ability to function.133  As I suggested 
before, Aristotle was acquainted with the concept of alienation inside a political 
community. But his ethics mirror the initial position the ideal student is in – we find 
hardly a thought concerning the recovery of the telos of virtue or the continuous 
threats to that telos.  This is an idea that greatly concerns both the Hegelian agent, 
who has to align himself with virtue and therefore with others, and the Marxist who 
perceives the alienating dangers of property in both power and wealth.   
 
The confrontation of power and wealth  
104. When we reflect on an individual’s outlook on life, and this is an 
individual who is situated in the actual world, this implies that we reflect on the 
concepts of wealth and power as things that condition his freedom.  
The formulation of an accusation made by a class is precisely the vindication 
of shared beliefs; it is a vindication that the existence of more than one individual has 
been frustrated in the same way. But membership to this class is not necessary for the 
ineligibility of this vindication. Even if we grant that ideological considerations 
illuminate certain beliefs in a distorting way, or even leave them in the shadow, there 
is a conceivable threshold with respect to how far such ideological considerations can 
extend. Just like solipsism misconstrues the nature of mental phenomena, ideology 
misconstrues the nature of morality. 
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105. The underlying insight this problem offers, which is the opposition 
Lukács portrays, is precisely how the actual world distorts a good to be realized and 
how it becomes a source of future content for that conception – how a mistake 
demands correction. 
To assert that a given mistake affects some is not coextensive with the 
assertion that it is not a problem for all.  
Therefore, it is inconceivable that one could trivialize class-consciousness by 
reducing its insights to membership or to the circumstances of the problems felt by a 
particular class. Morality is asserted in the face of a real world, and the formation of 
class-consciousness is intelligible as the distortion of equality and freedom brought 
about by the actions of individuals as members of a society. The vindications of a 
class are made from the point of view of a political community as a cooperative form 
of existence. 
A vindication of the morality by members of a political community presumes 
the recovery by these of their activities; the self-conscious addressing of a mode of 
life in the form of a just sharing of profits or ownership of the means of production. 
Through this, a real conception of the good, and not a warped one, comes to light.  
 
106. For Hegel, self-consciousness is an inherently moral notion. It represents 
the point of view of people have when they are capable of learning from their actions, 
sharing a mode of life and vindicating their beliefs. But this position is one that finds 
an initial opponent in the way of the world. The regimented practices of the world 
force arguments from virtue to confront qualified forms of naturalism and utility. 
The resolution that the confrontation between power and wealth is supposed to 
aspire would be unintelligible without the notion of a putative self-conscious agent.  If 
the critique presented in the Capital has significance for anyone at all, it will be for a 
self-conscious agent who understands the realization of freedom and the dissociation 
of culture to be morally problematic – a capitalist with a Hegelian self-consciousness.  
Immersion in an actual world implies that individuals will have non-trivial 
moral problems derived from their situation and class. The power of actual conditions 
to determine one’s outlook on the future is a problem that is political in nature, as 
long as the effective exercise of coercive power by a state is conceived as the 
performance of a task directed at a particular people. There is a moral significance to 
being left out of those for whom this task is performed, as there is to having one’s 
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condition diminished by how oneself and others can legitimately act. But the root of 
the difficulty emerges as soon as we understand the connection between the 
justification of state power in relation to its addressees and the implications this has 
on the positive freedom of individuals.134  
Hegel purported to show how the explanation of the genesis of state power 
was not necessarily contemporaneous with the genesis of its legitimate functioning. 
Contrary to Lukács’s contention, Hegel did not stop at the isolated individual in civil 
society. He did not stop there precisely because he considered morality as something 
established only after the existing society permitted individuals to have integrity 
through the formation of a Sittlichkeit. Equality, as a problem, only emerges once 
society grants the recognition of individuals. Hence, morality becomes the practice of 
autonomy; the description of dissociation we find in the chapter on culture in the 
Phenomenology is the apprehension of this peculiar demand. Integrity demands the 
reiterated reconsideration of one’s society.  
Dissociation starts with the loss of one’s faith in the principles responsible for 
the formation of one’s society – Hegel puts this in the chapter on culture in the 
pregnant form of a denial of certain principles as the justification of one’s action, in 
the context of confrontation between Faith and Enlightenment – but it does not 
exclude the recovery of one’s allegiances.  
We can avoid the problem of allegiance only if we put forward a theory that 
appeals to a form of individualism justified on extrinsic principles. This theory would 
rely on a different picture of what persons are and desire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 ‘Sources of the Authority of the State,’ pp. 134, and 154-155 in Ethics, Religion 
and Politics, Collected Philosophical Papers Volume III. 
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7. Reciprocity   
 
 The appeal to a self-image of men  
107. For Hegel, the appeal “be for yourselves what you all are in yourselves – 
reasonable” was the problematic expression of the self-image of Enlightenment, 
portrayed as a claim about people in general.  
The appeal assumes that equality is defined as a shared common trait, a 
capacity to be reasonable. But this particular conception of equality is reductive in 
character; it is a naturalized version of equality. It trivializes both the existence of 
inequality and the particular achievement of equality as recognition.  
The appeal springs from the necessity to find a connection between how the 
actions of individuals are determined. Enlightenment enters into a dialectic here 
precisely because of its claim for a determined nature of action. Faith opposes 
Enlightenment because the latter proposes that the determination to act should be a 
positive consideration dictated by what is actually useful. In this way, utility avoids 
the derivation of its content from an archetype and grounds its justification for action 
on the emergence of shared needs; there is nothing beyond what has been perfectly 
realized, nor any postulation of a source of action that is not strictly contained in the 
simple idea of men.  
This represents an appeal to an extrinsic justification of the notion of 
reasonableness. The extrinsic conception of utility and this particular form of 
naturalism go hand in hand. Utility is justified by guiding the effectiveness of certain 
actions. Actions from utility are justified by a belief that these actions will promote 
the common good as a consequence. Any worry about cognitive gain, in the 
consideration of the forms of action peculiar to a society, is rendered unnecessary. 
What lies beneath this form of naturalism is an assumption about the prospective 
guarantee that the promotion of the good is achievable on an extrinsic and automatic 
basis.   
Hegel’s concern is both recuperative and explanatory. It springs from the 
understanding that a demand for a justification becomes pressing for any given age 
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and that any such justification will be bound to recover a genuine sense of what it is to 
act with dignity. The arrival at the notion of utility represents, therefore, a genuine 
gain for spirit. Pure insight, when differentiated from the authority of a culture – from 
a reified result of its own productive power – is put under the stress in order to arrive 
at a justification for this very culture. Insight is put under stress to achieve the self-
conscious return from alienation, that is, to justify the achievement of conditions for 
the stability of this mode of life.  
Hegel wants to trace his steps toward the realization that the dignity of 
humanity implies a self-image of itself. The dialectic of Enlightenment is itself 
nothing more than the struggle for a conception of what it is to be human under the 
threat of alienation. As a philosophical topic, the question pertaining to the dignity of 
a particular self-image assumes a dialogical form in the Phenomenology.  
 
108. This dialogue starts with the avowal of some contrasting conceptions by 
both participants. We cannot lose sight of what unites these contrasting conceptions. 
We cannot miss the reason why Hegel suggests that this dialogue was bound to have a 
mutually corrective effect on both positions. At this point, Hegel’s argument requires 
caution; there is as much truth in the mutual accusations of both participants as there 
is an inherent failure to apprehend what is substantial in both of these positions. 
Hegel dramatizes such an encounter as an encounter between the 
crystallization of the pure insight of an age and an individual who professes faith. Of 
course, it is not an accident that the opponent an entire age encounters is a generic 
individual acting out of conviction. This is simply the reenactment of the inherent 
difficulty Enlightenment feels when it puts forward its image of mankind, and its 
difficulty with having its authority recognized, which is the only way it can come to 
enjoy a genuine conferral of power.  
It was out of such an anxiety for acceptance that Rousseau supposed that a 
pure civil profession of faith could be demanded of a person. The content of this 
profession of faith should be determined by the sovereign and both religious beliefs 
and social conscience should coincide. But the notion of Sittlichkeit does not survive 
this kind of imposition; it owes its actuality to an achievement. A fundamental 
element in Hegel’s political philosophy is that that imposition directly undermines the 
notion of revelation. This notion, which represents the greatest difficulty for the 
generation of a just political community, cannot be abstracted into political theorizing 
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without a moral cost. In Rousseau’s philosophy of the Social Contract, when this 
happens it explicitly incites violence. Faith contains the tranquility of the 
understanding of where the limit of political philosophy lies. But it does not, as of yet, 
have an answer as to the moral actualization of this understanding. 
The Rousseauian imposition represents the recognition that the content of 
Faith contains a more powerful element. It recognizes that faith is not merely 
reducible to a fantastic representation of another world or to the fetishistic endowment 
of objects in this world with otherworldly powers. Its power relies on the truth to 
which the allegiance of individuals aspires. This is an allegiance that is grounded on 
the conviction these very individuals hold with respect to how much their faith is 
worth, both as an object of reverence and as a reason that guides their actions. 
But is the self-image of Enlightenment reconcilable with this desire to have an 
analog of the intrinsic mechanism of faith? The entire structure of the criticism that 
Enlightenment exerts upon faith removes this very possibility. The object of faith as 
pure certainty – be it the certainty in Christ’s actions as the doings of unimpeded good 
within history or in the certainty that God secures all that is good – does not rely on 
certainty for insight. Enlightenment accuses faith of not achieving any relevant 
knowledge in its worship, of having an abstract object as the grounds for its hopes – 
as Hegel puts it, Enlightenment’s first achievement in its encounter with Faith was to 
pollute the certainty of its object.135  
This exerts an unavoidable power over the mind of the believer, especially 
because, if this accusation is true, then the believer acts on the basis of a mistake. The 
believer cannot maintain that his conviction springs from ignorance. The believer 
cannot avoid the accusation; he cannot trivialize his own self-image before another, 
he cannot because he cannot trivialize that in which he believes. It is the believer’s 
trust that Enlightenment envies and puts under suspicion.  
Rousseau did aspire to insert what was a certainty in an unquestioned civil 
unity in this very link. The exercise of conviction in the name of faith is both the 
possibility condition of Enlightenment’s critique and its aspiration.  
 
109. We find an expression of how much Enlightenment yearns for this 
religious conviction at the very end of the Social Contract: “If anyone, after having 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See Phenomenology of Spirit, §572. 
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publicly acknowledged these same dogmas, behaves as if he did not believe in them, 
then let him be put to death, for he has committed the greatest crime, that of lying 
before the law.”136 In this assertion we do not find the slightest possibility for 
repentance. It is a strange moment for the reader when this passage seems to fold back 
on itself, like the two sides of a sheet of paper, back to the chapter on the right of the 
strongest.  
The underlying difference between faith and civil religion has to be 
understood as a difference of content, but also as difference in the manner in which 
people profess their beliefs. Enlightenment presumes to have discovered the self-
image that is most true for persons – the very rigorous search for truth that causes 
such an impression on faith –, an image that relies on nothing more than its own 
powers and allegiance to the possibilities of its own powers.  
We should not ignore how Hegel’s argument absorbs the Rousseauian 
concern. The idea of a civil religion is but the anticipation of the threat of alienation. 
But what is presented in Rousseau under a historical guise as the historical birth of 
Christianity, assumes in Hegel the moral significance that deserves a consideration as 
to its internal structure within the history of Spirit. With internal perspective I mean 
only the precise explanation of what the object of faith represents for the believer. 
Rousseau’s argument exhibits a strange form of dependency. In the end of the Social 
Contract, we find the principles expounded there to be ordered to the necessity of a 
civil religion. This ordering expresses, to a certain degree, the lack of autonomy in 
political thought. 
Of course civil religion is unspecific; it does not exhibit the content of any 
particular creed, but in the enumeration of its articles we find compromise and 
devotion as acts of a self-constituting individual – as acts of someone who is 
becoming a citizen. In the end, an unspecified theistic figure is subjugated in 
association with the sanctity of the social contract; Rousseau’s civil religion is an 
attempt to determine the object of faith. It is a move of abstraction that aims to retain 
the authority of a theistic figure without any of the content of a given creed.  
But we find something irreconcilable in the process of this determination. The 
attempt to determine the object of civil religion should stay strictly within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Social Contract, p. 186. 
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boundaries of public utility. 137 In this respect both Rousseau and Marx are in 
agreement: the specificity of the religious beliefs should not constitute an obstacle to 
political participation. But on the one hand, Marx hoped that the clarification of 
politics as theology would bring people to the revelation that the reciprocal social 
relations they share with one another signify an undisputed moral demand. Rousseau, 
on the other hand, tried to artificially recreate religious certainty and devotion as a 
genuine political sentiment. 
Hegel saw that this artificiality could hardly fix the problem Rousseau started 
with.  The historical occurrence of Christianity represents a point in the history of 
Spirit, a point the Phenomenology gravitates toward, as containing the conditions of 
genuine reciprocity that is explained as trust and forgiveness. The starting point for 
Hegel is the self-consciousness of the believer – the problematic self-constitution of 
the believer expressed as the acquisition of virtue and the demands of life according 
to virtue:  
Freedom is therefore situated.  
 
110. It is in the context of the culture chapter of the Phenomenology that we 
first encounter the Hegelian thought about the association of freedom with self-
constitution. In the argument that follows, I want to suggest that this implies a 
reconsideration of Aristotle’s notion of acquisition of virtue, as well as the proper 
consideration of freedom in the context of political participation. The first idea is but 
the revision of what seems to be unacceptable to us now in Aristotle’s naturalism; the 
second idea amounts to the danger we find perfected in the historical intervention of 
various revolutionary movements. Hegel found the second idea in the French 
Revolution, and we subsequently found it in our moral assessment of the history of 
Marxism where terror is annihilation in the name of a rational principle – it is an 
expression of discontinuity justified as an absolute foundational moment.  
The main philosophical mistake of the Enlightenment resides in its 
incompetence to truthfully apprehend actions from faith. What it perceives as 
detachment from this world, or the burying of true worship in empty ceremonials, 
condenses the genuine concern of the believer for this world – it is the expression of 
active engagement in communal practice.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Social Contract, p. 185. 
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Hegel apprehended that to the content of faith belongs also the imperfection of 
the actual world.138 The mind of the believer, through its actions, is not moving into a 
self-contained domain; it contains the believer as the believer is in this very world – 
as a sinner. And in this world the believer’s concern can only unfold from him to 
others, as much from genuine desire for the welfare of others as from the believer’s 
own failure to have helped others when it should have. Actions from faith are as much 
endowed with reverence as they are entangled with the inescapable individual 
concerns of the believers. Prayer is not merely exaltation, nor is confession merely 
subjugation. The former is also desire constrained by reason, confessed fear and hope 
for that which is not wholly within the power of one’s will; the latter sets a task. This 
represents the genuine content of faith, and we can now already discern a self-image 
of individuals coming to light.  This image implies one’s imperfection, plagued by the 
possibility of an ever-occurring demand for perfection. And here we find a further 
complication: this image involves some instability, insofar as one of the ideas 
primitive to it – the ever-occurring – resists an immediate formulation. It resists a 
completed formulation, one that stands legitimately without reference to something 
that is not finitely given. As Hegel puts it in Glauben und Wissen: – the poetry of 
Protestant grief becomes the prose of satisfaction.139 
 
111. The religious image of men necessarily implies a distant reconciliation. 
And Hegel, already in Glauben und Wissen, recognized that the programmatic aspect 
of the finite in Kant’s philosophy resulted from this concept assuming a fixed point in 
the culture from which Kant’s philosophy emerged. The reconciliation of men with an 
image of itself has to begin closer to home. It has to begin with a critique of the 
cognitive faculties, and the description of a palpable moral psychology, rather than 
with an aspiration for reconciliation. But we can see the force of Hegel’s critical 
preoccupation only in the figure of faith in the culture chapter of the Phenomenology. 
It is here that the program of the Enlightenment meets its failure precisely by inducing 
the alienation of its addressees.  
This appears firstly in the form of scorn for the rejection faith makes to let this 
finite principle guide its actions. We witness the purely negative attitude of faith from 
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139 Faith and Knowledge, p. 61. 
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the place where Enlightenment derives of its accusation. This accusation threatens to 
reduce the moral worth of faith’s rejection to an attitude of dissemblance.  
Enlightenment posits utility as a central concept in the explanation of the 
content of a self-image of individuals. This utility contains the explanation of the 
concept of individual as someone capable of holding property and searching for 
necessary possessions and enjoyment; this partially forms the grounds for the notion 
of reasonableness Enlightenment appeals to. And Enlightenment regards the purely 
negative attitude faith is capable of as merely a foolish action. Faith rejects the 
enjoyment of property, the holding of possessions, and the enjoyment of pleasure.140 
It rejects both the possibility to retain an individual itself as an individual in civil 
society and as a mere species-being.  
The significance of this rejection lies not merely in the apprehension of the 
determinants of action. This contention implies the proper understanding of a moral 
psychology. Faith’s rejection of the enjoyment of pleasure puts forward a self-image 
of individuals that is associated with transcending its mere species-membership. This 
occupies a space within any conception of moral psychology as a thought about the 
possibility of self-constitution, even if this idea is regarded as problematic. A notion, 
such as that of incentive, is not regarded merely as something that fuels a moral 
psychology. Instead, the suggestibility of men to incentives carries significance for 
the constitution of a self-image Faith is working towards an image that is less exultant 
about both the finite aspect of cognition and absolute freedom.  
 
 The identification with one’s moral psychology as a requirement  
112. What is the consequence of reading the existence of a moral psychology 
as something that springs from a religious concern?  
Hegel is certain that philosophical reflection stumbles on this very problem 
when it has to cope with the difficulty of justifying identification with something 
beyond individuality. The appeal to reasonableness tries to make individuals aware of 
their own capacity in the service of moral action, and this is perhaps the root of 
Rousseauian self-reverence. But the very elaboration of a moral psychology as self-
directed reflection arrives at an insight that points beyond the conclusions of finitude: 
reconciliation aspires to a movement from a given to a task.  	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If we are to be able to give an explanation of such notions as aspiration, 
forgiveness, charity and confession, our moral psychology has to relevantly 
apprehend the nexus between rationality and the acquisition of beliefs in a given 
community.  
The reason why Hegel locates the analysis of this insight within the conflict 
surrounding the apprehension of a proper self-image follows from the fact that the 
image put forward by Enlightenment is already reconciliatory. Thoughts about self-
constitution emerge as necessary elements of the Enlightenment’s own conception of 
self-constitution (e.g. in Kant these are the derivable duties to improve oneself, and in 
Rousseau it is an act of will to become something of a new metaphysical kind, i.e. a 
citizen).  
As I have said before, Hegel saw a distinct problem in the appeal of 
Enlightenment: the very idea of an appeal to a self-image expresses the desire to 
counteract the presence of alienation. The discussion then becomes one about what 
the source of this reconciliation should be.  
 
113. The question at this stage is how to understand a form of agency that has 
its source in a self-constituting principle. The self-image Enlightenment puts forward 
concerns the vocation of mankind. The violence contained in Rousseau’s thinking is a 
symptom that the self-image put forward meets with resistance; it does not have the 
force of self-evidence. The perennial problem of political philosophy concerns its 
capacity to reveal the need of reconciliation as the genuine vocation of mankind. 
Alienation is a threatening force to the constitution of a society, precisely because it is 
embedded in the concept of human action – reconciled agents do appear, upon 
philosophical reflection, as the genuine condition of realized justice. 
Hegel recognized in philosophical reflection two distinct ideas that run the risk 
of being conflated. In Faith and Knowledge he characterizes these ideas as distinct 
philosophical tasks:  
 
Philosophy is not supposed to present the idea of man, but the abstract 
concept of an empirical mankind all tangled up in limitations, and to stay 
immovably impaled on the stake of the sensuous – either analyzing its own 
abstraction or entirely abandoning it in the fashion of the sentimental bel 
 178 
esprit – philosophy is supposed to prettify itself with the surface color of the 
super-sensuous by pointing, in faith, to something higher.141 
 
The difference between an idea of man and an empirical mankind elucidates 
the sort of shift between an appeal and the emergence of a moral psychology – what 
man is and how men are.  
Hegel is of course interested in the necessity of pointing to faith. But Hegel’s 
distinction is not merely reducible to a critique of the attempt to construct an all-
encompassing picture of mankind – even though he thinks that this sort of project is 
an abstractive violence with no practical truth. Hegel, instead, is sure that the 
emergence of a moral psychology, which attaches to a given individual, posits a 
conception of freedom that requires a detailed treatment.  
Instead of a postulation of reason or a form of collective will, in the 
Phenomenology we find the notions of confession and sacrifice. These two notions do 
not override the importance of being capable of denying action on incentives, nor the 
capacity to ally one’s will with the formation of a general will. On the contrary, the 
Phenomenology treats moral action and allegiance to one’s community as things that 
are threatened by the action of those very individuals who belong to such a 
community. Freedom appears therefore situated142 and philosophical reflection is 
forced to admit that it not only points to faith, but that some of its crucial ideas spring 
from faith itself – the content of an idea of man expresses faith in the apprehension of 
a universally valid moral principal. 
 
114. Individuals actualize themselves through their actions, and as such they 
have to be apprehended as situated individuals; it is as individuals that they sacrifice 
something for something worthy or confess their individual faults. Philosophy 
expresses faith when the impediment to the realization of justice is removed, namely 
the alienation of oneself and one’s community. 
Any putative outlook on life depends in equal measure on the situatedness of a 
given person and the degree to which this person has been able to realize their outlook 
on life. And this person’s failure to do so may have various sources, such as their 
society or the person themselves. Individually, the identification of an agent with their 
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142 This term is Taylor’s, Hegel, p. 563. 
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own moral psychology is a requirement insofar as it is necessary for any agent to have 
a moral existence that is connected to their intentional acting.  
 
115. The genuine difference between “the idea of men” and “an empirical 
mankind” resides in the distinction between constructing the place of morals in 
human life from the inside, rather than from an external perspective, especially if we 
recognize a threat to this external perspective – the reduction of moral persons to 
dispositional make-ups, with no other qualification.  
Sensitivity to this issue runs through the entire culture chapter of the 
Phenomenology, although it would be wrong to fully identify this perspective on 
morals with the figure of faith still at very early stage. Eventually, as it progresses, 
spirit will apprehend the act of confession as the genuine understanding of both virtue 
and freedom. And the argument is incomplete until we understand how this moral 
resolution is to function as the genuine source of political reconciliation – the wider 
implication of moral action derived from Aristotle. 
 
116. Whatever the account of agency we favor, this preference is not exempt 
from explaining the wider implications that the Aristotelian picture of agency entails. 
Hegel’s efforts are directed towards bringing to light such a picture, a feature of the 
formative aspect of the Phenomenology.  
Every account of agency put forward by a philosopher has to make clear the 
implications their concept of action has for humans – the very form of action we 
study. Theoretically, to designate action as a property of empirical mankind simply 
fails to relevantly address the internal perspective I am considering. From the 
perspective of agents, instrumental reasoning is the condition of their actuality, the 
condition of their achievement, and failure. Deliberation is the source of their 
aspirations and shame. The idea of man consists in recovering what would constitute 
pointing to a recognizable explanation of morality. 
Hegel’s attempt at a moral psychology is then an exemplification of what 
morality looks like to an agent who holds a strong image of himself. For the 
remainder of this essay I shall follow Hegel by not addressing what would be a 
scientific image of man and morals – although I do not dispute the truthfulness of 
such an image – nor the justification of first principles (that is, a justification of 
morality as such).  
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What emerges instead, the idea of man, is precisely the self-image any honest 
agent is capable of giving of himself. Moral attitudes appear to him as aspirations, 
failure, and the feeling of having succumbed, rather than collections of dispositions, 
both natural and psychological. The place of morals in collective human life is 
manifested as either something towards which one is indifferent to at times, and at 
other times regards with enjoyment and respect. These manifestations strike us as 
having a stark difference from correctly ordered justifications in a system of 
knowledge.   
And yet, the manifest image of morals does not oppose these other pictures; its 
elaboration is but a claim of its epistemological validity. The universality of morals 
appears in the Phenomenology already at work in the figure of Faith. It issues from an 
agent who is already acting, an agent who does not occupy the Aristotelian initial 
position. Universality can only claim its validity if the individual can issue a 
justification as to its practical nature – not that morals simply have the property of 
being universal, but rather that the universality has to be actualized by the agent 
individually even if the cost implies the sacrifice of individual attitudes or desires. 
This does not have the validity of justification in a system of knowledge; instead, it 
brings out the genuine practical context in which morals become manifest.  
 
117. Initially, Faith expresses this human characteristic only negatively. It 
confronts Enlightenment’s principles as being merely extrinsic to the genuine virtuous 
act. In earnest, Faith, in this context, is sacrifice as a form of imitation. But in willing 
to be free from any trace of pleasure and desire for the possession of objects and the 
retention of the same, Faith aspires to a condition that is devoid of any stability. Here 
we discern immediately the terms of Enlightenment’s critique: the thoughts about 
self-constitution can only be captured positively in a system of duty, or in a genuine 
civil article of faith.  
Faith has the virtue of having brought to light the genuine problematic that 
moral psychology attempts to answer. The simple association with property and the 
enjoyment of pleasure is an unsatisfactory self-image of man. The prose of enjoyment 
is, as a self-image of man, only a glorified platitude. It is the reconciliation as 
acceptance, and acceptance as avoidance of a recurring problem. Utility as a 
justification for holding property, and retention of the same, lacks an intrinsic 
principle behind it.  
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The attitude of the believer may be criticized for having purchased its superior 
consciousness of purity at the cost of a positive realization of a recognizable, and 
necessary, stability for human life. But the believer cannot be accused of possessing a 
false consciousness. To be a believer is not simply a matter of believing in ideas that 
are unintelligible and surviving what is perhaps a mere ideology. If, on the one hand, 
the truth Enlightenment reveals is contained in the accusation that the believer has 
failed to understand what he is – simply a man – then on the other hand, how does 
Enlightenment propose to explain the source of a pure intention, necessary for the 
earnest profession of civil faith? 
This entanglement makes another deep-rooted problem apparent. We are now 
in a position to discern two distinct tendencies within the dialectic of Enlightenment. 
The first is to associate the justification of all principles with utility. The second is 
expressed by Rousseau’s desire for a pure determination of the will similar to that of 
faith, but without any reverence for anything besides men themselves. 
Utility simply avoids the burden of self-reflection – it possesses an assumed 
purposiveness. Hegel’s concern, in the culture chapter of the Phenomenology, is 
nevertheless not simply that this absence of principle exhibits instability. On the 
contrary, it may crystallize what is the official view of a culture where alienation will 
be unavoidable. In the denial of the believer, we find a refusal to succumb to an 
alienated culture only in the provisional sense; we find a refusal to let one’s actions 
become purposefully the embodiment of an automatic imperative: the useful as 
individualistically conceived. This form of self-reflection is connected to religious 
reverence; it is a desire for self-determination that will include others.  
 
Confession as the identification with one’s moral psychology and alignment 
with a shared outlook on life  
 118. The inclusion of others that we assume above in a desire for self-
determination is exemplified by the act of confession, which is a practice of self-
reflection in itself. Confession should be understood not as the Catholic sacrament 
from here on out, but rather as a public profession of faith (although the term will gain 
its content as I progress with my interpretation).  
This practice tacitly assumes the imperfection of the agent who is confessing. 
But it would be wrong to conceive of the practice of confession as a mere functional 
element in the generation of an un-alienated political community. As a form of 
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realized morality, confession brings into existence a space where two individuals 
meet reciprocally. We have to understand how reduction to the merely functional 
argument obliterates the understanding of the link between an individual moral act 
and the realization of a just community.  
 
119. Confession entails the first positive realization of faith; it is an intentional 
act that brings forward the worth of self-reflection in the form of self-assertion. As 
such, this act reveals one’s self-distortion and, as a communicable act, it presupposes 
its relevance to another. Hegel locates the generation of a just society primarily at the 
level of an individual achievement. This is primarily at the sight of the removal self-
alienation. But this form of moral philosophizing carries the burden of both having to 
explain, in equal measure, the relevance of individual life according to virtue and the 
formation of a just society.  
 
120. The main idea at work is how reconciliation entails forgiveness. Hegel 
starts with the idea of a rejection of continuity with another and the moral salience of 
this rejection.  
It is in the figure of the Hard-Heart143 that moral certainty and value is 
asserted – it is asserted as the legitimate denial of recognition. This legitimacy results 
from no less than the wicked act of the one who confesses. The confessional space 
does not admit any ambiguity concerning the moral value of an act.  
In the confessional act, the radical nature of evil is not merely a presence in 
the self-consciousness of the confessor’s mind, nor is its overt expression mere 
expression. The confessional space it generates is a form of recognition that demands 
a task. This task becomes communal continuity. But the position of the Hard-Heart is 
not, in Hegelian terms, exhausted by the explanation of its position in the confessional 
space. The Hard-Heart is, as a bearer of resentment, capable of denying this 
continuity; the confessional space makes a demand on the Hard-Heart – the virtue of 
charity. 
Continuity does not reside in the full identification of both individuals in a 
relation with one another; they must be able to maintain a reflective-distance from 
each other, and they do so in the denial of recognition. To be denied recognition is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Phenomenology, §667. 
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form of exclusion that surpasses one’s naturally granted status as a member of a 
species. To be denied recognition does not, of course, detract from its significance, 
but it brings into consideration one’s power to set oneself to the side through one’s 
own actions. It fundamentally treats personal identity as dependent upon what one 
does, and as dependent upon what one has done; it finds the measure for what one 
does in the recognition of others; it expresses the wish for continuity with others.  
The confessor actualizes the consciousness of his historical continuity as 
moral continuity. Personal history is, as an act of freedom, recognized as something 
that demands full moral awareness. And such awareness is something that cannot – 
contrary to the attempts of the frenzy of self-conceit – survive as something fully self-
contained. The act of confession makes explicit the wish for recognition as the 
contrast between personal realized history and moral aspiration.  
In the Phenomenology, this possibility in the moral life of humans serves not 
merely as a treatment of the Christian virtue of charity, but also as the final resolution 
for the concept of freedom – not as absolute freedom, but rather as positive freedom 
in the service of a community. Hegel finds, in the act of confession, the charity that 
should be extended to those who are putatively outside of a revolutionary faction. 
This is not of course a requirement that those who live outside a given faction would 
have to confess to those who do. Instead, Hegel’s idea suggests that history ceases to 
be, per se, the history of enmity. Confession serves in the argument as a reminder of 
humility, an indirect way of qualifying the powerful self-satisfaction of self-conceit 
and self-reverence. 
 
121. The initial denial of recognition by the Hard-Heart is wanted by the 
confessor; it is something that the confessor ought not to avoid. Ultimately the 
confessor seeks forgiveness, and this forgiveness cannot abstract from the moral 
determination of a deed that has been done.  
The possibility of reconciliation rests therefore on the Hard-Heart – if the 
Hard-Heart is able to respect and recognize the moral aspiration of the confessor. 
Aspiration relies therefore on the author’s recognition that his evil deed was an 
exercise of freedom, with that particular moral determination. It necessitates the 
recognition of a past act as morally implicated in his future (the very future that, due 
to resentment, the Hard-Heart is initially incapable of recognizing and therefore 
incapable of sharing). The conception of an outlook on life appears in the act of 
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confession as sharable and, more importantly, threatened on the level of an individual. 
The possibility of reconciliation relies precisely in the identification of these 
individuals with their outlook on life and their recognition of the distortion they bring 
about in their own outlook.  
On the one hand, the Hard-Heart is a protective attitude towards this outlook 
on life; it represents a distinct form of identification with one’s moral psychology; it 
is not recuperative, but fully assertive. On the other hand, the confessor’s honest 
aspiration demands the Hard-Heart’s charity.  
The confessor brings about a moment where this form of recuperation 
represents an assertion of the same outlook on life; the position the confessor occupies 
is recognizably one of inferiority, but his position is nevertheless not simply one of 
self-debasement – the dignity of honest aspiration. The Hard-Heart is pushed into the 
position of recognizing the freedom of the confessor as a form of earnestness, as the 
assertion of the importance of this outlook on life as grounds for their co-existence – 
the confessor reassures the other of his moral convictions.  
 
 The position of the Hard-Heart: to identify someone as good or evil and to 
identify with someone  
 122. The reflective distance exhibited by the act of refusal contains the 
possibility of an individual moral attitude: blame. It is not merely a question of 
rejection of participation in an outlook on life; it is a question of confronting 
individuals who oppose their individual dignity.  
The Hard-Heart asserts his moral dignity when scorning the immoral action – 
it is something he would never do, something he would have never done. 
The violence of blame relies on the assertion of identity. When we assign 
blame, we identify someone as evil. The individual who is blamed has made himself 
unrecognizable. He has moved away from a shared conception of morals. What 
becomes problematic through the reciprocity of confession is the contrast between the 
present identification and the confessor’s earnest moral aspiration. The failure of the 
Hard-Heart, which is the failure to act according to the virtue of charity, is the 
trivialization of the confessor’s repentance and the total exclusion of the confessor 
from the moral community. 
There is a further possibility implied by human morals, one that is contained 
in Hard-Heart’s position. The deed that the Hard-Heart blames another for having 
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done is not necessarily alien to him. It is not necessarily something he would never 
do, or has never done. And the feeling of resentment is not necessarily diminished by 
this being an act the Hard-Heart capable of himself. The fact that the Hard-Heart 
identifies with the other does not make forgiving easier, although in some cases 
forgiving becomes more fathomable; sacrificing an individual attitude, that of 
resentment, is still as much a moral demand as in the first case – forgiving is neither 
dependent on simply identifying someone as evil nor on identifying with someone.  
To identify with someone does, however, reveal a morally important notion, 
which is the hardship of forgiveness. One may feel repulsed when seeing acts one has 
done carried out by another, and these might only become fully apparent when we see 
another person doing them. The Hard-Heart may know this position well; he does not 
have to be the perfectly virtuous agent to sustain the position he has. The Hard-Heart 
may know how hard it must have been for someone to forgive him – he may know 
this from himself, and from how hard it is for him to forgive others.  
The confessional space throws the Hard-Heart into this position 
independently of his particular history. A father who witnesses a flawed action carried 
out by a son cannot avoid judging the deed because he himself had once done the 
same. The father cannot trivialize the sense of a shared morality. Nor can he, perhaps, 
help feeling disappointed, or even resentment, lest he would suppose that there was a 
previous warning for that particular deed.  
 
123. There is a further position, one where a person cannot avoid perceiving 
something as utterly unforgivable. The notion that something might be unforgivable is 
a genuine possibility of human life. It does not erase the moral demand nor does it 
make the Hard-Heart ultimately blind to the genuine possibility of the confessor’s 
profession of earnest aspiration. It is, as a possible moral position for individuals as 
well as nations, something that carries the cost of what Hegel calls continuity. This 
cost may be overwhelming for persons, and yet they might incur this cost all the 
same.  
 
124. Confession implies blame, but it is not exhausted by it. There is a 
particular form of dignity in the vulnerable situation of the confessor. What we find 
here is an analog to the fight to death for recognition. The confessor earnestly risks 
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his personal identity by placing himself in this particular relation; he offers it up for 
consideration and knowingly suggests himself to receive blame.  
The confessor cannot assert his individual identity without an appeal to the 
confessed act. But if he confesses, he has no desire to make such an appeal. It is here 
that we encounter a fundamental difference between confession and shame. The 
difference is not just one of quality. The difference depends on the act of confession 
being seen as a possibility for authentic recognition. The confessor undergoes the 
vulnerable position, so as to be recognized in his individual authenticity for better or 
worse.  
To be authentically recognized represents full continuity between individuals. 
It is more than equality conceived as educated individuality,144 as fully expected 
instances of the same Bildung. It discerns the unessential aspect of Bildung that 
camouflages any authentic position, or is turned into an advantage by someone with 
enough wit. 145  Educated individuality ironically recognizes the tension between 
individual existence and one’s alignment with a shared outlook on life; confession is 
the reversal of this. 
 
The aspect of an individual moral psychology 
125. Educated individuality restricts mere animality and exhibits the 
characteristic aspect of an imperfect philosophy. It explains people through an appeal 
to a given empirical contrast, but does not trace the consequences of this contrast. 
Hegel, of course, was certain that whatever moral phenomena was describable, it 
could not but represent the content of the idea of men. This moral phenomena has to 
be interpreted as the acquisition of virtue.  
 
126. The notion of authenticity may well be the starting point for this 
reflection. We may begin with the idea of an individually experienced conflict 
between one’s allegiance to authenticity and a demand for education.  
There is a position that tries to avoid a putative conflict. The individual who 
holds this position would have to explain virtue as a completely natural property of 
that person as an individual. And this conception would have to exhibit consistency in 
all of the individual’s actions and intentions. This person would be an authentic moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Phenomenology, §537. 
145 See Phenomenology, §540. 
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agent, in the unqualified sense of having the concept of morality be naturally 
coextensive with his individual identity. 
In the Phenomenology this position appears as a result of a reflexive 
apprehension one achieves of oneself as an individual; and the capacity to 
differentiate relevantly between the presence of desires and a moral form of 
necessitation is what affords this very achievement.146  
But this difference is experienced, first, as the destruction of one’s 
individuality. Succumbing firstly to an exclusive heteronomic principle, individuality 
becomes merely the momentary satisfaction of contingent desires. In this succumbing, 
the moral agent apprehends an idea about necessitation (a heteronomic one, his fate) – 
a notion derived from the thought that one is necessitated – seem entirely outside of 
the individual himself. The way out is a form of compatibility: this individual has to 
make himself part of his fate; he has to conceive of an autonomous kind of 
necessitation. 
This implies that the individual is in a position to discern tensions between 
desires and moral necessitation. In one sense, the argument derives from the 
apprehension of one’s moral psychology that is also a qualification for the concept of 
freedom – freedom can now be seen as an achievement. 
But the contrast between the contingency of desire and an autonomous form of 
necessitation still has a problematic aspect for this individual. The autonomous 
principle qualifies the notion of fate; it inevitably represents an escape from natural 
necessitation for the individual. But how is the individual existence of a person 
supposed to integrate autonomous necessitation into its framework?  
The essentiality of this question escapes us if we fail to understand that our 
thinking cannot stop short of accounting for the need of two contrasting forms of 
necessitation. But it also has to express the need to explain the unity of an individual 
with the demands of autonomous necessitation. To answer this, Hegel addresses the 
Kantian thought that freedom has to be presupposed.147 Nonetheless, he re-interprets 
Kant’s contention that it is insufficient to prove this claim only from human 
experiences. It would be incorrect to perceive Hegel’s re-interpretation as a step back 
to a popular conception of morality. The concept of freedom, as something secured by 
a proper deduction, is distinct from the history Spirit tells about the concept of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See Phenomenology, §364. 
147 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 95. 
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freedom; but this history the Spirit tells is far from the history of empirical morality, 
say case by case – it is the history of freedom as an individual achievement.  
The presupposition of freedom cannot dispense with the history of the 
acquisition of virtue; and for Hegel’s confessor, it is this acquisition of virtue that 
gives content to the presupposition of freedom. The Kantian presupposition of 
freedom for all creatures with a rational will is indeed generalized, but generalized in 
the context of a moral psychology. The answerability peculiar to human will, the very 
form of necessitation studied in moral cognition, gives its differentia to a supposed 
perfectly good will. This will may function under objective laws, but is not 
necessitated in the same way as humans are; in the Phenomenology, the theme of self-
consciousness will address not human freedom as such, but the freedom of individuals 
in their reciprocal relations to others.148  
Hegel’s introduction of the concept of fate already makes apparent the 
problematic realization that an individual will resist his own elimination; an 
individual feels that they must take a part in what happens to him as an individual 
person. This demands that the general property of freedom be understood by an 
individual as all-important for his identity – as an internal good relevant to his 
existence. The generality of freedom implies of course the ineligibility of its 
extension, it implies that all rational beings possess it. But this thought does not yet 
express the particular dignity inherent to it, which is the dignity that comes with 
actual exercises of freedom. Recognition will entail other individuals as actualizing 
the law of autonomy in their actions: it will entail them as discrete individuals who 
can be recognized to be responsible for their acts.  
 
127. The generality of the heteronomic form of necessitation that necessitates 
us as animals, transitions to a general law that encompasses all rational creatures.  
This expresses a sentiment that interprets the property of freedom as 
constitutive of one’s individual existence. Hegel’s individual separated himself from 
his desires and realized that something else necessitates him to act, something rooted 
in him as desire. 
This is the law of the heart. This law represents a wish for the total conflation 
of one’s individuality and one’s natural makeup. The heteronomic necessitation made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:413. 
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clear that the movement to satisfy one’s desires leaves individuals destitute of any 
possibility of a shared existence; individuals become the isolated function of their 
desires. But the autonomous principle induces a certain kind of anxiety; there is now a 
prospective dimension contained within this principle, one that makes self-
determination both a condition of the realization of one’s individuality and of a shared 
existence with others. The Phenomenology answers this form of anxiety first by 
asserting the conviction that an individual is naturally in possession of a moral heart.  
 
128. Individual agency has to be reinterpreted as an exhaustive conflation of 
the authentic individuality of an agent with an agent who acts on the correct principles 
simply in virtue of being the individual they are. But, of course, the notion of the 
acquisition of virtue cannot be shaken off in light of this simple demand. To embrace 
an uncanny form of necessitation seems to be intolerable for the development of this 
individual who has, at this stage of the history of Spirit, already succumbed to this 
trap at least once. So, the law of the heart is the anxious reaction to the experience of 
having learned precepts of virtue, or of still having to learn them. Virtue should be as 
general as desire; it should be naturally justified as an element of the existence of 
every individual and therefore of their shared existence.  
The law of the heart cannot understand enmity, and therefore it also cannot 
solve it. It cannot understand the diffuseness of human motive that Kant famously 
complained about (Kant’s complaint was about the authenticity of a moral subject), 
and it cannot accommodate the notion of acquisition.149 The fact that moral sentiment 
does not transition in the same pattern as natural necessitation poses the problem of 
authentic moral achievement. Now this is to say that the simple divisions of the 
coward and the hero do not exist; more accurately what we find is the hero who felt 
tremendous fear, and the man who doubted before he walked towards his destiny. 
At this stage, we have to pause briefly to remember that to understand the text 
of the Phenomenology is to understand that we are witnessing an individual who 
retraces the steps of their own moral growth. Hegel revises the matter of the 
acquisition of virtue as a personal conflict, and all along we are being led to a 
particular understanding of alienation. It will become clear that the threat of 
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alienation is not simply that of a fall from a state of nature, but rather of a permanent 
threat to the exercise of virtue.  
 
An excursus: An interpretation of the elements that pertain to the Aristotelian 
notion of the acquisition of virtue  
129. Let us look at the origin of the idea concerning the acquisition of virtue. 
Aristotle stated the importance of acquisition in his account as differentia of virtue 
itself. The definition states the contrast between virtue as a result and virtue as arising 
naturally. Virtues arises in us neither naturally nor against nature, but its completion 
is brought about by habituation.150 This definition does not yet address the difficulty 
of the concept of habituation. It simply states morality as permeable to acquisition and 
active habituation, which is unlike the perfected nature of a stone. 
This initial approach does not yet mention the workings of virtue – how the 
virtuous person proceeds – in order to focus on the apprehension of the quality of this 
state. However, Aristotle presents an explicit motivation for his definition: virtue as a 
result of correct habituation can explicitly integrate the teleology of a good political 
system. This idea represents an insight about the threat of alienation. Aristotle’s 
insistence on the acquisition of virtue foreshadows the necessity of conceiving 
institutions that will not deteriorate. His argument about individual acquisition makes 
the demand for sustaining a space, where a shared conception of an outlook on life 
can be actualized, explicit. 
 
130. Aristotle concludes his definition by discerning a state the very existence 
of which entails the indispensability of a teacher and a practice. This brings us to the 
proceedings of the virtuous person – an account that is not merely descriptive, and 
certainly not a phenomenology of that very state, but rather an account that discerns a 
meaningful incompletion.151 This form of incompletion is partially derived from the 
kind of state that Aristotle defined. The inability to provide fixed answers is internal 
to the account of virtue, given that the acquired state is not independent from a form 
of reasoning and perception of the world. We thus come to an account of a guiding 
form of reason from necessity. We find in this account a nagging feeling that there is 
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a real difficulty in accounting for particular cases, we are told: “the agents themselves 
must consider in each case.”  
This introduces a further demand: we are beyond the characterization of a 
state and on to the assertion of an essential link between the acquirable state and a 
particular form of reasoning – this unity is the agent himself. The agent completes an 
account of virtue through his action. As such, his reasoning is manifested as the active 
exercise of virtue for virtue’s sake. 
 The genus of virtue implies therefore a fundamental reflexive distinction. 
Aristotle brings this out by considering a fundamental difference between virtuous 
action and the practice of a craft. Although these two activities share the need of a 
teacher and some practice, the difference consists in the impossibility of reducing 
virtuous action to the quality of production; virtuous action implies that the agent be 
in the right state.  
This thought demands a reflexive identification. But what are the effects when 
we are deprived of this reflexivity? There is, of course, the immediate question of the 
absence of an underwriting of the virtuous action by an agent; this is idea leads us to 
natural authenticity. At this stage of the argument we gain insight about the 
significance of the very absence of this form of reasoning: just imagine someone who 
is incapable of knowing what she is doing, in contrast with someone that feels some 
anxiety at the thought of not knowing what to do or if what he is doing is the right 
thing at all. 
Aristotle, nonetheless, plays down the condition of knowing in the case of 
virtue, which asserts the all-important act of decision and apprehension of this state 
(that exhibits the quality of being firm and unchanging).  Now, the question that arises 
is: how to conceive of the apprehension and decision of a state without implying the 
condition of knowledge? 
 
131. An initial suggestion would be to paraphrase away the knowledge 
condition as a mere instrumental principle, and then construct an independent 
deliberative procedure. But this will inevitably reduce the significance of Aristotle’s 
insistence that the frequent doing of just and temperate actions is meaningful; it will 
obliterate the agent’s concern for the effectual actualization of such states; and it will 
do away with the meaningful link between the perception of the world and reasoning 
towards finding a way to realize a good action in the world. How is it possible that the 
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significance of repeated practice does not satisfy the knowledge condition? What we 
find in the Aristotelian argument is a further demarcation within the concept of 
knowledge – what is the relevant kind of knowledge. These conclusions can be found 
in how the preservation of the nexus of perception, habituation, and actualization of 
the good for a political community is never thought about apart from its effectual 
existence. Virtue is never abstracted; it is always thought about as e.g. courage and 
courage as military training and gymnastics.152 
As said, Aristotle discerns between technical knowledge and moral knowledge 
without wishing to sever the connection between the stability and actuality of 
deliberation, which is a necessity in order to maintain a good political system through 
the learning of certain activities. In this, we discern again that Aristotle is fathoming 
the threat of alienation. The stability of any practice will not only exhibit agents who 
embody the instrumental principle (the technical principle); instead, and if we are 
concerned with healthy agents, these agents will also have a critical stance with 
relation to this practice, as well as a meaningful connection to how the ends 
(embodied in that practice) are sustained.  
 
132. In the Nicomachean Ethics we do not find any explicit definition of 
alienation, although, as we have said earlier, Aristotle gives us a description of its 
moral effects. In the Politics we find a further approximation to the concept of 
alienation. The idea of becoming a vulgar craftsman is presented as something that 
should be avoided in virtue of education. Vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers do not 
qualitatively act in a way that promotes virtue. They are indifferent to the unity of 
practical reasoning; they do the work they do because they are hired, or because they 
have to, not because of the dignity of that activity. But, of course, so do the children 
who are being educated, at least initially. This is the problematic area Aristotle tries to 
discern. The acquisition of virtue is made through education in some activities, and 
there is an inherent difficulty in transforming the learning of these activities into 
something self-contained, something not subservient to the teleology of the 
achievement of virtue. The habituation leading to virtue cannot eliminate a reflexive 
understanding of the practice; it cannot qualitatively have the same aspect of hired 
labor. Activity according to virtue has to be, independently of its form – gymnastic, or 	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music – done for the sake of virtue, for the sake of oneself and one’s friends.153  The 
acquisition of virtue, therefore, has to contain a qualification upon the acquisition and 
habituation of states of virtue.  
 
133. Aristotle’s introduction of a qualification upon a state demands the 
understanding of what exactly this qualification can mean for an individual who 
entertains this very state. These states may gain their differentia from the existence of 
changing states, such as feelings, but this is still insufficient to account for the 
firmness of the decision. Therefore, there has to be a proper understanding of the 
concept of end, one that affords the ranking that is exhibited in normatively structured 
activities – seen in the value of the ends that are thought, learned and repeated.  
In this, we already discern something unfathomable for the law of the heart, 
since in principle, there can be no relevant normative insight that does not derive 
directly from an instance of this form of law. To put it plainly, for the law of the heart 
it is sufficient to have a heart and nothing more can be learned from a collective mode 
of existence, which is to say nothing that is morally relevant can be learned from a 
collective mode of existence. For the law of the heart, the concept of acquisition is a 
form of pollution. In this we find that it is not merely because one possesses a heart 
that one is a Christian or a Muslim. In a similar way possessing a certain kind of  
heart that not prevent one from feeling anxiety before the apprehension of one’s 
identity, a problematic thought, which is a thought that one has now acquired. 
 
The aspect of an individual moral psychology, continued    
134. Hence, the law of the heart is incompatible with both the condition to 
make decisions and the demand for an unchanging state. The anxiety this agent 
exhibits derives from having its origins in the reflexive apprehension of being 
necessitated non-naturally, from the apprehension of his individual destiny that does 
not have a strictly natural justification.  
 
135. The individual resists his complete elimination, but resists in equal 
measure the thought that his individual moral worth implies any sort of habituation, 
practice, education and, in a way, action. It transforms the possession of virtue into a 	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natural non-acquired state. This naturalization of virtue implies its full generalization 
extended to the species. And it is as a species-member that the law of the heart asserts 
its moral thought.  But just as Aristotle distinguished the genus of virtue as something 
that implies acquisition, the law of the heart is incapable of obliterating its own moral 
psychology (the sort of existence he feels anxious about) – his individual nature 
appears to this particular agent differently than his account of the nature of the 
species.  
 
136. We are able to overthrow the validity of this form of law through the 
presence of the individual’s own moral psychology, by discerning of a source of 
perversion of this law within the individual himself.154 This position is, of course, a 
critical one and Hegel exploits this situation for at least three separate motives. The 
self-image of men proposed by the law of the heart falls like a deck of cards, and 
dissolves with it any possibility of an individual moral psychology. But this position 
also implies the dissolution of a particular conception of alienation, which is the idea 
that mankind had fallen from a state similar to that exhibited by the law of the heart 
into a corrosive state of sociality – we now know that the source of this perversion 
lies within the agent himself.  
 
Dissemblance of the consciousness of evil and moral aspiration – self-
trivialization 
137. The presence of the evil conscience starts with the apprehension of the 
idea of an impulse. An impulse is an absolute starting point, a point before there is 
nothing else, the spring of action in its authenticity. 155 But impulse does not exhibit 
the stability necessary for an exhaustive derivation of the concept of morality. 
Impulses are too varied, and natural impulses are far from a complete conflation with 
moral conscience. 
Exculpation of natural impulses on grounds of its simple identity is 
unsatisfactory for a perfected moral conscience. These impulses are, of course, what 
they are; but these impulses are also putatively in a strong contrast with the person 
this agent wants to be – they constitute a threat to one’s moral aspirations. 
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Impulses as an absolute beginning are coextensive with absolute personal 
authenticity. But there is the possibility of discovering an equal worth in moral 
aspiration. This worth figures as the presence of a moral sentiment embodied in the 
solitary act of worship.156 The pure insight of Enlightenment missed the significance 
of the act of prayer as the apprehension of one’s personal identity. Hegel finds within 
self-consciousness an order to the spontaneity of life as the worship of a divine 
element present within this individual. 157  The solitary act of worship is, 
simultaneously, the worship of a community as a moral community. The base 
accusation of dissemblance, the accusation that Faith as imitation is meaningless, 
preempts any comprehension of the content of worship at all. It becomes but the 
arrogant threat to moral aspiration – the absence of charity. 
 
138. Self-trivialization implies the trivialization of the acquired moral of a 
community. The worth of acquired virtue emerges now as something that possesses a 
moral dignity that is not diminished by the simple spontaneous emergence of 
impulses. The thought of one’s allegiance to one’s community springs from the 
solitary addressing of one’s personality, which is not simply contingent on natural 
place of birth.  
The moral view of the world implies the moral view of a person of herself. 
The knowledge of one’s moral imperfection can, through aspiration, become 
happiness according to worth.158 The idea of merit co-exists with the knowledge of 
actual imperfection; that which before was a sheltered as a hidden life in God, as 
Hegel puts it. But by introducing the notion of happiness as merit, Hegel also 
introduces the opposite idea even though he omits this problem. 
Sadness as failed aspiration may assume a reiterative aspect in the moral life 
of a person. It may stand over and above that person’s actuality as a hidden life in 
God – the world of the happy man is different from that of the sad man.  
This form of sadness is beyond self-trivialization; it is beyond the simple 
presumption of the frenzy of self-conceit, but it may also present the idea of an infinite 
moral imperfection in terms that are less contradictory. The reiterative character of 
moral sadness may simply be failure to act; it possess the aspect of a personal 	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problem more than of a purely metaphysical one. Infinite sadness becomes personal 
failure (and this narrows down our comprehension of the thought about the ever 
occurring).  
But merit can be a stop to such reiteration. The amount of happiness merit can 
bestow, nevertheless, is outside of any philosophical theory; this is not because it is 
unfathomable, but because it is simply a matter of individuality. Someone might feel 
sad at the thought that he is cowardly, even if he has conquered his cowardice. His 
merit is however ineliminable, and his sadness is something that ought only to 
concern him. This is a qualification I find necessary for Hegel’s argument about the 
happiness of moral merit – the religious sentiment that accompanies aspiration is one 
that is not exhausted by happiness.  
 
139. I am suggesting that the possession of both self-consciousness and the 
capacity to acquire the morality of a community becomes intractable the moment our 
concept of a moral psychology assumes a purely naturalistic aspect. Hegel does not 
call it a moral psychology, but simply self-consciousness. My intent is to show that a 
moral psychology is but one qualification upon the all-encompassing concept of self-
consciousness (although this still has to become clear in the course of the argument). I 
say this now because addressing moral aspiration is not usually treated as an element 
of a moral psychology. The reason why I am assuming Hegel’s religious treatment of 
this problematic is, however, not merely because of a textual imposition; it is 
conviction. 
            
Opaqueness  
140. Let us return to Aristotle’s problematic about the acquisition of virtue. 
One thought implied by the idea of acquisition is precisely the notion of authenticity 
Kant casted doubts upon. What functioned in Kant as a cue to shift the paradigm of 
investigation of a moral science – to secure the source of the justification of morals – 
in Hegel becomes a problematic relation of the agent to his authenticity as a moral 
person. Since the voluntary is a mark of virtue, to entertain certain ends will be in 
accordance with the acquired character. Nevertheless, this strict dependence does not 
stop Aristotle from considering the argument of where certain ends figure naturally to 
certain agents.  
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His refutation through the accentuation of the idea of acquisition and exercise 
of character partially refutes the naturalistic argument. It removes the complete 
dissociation between the acquisition of virtue and the ends made possible by this 
acquisition. But there is an important distinction, one that brings back the plausible 
motive for the naturalistic argument. Actions and states are not strictly voluntary in 
the same way; the main difference between them is our lack of knowledge as to the 
cumulative effect of virtuous actions. This accumulation depends on the voluntary 
capacity of the virtuous agent to align himself with the actions that follow from virtue, 
but only if these actions will fortify his acquired state is initially opaque to him. 159  
 
141. Opaqueness, does not, however, remove the priority of clarifying the 
necessary consequences that follow from the acquisition argument; strictly speaking, 
the idea of a human function would dissolve with the dissolution of the concept of 
activity and leaving us with very little to start with. It is rather that we have to get a 
clear picture of the significance of the ongoing existence of the virtuous agent. This 
will be how, whatever the cumulative aspect may turn out to be, his moral worth is 
still responsible for the stability of his actions. 
Hegel remarks on this tension in the form of a problematic equivalency. In the 
ethical consciousness the “immediate firmness of decision is something implicit, and 
therefore has at the same time the significance of a natural being.”160 But there is 
enough margin here for a consideration of this firmness as something induced and to 
the self-consciousness it now occupies. Inducing, in the absence of a fortifying 
cumulative effect, will still possess its merit from the function argument – in other 
words, you do not need everything you do not have, but you do need what you are 
lacking.  
The moral worth of an individual may figure to him in the guise of guilt, in the 
active realignment with virtue in the absence of a completely natural motivational 
force and the removal of dissemblance.  
Here we find guilt as the presence of a condemnable intention in the mind of 
the agent; we do not yet have guilt with respect to an action. There is a moral 
significance in this form guilt, and it is one Hegel addresses that introduces in the 
mind of the moral agent the idea of his personal destiny.  	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 Guilt and Intention  
142. Unlike the humiliating passiveness of fate, destiny is the burden that 
implies a form of reflective acknowledgment. It includes the active consideration of 
what intentions should be actualized. As such, the consideration of a wrong intention 
occupies the entire mind of the agent, as Hegel puts it, because guilt is not an 
indifferent ambiguous affair.161 The way it occupies the moral mind is that it contains 
a threat to its identity and existence with others. It contains the mark of what his 
existence and identity will bare from now on.  
 
143. This from now on is a constitutive principle of individual identity; for the 
moral mind, it is endowed with the significance of his becoming. The agent is capable 
of fathoming the accusations of others. He makes himself the grounds for such 
accusations, and is, in this reciprocal mode of thought, capable of anticipating the 
truthfulness of these accusations.  
The anticipatory aspect of guilt is at the same time the consideration of the 
importance of a moral conception, and this becomes the genuine consideration of its 
weight. It is so from an internal perspective, from the point of view of its importance 
to the individual mind. As such, the reciprocal element in guilt is what lights up the 
value of a stable continuity among individuals.  
Guilt overwhelms the individual mind, echoing a future dissociation from both 
others and one’s moral existence. For the virtuous agent, the weight of such a point in 
time in his existence has the significance of self-induced instability. The deliberative 
certainty that arises out of the consideration of an end establishes this moment in time 
as actual self-determination. Knowingly committing a crime is an assertion of the 
non-accidental character of the deed. It offers a sense of difference to when 
unintended consequences arise from an action.  
This is a characteristic experience of self-alienation.  We may represent this as 
the standing over of the agent against the arising of an end in a dispositional form – 
this end issues from him against his moral conception.162 It represents a loss of reality, 
a form of self-conception that bends to the very arising of such an end and leaves the 
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agent incapable of finding that his integrity lies, precisely, in the denial to confer any 
existence to this end.  
There is a describable state of panic that consists in conceiving of the arising 
of such ends as fully exhaustive, as a complete determination of the moral integrity of 
a given individual. This particular anxiety may issue in a particular metaphysical 
outlook of what a person is. And this panic may be lived strictly in the first person – 
‘how am I capable of thinking of this, of wanting this?’  
Hegel characterized this moment as a kind of surrender, a dissolution of 
identity into disposition and sentiment. Of course, the point of such a characterization 
is to criticize what is lost. With this we further develop the moral significance of self-
trivialization in a guise that is outside theological-virtue, but that appeals to the 
metaphysical determination that such religious sentiment morally values.  
 
144. We find at this point that Hegel’s revisionism of this Aristotelian 
problem163 consists in characterizing the issue from within a self-conscious agent. In 
anticipation, there is a discernable fright in the putative conflation of the moral mind 
and a dispositional make-up. Simultaneously, this distinctive moral episode contains 
the evaluation of such a disposition. The postulated disposition, and the ends issuing 
from it, push the agent’s self-conception to a sort of substratum, an inherent principle 
of identity that is responsible for inducing the fright of becoming and doing 
something that lies outside the bounds of one’s active conscious – an impulse.  
But there is a distinctive moral significance in the moment where this 
individual realizes that this fright amounts to a form of self-reduction. Even if the 
conception of a substratum holds true, it does not follow that this individual has 
eliminated taking a stance in the face of the presence of condemnable ends. From the 
realization that he cannot eliminate this stance follows that neither is the presence of 
condemnable ends an exclusive constitutive principle of his identity, nor that the 
presence of these ends are without a trace for his mind. 
Aristotle posed the question of a putative dissociation between how an end 
appeared to the good and the bad person, and also of what was up to both equally. 
This dissociation, if true, cannot but force us to conceive of a relation between the 
voluntary element of virtue and the bad ends that naturally arise from the moral mind; 	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it cannot but force us to account equally for the responsibility of moral action and for 
the responsibility of self-trivialization.  
 
145. It might be argued that it would not have to be in the guise of guilt that 
this problem should be addressed, that it might be conceived merely as a self-imposed 
restriction for an extrinsic consideration. But something is lost with the generalization 
of the bad person.  
As a caricature, the bad person is absolutely oblivious – constitutively so – to 
our description of guilt. And we might wonder what are this person’s conditions of 
intelligibility might look like to us. We might ask if he is even doing bad things. For 
this postulated agent, there is no such thing as fright in his self-apprehension as 
substratum; there is absolutely no intelligibility to the idea of acquisition or 
aspiration.  
A person as a dispositional set is the expression of that very dispositional set, 
not a moral agent. A self-conscious agent is a moral agent, and possibly also a 
religious agent. Just like the religious nominalized agent exists exclusively in an 
unreal tranquility, the dispositional agent exists in unavoidable nature. For self-
conscious moral agents, however, becoming is fraught with failure, and aspiration 
confirmed by achievement –religion is the shape of this moral sentiment, as happiness 
and as sadness. 
Outside a religious idea, the reductive argument about the total conflation of 
persons and dispositional sets induces instability in the concept of responsibility. The 
future directedness of this agent’s actions appears only marginally in its moral aspect. 
His future appears as dispositions to be expressed; his future becomes an anticipated 
future. But can the first personal stance – that is expressed as a personal burden in 
religious thinking – be fully eliminated without eliminating both answerability and 
commitment to responsibility? 
I believe it cannot. Hence my argument cannot trivialize the radicalness of 
human evil, nor be reductive so as to override the nexus between persons and their 
active stance upon their respective futures. I prefer to investigate the generality of 
religious sentiment as an expression of the self-consciousness of morality versus the 
categorical generalization of full-blown vicious amoralists and heroic characters. I 
understand that the generality of human moral existence expressed in religions may 
be rather unfathomable in our time. Therefore, the argument from responsibility 
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should justify the need to further investigate the importance of self-constituting moral 
actions. 
 
 The Function Argument and the morality of Self-consciousness: Becoming as 
anticipated and as action  
146. Both Aristotle and Hegel felt a lack of interest in such a postulated 
amoralist. For Aristotle the concept of an amoralist seems to bypass the very purpose 
of ethics; it sets an unsurpassable limit to any of the moral insights Aristotle can 
present. The amoralist seems to be beyond any limit we can conceive of; his being 
seems to be of a distinct kind. And we do not even have any conceivable grasp of 
what an amoralist would be answerable to. Where Aristotle finds an inborn capacity 
to aim for the good, according to that view, which is a great and fine thing, Hegel 
considers guilt an unavoidable burden of a moral existence – yet both of these 
expressions are grounded on the actuality of self-conscious action. 
 
147. The common ground underlying these different expressions sets forward 
a metaphysical assumption that has appeared to the moral conscious in the form of a 
problematic substratum. In the preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel paraphrases 
Aristotle’s teleology as something that contains an insight about the equivalence 
between reason and purposive activity. His paraphrase makes use of a metaphysical 
vocabulary that is altogether absent from the Ethics (although Hegel’s assumption is 
contained in Aristotle’s concept of acquisition as a condition of the realization of a 
human function).   
Hegel starts his paraphrase by explaining the problematic presence of opposite 
concepts – motion and rest – that appear simultaneously in an explanation of purpose. 
Considering the subject as a fixed point, we can conceive of purpose as already lying 
in him, although at rest. In this sense, what follows (its movement) will be considered 
as anticipated by the postulation of the fixed point. But in this characterization, the 
moving is altogether excluded from being able to contribute to the content – self-
movement as anticipation is distinct from self-movement as actuality.164  
Moral descriptions of persons cannot dispense with the notion of becoming, 
and the value of this becoming cannot be fully rendered as anticipated. As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Phenomenology, §23. 
 202 
anticipation, I am eliminated in favor of an expression that a theorist is trying to 
articulate. As a moral person, I exist as achieving or failing to actualize a moral 
commitment, with the sentiment that attaches to the traces of those achievements or 
failures. The generality of the Aristotelian human function is not, if it is to capture the 
moral existence of persons, a theoretical vantage point capable of ordering, the so 
conceived, expressions of my behavior; expressions that linearly flow from I as 
anticipated – the teleology of the human function contains the idea of the self-
conscious agent who lives for such an end. 
In an account of the human good, Aristotle defines a human function precisely 
as something that requires reason. Since Aristotle severs this concept from the 
requisite of self-conscious activity, if a human function did not require reason, it 
would then render his teleological notion insubstantial as an element of a theory of a 
sharable human good. Hegel’s argument in the Phenomenology is guided by the truth 
of this assumption, by the dangerous immediacy expressed by this type of 
explanation. What we have to appreciate is the need of a moral psychology to explain 
the significance of moving for something similar to us. Aristotle stressed the 
reiterative aspect of habituation precisely involving self-conscious reasoning, and he 
expressed his belief in the putative difficulties of this form of habituation.165 
 
148. We can now reposition this problematic inside the function argument. 
This is not simply to say that the presence of moral psychology in an individual in the 
form of guilt proves that, as an individual, he lays outside of the function argument. 
What we recognize instead is a specifically moral reality in the individual’s that has 
now abandoned a recognized function. It is not the case that he has discovered that he 
is not a person, but that he has acted (or wanted to act) unlike a person.  
No person has the power to metamorphose themselves and therefore to 
abandon their function. Thus no person has the power to acquire a new mind where 
their actions and intentions leave absolutely no trace – Hegel revises the truth of 
Aristotle’s function argument as the reiterative problem of a moral existence. 
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The characterization of a function loses its grip on any individual if its 
operation is impermeable to reflection. For this reason, Aristotle stresses the fact that 
most activities merit study. Technical evolution inside a given activity has important 
differences from the activities guided by virtue, as does the notion of excellence in 
both cases.166 But the stability of their achievement requires a reflective activity. In 
general, the stability of human achievement requires reflection such as the absence of 
indifference, which is the reiterative consideration of one’s actions inside a given 
activity and as what contributes to its existence.  
Aristotle’s argument does not eliminate the tension between a moral 
psychology and a demand of virtue; it simply expresses faith in a link between 
reflective activity and stable existence; it is an expression that makes the virtuous 
agent face whatever may be the effects of habituation and the anxiety of opaqueness.   
 
Self-conceit as distorting the moral significance of one’s actions: My actions 
and You  
 149. Let us return to the idea of a kind of anxiety generated by an impediment 
to the conflation of authenticity and stable moral existence. We now have to consider 
another shape of self-consciousness, namely the frenzy of self-conceit. 
When having to choose between the preservation of his individuality and 
succumbing to an alien form of necessitation, this individual this time chooses to 
assert his individuality as morally valid for simply being and inevitably knowing how 
to be that very individuality; the expression of this state of panic is the problematic 
tautology ‘I am who I am!’ 
Self-conceit is the result of the apprehension of personal conflict within the 
moral psychology of an individual and it pushes this individual to a resolution that 
makes any form of recognition impossible. Authenticity becomes the main concern 
for the individual’s moral existence.   
 
150. As long as his intention has not been evil, his individuality can be 
asserted as a form of authenticity and therefore as a form of morality. This vision is a 
retreat from the nullifying effect of tranquility (the realization that an individual 
cannot be a mere prospective act). But the existence of the individual in this particular 	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state is fraught with the panic of a realization that morality, as constitutive of his 
identity, will be overthrown by the accusations made by another person. 
 The moral psychology of this individual experiences a difficulty in finding a 
place to accommodate thoughts about the alignment of his existence with a shared 
moral outlook on life. He experiences, therefore, the difficulty of reappraising certain 
non-intended effects of intended acts. Hence, this agent regards knowledge of his 
intentions as incompatible with the importance of his intentions for others. This 
disruption removes our ability to consider his actions as having a significance that 
will contrast with his knowledge of his intentions – he cannot learn from others. 
For example, someone who likes to tell jokes may be confronted with the fact 
that his jokes are not funny at all and may even be bothersome. He may feel offended 
and he may resist this by explaining that he never intended to bother anyone: he was 
just being the warm and congenial host he is – a warm and congenial host is who he 
is. An accusation contrary to this threatens his personality as an expectation about a 
change in behavior that he should bring about in himself.   
We apprehend the moral significance of self-conceit in this example. This 
stage of moral conscience does not strictly represent a rejection, but rather 
development from a naturalistic conception of virtue. This individual no longer 
maintains that the possession of a heart is sufficient for morality; his self-assertion is 
the result of when the validity of a general law collapses – he becomes merely 
himself, which is merely what he does and his guilt. 
 When faced with the attribution of a wrong motive to one of his actions, this 
individual resists the elimination of himself by asserting his authentic motive. The 
virtuous agent is expected to resist elimination via false attribution (which is an 
exercise of his right of intention). And there is a moral salience in the difference 
between this form of resistance and the ironic agent who, out of intelligence, 
manipulates the expectation of education in his favor. It is precisely this idea of 
earnest resistance that Hegel wants to preserve in the discussion of self-conceit. 
If his actual actions are to have a revelatory aspect that lies outside the realm 
of his intentions, this individual has to accept that evaluations are for the reappraisal 
of his realized actions.  
So we find in the concluding phase of self-conceit the initial problematic of 
motivation. An individual’s self-conceit has to dissociate itself from an existence with 
others in order to preserve the individual’s authenticity. Others may critique the 
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individual’s motivations, and the effects of the individual’s actions. But these will 
have little relevance for the individual because these critiques cannot integrate into 
the individual’s identity.  
If a person’s moral worth is not naturally granted at the outset, it cannot be 
constituted by realignment; the person’s moral psychology however flawed is after all 
who that person truly is. Such an agent finds himself as isolated as the agent who lives 
for the satisfaction of his own desires. 
But the position the agent finds himself in cannot undo the recognition of 
others, even if this recognition seems to be nothing but a threat – it is too late to 
simply eliminate others. This introduces a different perspective on both intentions and 
the identity of this individual. This agent’s protective stance may degenerate into a 
pretense to eliminate a second person: ‘My actions are not of Your concern’ and ‘You 
cannot threaten Me’. He loses the capacity to reappraise his actions, such as to forego 
repeating a certain action. He is also unable to prospectively intend acts that are 
external to his isolated existence or that have a concern that is not strictly expressive 
of self-interest.  
 
‘I am worried about you’ as a distinctive moral reciprocal attitude – non-
elimination  
151. In this sense, the agent who succumbs to self-conceit is incapable of any 
reciprocal mode of thought. The fear of elimination is found in a moral aspiration for 
authenticity as a desire to maintain an intact vision of one’s self. But this sort of agent 
fails to realize a specific reciprocal attitude that is not a threat to his elimination, 
which is namely concern.  
This may be someone who is concerned with that agent, and does not wish to 
eliminate his particular individuality. Concern consists in a form of appraisal of the 
actions of another person that relies on their intelligibility and issues from the putative 
explanations of this very agent – concern is constitutively reciprocal.  
What is fallible about concern is its possible non-application, such as the 
possibility of a misguided advice. The agent who succumbs to self-conceit can hardly 
appreciate the concern others might have for his actions; concern as worry would 
have to assume the guise of a threat. In this isolation, the agent realizes his 
particularity as issuing from him, but deprives himself of recognition.  
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For Hegel, this becomes the moral issue of understanding a fundamental 
aspect of a moral mind: recognition cannot abstract from the connection between 
consciousness of one’s actions and what these actions mean to others. For example, in 
the case of concern, what we may find (such as in the form of an advice) is the 
supplementation of the knowledge of one’s action with something that is crucial for a 
complete picture of the significance of this very action; this may be information about 
an unintended consequence of this action, or the suggestion of a better way or that one 
should forego doing something altogether.  
When someone worries about another person, the worrying is directed at this 
person. And the direction of moral concern may reveal a limit to the person who 
worries. It may become apparent that one’s advice is misguided, or that one lacks the 
power to help. Concern survives then as the hope that the other person will find a way 
of doing the right thing for herself or, for example, that the person will pass an exam – 
these are reciprocal attitudes that are strictly not eliminativistic.  
 
152. The attitude of worrying necessarily attaches value to acknowledging the 
existence of another and to the appropriateness of a choice made by another, but it 
also expresses a sentiment about how inadequate a certain attitude might be for the 
agent himself. The expression I am worried about You expresses this cluster of 
concerns in a non-eliminativist way, and there is a distinct moral worth that survives 
even its fallibility; there is such a thing as worrying too much over nothing.  
Self-conceit implies a form of isolation that holds moral significance insofar 
as this agent is capable of dignifying all of his actions as irreducible authentic 
expressions of his character. But once we consider a putative agent who holds this 
attitude, but lacks this sort of isolation, we find significant friction. Consider, for 
example, the following case: Someone who asks another person to stop trying to do a 
particular action and says: “Well I am only trying to help you, that is what I am 
doing.” In reply, the other person says: “Well, I understand that, so stop helping me 
then!”  
The agent who holds the attitude of self-conceit towards his actions cannot 
appraise his actions as possessing a reality that is beyond what he intended. He has to 
eschew the description of the other person. But can he genuinely be said to worry 
about the other person if he considers her statements in reply as irrelevant, if he 
refuses to reconsider his earnest concern as harmful?  
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There are specific moral problems that result from reciprocal attitudes. These 
problems require the circumstantial intelligence Aristotle thought was part of a 
definition of virtue.  
Hegel recognizes this sort of practical necessity as an element of a conception 
of practical reasoning:  
 
Now, the judging consciousness does not stop short at the former aspect of 
duty, at the doer’s knowledge of it, that this is his duty, and at the fact that the 
doer knows it to be his duty, the condition and status of his reality. On the 
contrary, it holds to the other aspect, looks at what the action is in itself, and 
explains it as resulting from an intention different from the action itself, and 
from selfish motives.167 
 
The moral precept is explained, as Hegel puts it, by the judging consciousness. 
The agent who holds an attitude of self-conceit would be horrified at the idea that it 
was out of selfishness that he tried to hold on to his reality. But Hegel points out the 
realization made by a moral consciousness that understands the declaration of its self-
sentiment to be second to the effectiveness of genuine moral action.  
This sort of self-explanation of an action rescues this agent from the threat of 
isolation. In this sense, there is a connection between individual practical reflection 
and practical reasoning in Hegel’s argument. There is a connection that has to be 
explained by the agent himself, between his future actions and moral apprehension in 
situations of conflict.  
To worry about someone is a distinctive reciprocal attitude in the sense that it 
cannot ignore the actual effects particular actions have – to apprehend that the effects 
of my actions are not independent of their effects on others. And this lays the 
groundwork for the notion of personal dignity.  
 
153. Self-conceit panics at the actual dissociation between individual moral 
consciousness and the actual world – as if the world had revealed itself to betray its 
own dignity. But this reveals to the agent that virtue requires more than the individual 
importance of one’s acts.  
Part of the humiliation of self-conceit relies in the recognition that one does 
not cease to be checked by others with respect to the significance of one’s actions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Phenomenology of Spirit, §665. 
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This person realizes that he is not impermeable to what specifically results from his 
existence along with others and how this particular mode of existence makes demands 
on him. 
The return of faith from alienation is analogous to the return of the confessor. 
And in each case, the humiliation suffered is essential to the constitution of individual 
identity.  
The undisturbed, individual moral existence faith initially conceives has to 
apprehend its self-constituting power as completely independent of a world and 
others. This individual conception is a form of alienated existence; it generates a 
world where it does not exist as a happening, but as a purely unimpeded prospect.  
This return implies the reconciliation of real existence and aspiration. To feel 
humiliation is a result of an existence that is conceived as being-for-others and not 
merely for oneself.  
 
Reassurance and Reiteration 
154. To establish continuity with other members of one’s political community 
is a form of reassurance and is the culmination of the Hegelian political argument. 
This form of reassurance does not exclude non-exemplar members; it is not a form of 
moral perfectionism.  
It is rather the presentation of a form of revelation about freedom and equality. 
Far from reducing the understanding of the concept of freedom to I could have done 
otherwise, the continuous existence with others during a particular time implies a 
particular mode of existence.  
 
155. Reassurance is the self-conscious reflection on the actual values of 
communal life. The confessional relation contains the reiterative aspect that interests 
Hegel in the constitution of a Sittlichkeit. Since we are now addressing the thought 
that communal life is bound to encounter limits in the form of conflict and in 
acknowledgment of  its particular history that contained the use violence as power. 
Faith in the possibility of a genuinely expressive Sittlickeit is very different 
from reverence for a set of self-contained political ideas that are presented as justified. 
The contrast between a problematic present and the optimism for a bright future is 
qualified in the Hegelian philosophy of history. The future faith aspires to is not 
purely anticipated future, in the same sense that moral agents are not anticipated 
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persons. Faith has to survive within the historical situation that is occupied by actual 
persons. Within history, faith can be both threatened by the false justifications of the 
way of the world or the moral conflict within political communities and amongst 
different political communities.  
This is the final positive realization of faith: the removal of the accusation of 
dissemblance. Faith is capable of distinct action; it has pulled itself out of an 
aspiration for a condition of pureness it cannot achieve and it has been forced to 
recognize in the confessor the discernable moral problematic of its aspiration for 
perfection – Faith no longer retreats into unhappy consciousness in order to sustain its 
exemplar imitation.  
 
156. The investigation of the idea of men, so conceived, reveals that the 
reiterative character of a conception of how one should live that contains actual 
agents. Hegel argues that the confessor exhibits the self-conscious desire to return to a 
community by finding the measure of his action in a sharable conception of how one 
should live.  
This particular gesture represents the desire for recognition. To remove the 
Hard Heart is the final acceptance of mankind’s imperfection, although not simply as 
an element of an empirical limited mankind. Rather, the Hard Heart is seen as a 
genuine impediment, correlated with the fact that self-alienation implies alienation 
from one’s communal existence.  
In the act of refusing recognition, what becomes apparent is not merely the 
moral dignity the Hard Heart exhibits – a form of, indeed, of justified intransigence – 
but also the immediate frustration of genuine reconciliation. The religious attitude of 
the act of forgiveness consists in the recognition that the dignity of mankind lies 
beyond a consideration of utility or a general appeal to reasonableness.  
 
157. Conflict within a community often assumes a historical turning point for 
that community, like a communal form of from now on. For example the situation of 
war, where there is a demand for aligning an individual’s action with the service of 
protecting a community. In this particular situation, an individual may experience 
alienation from his community; he may experience his community as being the reason 
that he risks his life and what potentially puts an end to his life. In the moral 
psychology of this individual, these thoughts would figure to him as dissociative 
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thoughts, as a retreat into his individual existence or as fear of an unacceptable limit 
to his individual existence.  
Sacrifice appears in the Hegelian moral vocabulary as a particular 
phenomenon of the idea of men. The decision to embrace the non-dissociation from 
one’s community is inconceivable without a particular individual cost. The morality 
of a given situation relies precisely on the evaluation of given actions in the face of 
intelligible individual threat. To go to war does not exemplify a contribution of the 
agent to his individual outlook on life; strictly speaking, it lies at a problematic limit 
of this conception and it putatively represents the end of the agent’s life.  
This extreme form of demand gives us part of the sense of reassurance, insofar 
as the notion of sacrifice does not remove the problematic relation of the agent with 
the action that is demanded of him. But we may suppose that this demand would be 
absolutely unbearable if we did not conceive of this form of reassurance as 
representing faith in the survival of one’s community, as meeting one’s sense of 
justice, as something worth saving. If there is a genuine difference between risking 
one’s life because… and being made to risk one’s life, there is enough space to 
discern these distinct attitudes in relation to one’s community in spite of the presence 
of individual fear.  
At this point, the argument seems to introduce a demand for a return attached 
to one’s allegiance. But how can we conceive of this demand otherwise considering 
the self-image of men we have put forward? Can we simply remove the critical 
relation individuals have with their community? Can we simply suppose that 
communal life is completely exempt from the accusation that it can induce alienation?  
 
158. Rousseau thought that it was far more admirable to go to war and 
promise to return as a conqueror than to simply swear to conquer or die.168 What is 
condemnable about the last attitude is not only its lack of confidence and tactical 
value, but also the presence of one as an individual in that very thought.  
This presence implies one’s frailty when facing the given situation. The task to 
return as a conqueror does not override this sense of one’s individual existence, nor 
does the relation of particular individuals to their actions even when done for a 
community. In Rousseau’s suggestion, the individual who exclusively swears to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Social Contract, p. 184. 
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conquer, to transcend their own individuality in thought, becomes the embodiment of 
their nation’s purpose.  
Rousseau seems to be appealing to a justification of communal activity that 
transcends anything that could figure as an item of a recognizable moral psychology  
(recognizable to any of us, that is).  
Rousseauian soldiers have no second guesses about the motives of their 
actions, no fear, and no opinions about the motives of their nations: they have no 
conscience at all. They are an example of unrestricted identification with a necessity 
of their nation, which is a necessity impermeable to justification. They have 
obliterated themselves altogether in favor of a pure collective act.  
This, in turn, wipes out any threat of alienation. I am suggesting that a political 
theory incapable of capturing the concept of alienation is also incapable of aspiring to 
the allegiance of its members. The ideal Rousseauian soldier, like the ideal Bolshevik 
revolutionary, does not conceive of the threat of alienation; or alternatively, its 
alienation does not represent a moral problem for him. The situation of war does, 
however, represent a special case for the study of morality. The thought of 
unconditional allegiance Rousseau aspires to demands a unilateral view of history. It 
sees history as nothing but the coming to be of one particular nation under one 
particular political conception. As such, war, be it civil or amongst nations, exercises 
freedom negatively and absolutely by overriding the historical sense of both property 
and individual – property and persons become obstacles to a particular idea. 169  
Abrasive perfectionism represents the complete absence of reconciliation: the 
degeneration of absolute freedom into terror.  
 
 Terror as detachment from the constitutive history of a community  
 159. Terror is the exemplification of reverence for nothing more than a 
particular political idea that is to be realized. When the unifying measure of aspiration 
established by faith (its realized self-image) is absent, it creates a faction that claims 
to be in possession of an imperative that is beyond recognition. 
Terror is the realization of immoral actions for a just cause. The idea of 
equality becomes a form of annihilation of the opposite faction. Obviously, the idea of 
reconciliation is immediately frustrated. But the point of Hegel’s analysis is to show 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169  Phenomenology, §475. 
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the genuine possibility of a misinterpretation of the concept of power: political terror 
carries out the equivalence between an act of freedom and truth without restrictions.  
At this stage, Hegel is careful in his interpretation of this phenomenon: 
absolute freedom, as in the generation of terror, belongs to a conception of freedom 
that is purely prospective. It does not take into consideration the dignity of individuals 
who protected the former form of life, the previous mode of existence that has now 
self-consciously realized a limitation – it ignores its own history. 
 
160. The idea of forgiveness appears here as a central concept for the genuine 
possibility of co-existence in a future form of life. Of course, we are far from the 
interpersonal model of confession. But the association between the content of faith, 
derived from the real existing world, and the pure will of freedom, come together for 
individuals who are able to understand their autonomy not only in the service of a 
future mode of life, but also as a form of responsibility for the recognition of each 
other.170  
In this sense, the Hegelian analysis of terror is both the moral apprehension of 
a violent tendency when humans reconsider their self-image and the insight that this 
very apprehension implies a particular moral demand. The assertive aspect of a 
faction simply constitutes allegiance to the new principles put forward as the measure 
of recognition: people are reduced to mere obstacles to the realization of an archetype; 
only those who believe are recognized.  
The important precept is at this stage the reconciliation that involves 
forgiveness as an expression of Faith in the possibility of a genuinely just political 
community that does not ignore the history of its constitution. What starts out, in the 
Phenomenology, as an argument regarding the interpretation of the complexity of a 
moral psychology (the constitution of the idea of men), becomes the rehabilitation of 
hope as a social virtue.171 
This rehabilitation presupposes the benefits of the exercise of such virtue for 
the wellbeing of a political community. Forgiveness within a political community is a 
form of apprehending its history. It actualizes a form of cognition that a faction 
eliminates. Resentment may persist, and there may be categorical political 
divergences within a political community. But hope and forgiveness, as well as a form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170  Phenomenology, §595. 
171 Marxism and Christianity, p.116. 
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of non-perfectionist recognition, are virtues that, if in complete absence, destroy any 
political community from within. 
The dignity of humans has to be apprehended as the history of realized 
morality, and the history of political modes of life. The idea that the revolution of the 
nineteenth-century should derive its poetry from the future does not imply a 
justification of terror.  
 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
161. I trust those who worry about me, I trust those who forgive me. Only 
those who have understood the danger of indifference, who have come to understand 
their dependence on others, can utter this. But I do not write this from the absence of 
indifference, on the contrary, I write this in the face of indifference.  
We do recognize in human history both the mourning of power and the 
occasional witnessing of forgiveness. History does bear witness to our indifference to 
a human vocation, a vocation we at times intuit, but do not always act on. It is still a 
condemnation to be born in certain parts of the world as it is to be born to a certain 
class or creed. Tyrannies are still built on resentment, wealth is still built on 
indifference towards its evident devastation and democratic progress is still impaired 
by the lack of respect towards other’s beliefs. Indifference is, perhaps, the last 
resource of power to protect itself from the accusations that are due to it. 
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